

GENERAL WASHINGTON



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EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON

GENERAL WASHINGTON

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George Washington

GREAT COMMANDERS



GENERAL WASHINGTON

BY

GENERAL BRADLEY T. JOHNSON



NEW YORK
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

1894

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I DEDICATE THIS BIOGRAPHY TO MY GRANDSON,
BRADLEY TYLER JOHNSON, JR.,
AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THOSE ENDLESS GENERATIONS
WHO WILL LOVE GOD AND DUTY,
HONOR AND LIBERTY, COUNTRY AND RIGHT,
AND BE PROMPT TO STAKE LIFE AND FORTUNE FOR THEM,
PERPETUATING, AND TRANSMITTING, TO THE REMOTEST TIME,
THAT AMERICANISM, OF WHICH WASHINGTON
WAS THE GREATEST EXEMPLAR AND ILLUSTRATION.

B. T. J.

PREFACE.

WHEN I was invited to prepare this biography for the Great Commanders Series the duty was accepted with unaffected diffidence. There are about five hundred biographies of George Washington, original and translations, published in almost every language of modern times, as well as Greek and Latin versions of them. It was therefore reasonably clear that no new facts could be educed to throw light on his career or his character. This biography is believed to be the first attempt to consider the military character of Washington and to write his life as a soldier. There have been three distinct eras in Washington-olatry.

The generation which fought the Revolution, framed and adopted the Constitution, and established the United States were impressed with the most profound veneration, the most devoted affection, the most absolute idolatry for the hero, sage, statesman. In the reaction that came in the next generation against "the old soldiers," who for thirty years had assumed all the honors and enjoyed all the fruits of the victory that they had won, accelerated by the division in American sentiment for or against the French Revolution, it came to be felt, as the younger

generation always will feel, that the achievements of the veterans had been greatly overrated and their demigod enormously exaggerated. They thought, as English Harry did at Agincourt, that "Old men forget: yet all shall be forgot, but they'll remember with advantages what feats they did that day."

The fierce attacks of the Jeffersonian Democracy on Washington, his principles, his life, and his habits, exercised a potent influence in diminishing the general respect for his abilities felt by the preceding generation; and Washington came to be regarded as a worthy, honest, well-meaning gentleman, but with no capacity for military and only mediocre ability in civil affairs. This estimate continued from the beginning of Jefferson's administration to the first of Grant's. Neither Marshall nor Irving did much during that period to place him in a proper historical light. The official and judicial statement of the case by Chief-Justice Marshall never reached the popular ear, and the laudatory style of Washington Irving did not impress the popular conviction.

But in the last twenty-five years there has been a steady drift toward giving Washington his proper place in history and his appropriate appreciation as soldier and statesman. The general who never won a battle is now understood to have been the Revolution itself, and one of the great generals of history. The statesman who never made a motion, nor devised a measure, nor constructed a proposition in the convention of which he was president, is appreciated as the spirit, the energy, the force, the wisdom which initiated, organized, and directed the formation of the Constitution of the United States and the Union by, through, and under it; and therefore it seems

now possible to present him as the Virginian soldier, gentleman, and planter, as a man, the evolution of the society of which he formed a part, representative of his epoch, and his surroundings, developed by circumstances into the greatest character of all time—the first and most illustrious of Americans.

The appreciation of Washington among other nations has steadily increased. General Wilson, the editor of this Series, in an address before the New York Society of the Order of the Cincinnati, at their annual dinner at Delmonico's, February 22, 1894, said: "When first a visitor to the princely estate of Strathfieldsaye, England, presented by the British Government to Wellington for a day's work at Waterloo, I was surprised, and also greatly gratified, to see a portrait of Washington, by Stuart, occupying the place of honor in the Duke's drawing-room. In answer to my look of inquiry, his eldest son, the second Duke, remarked, 'It was placed there by my father, who esteemed Washington as perhaps the purest and the noblest character of modern times—possibly of all time—and, considering the material of the armies with which he successfully met the trained and veteran soldiers of the Old World, fairly entitled to a place among the Great Captains of the eighteenth century.' This opinion of Washington, entertained by the conqueror of Napoleon, has never, so far as I am aware, been made public before. I may be permitted to add, on the same authority, that when asked to take command of the troops ordered to New Orleans in 1814, the Great Duke declined to fight against Washington's countrymen. His brother-in-law, Sir Edward Pakenham, was therefore sent with Wellington's well-seasoned peninsular veterans,

who had successfully driven the French armies from Spain, and fell, as all the world knows, in the most disastrous defeat ever sustained by a British army."

I am indebted for constant courtesy, advice, and suggestion to General Wilson, Mr. Ainsworth R. Spofford, Librarian of the National Library, Colonel John Scott, and General William H. Payne, of Warrenton, Va., whose relation to historic Virginian families, and whose wide and generous culture and friendship have given me much pleasure and great assistance, and to the work of Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator in Congress from Massachusetts, whose *George Washington* is the most vigorous, most graphic, and most just account and description yet published of his and my subject.

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GENERAL WASHINGTON.

CHAPTER I.

THE WASHINGTONS OF VIRGINIA.

GREAT industry, enthusiasm, and sentiment have been expended in tracing the genealogy of George Washington, Colonel of Virginia Militia, Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, first President of the United States, and greatest of all Americans.

Ancestor worship seems to concentrate in intensity as it ceases to be general; and as soon as an individual emerges above the mass, and distinguishes himself by achievement in action, admirers seek to connect him with a distant and illustrious past, through ancestors who have equaled or surpassed their descendant in fame.

So, as soon as the independence of the United States was achieved, industrious genealogists and ardent admirers, both in America and in England, set to work to explore all the hereditary sources from which the great character displayed by the leader of the Revolution had been derived. The pedigree of the Virginian Washingtons has been traced back to Odin, or to De Hertburn, who came into England on the Norman raid, and held on to a few manors, prize of his sword and his spear.

These mythical genealogies are based more on enthusiasm than on proof, and on faith rather than on facts. It is a very difficult matter to connect an emigrant who left a certain place in England, about a certain year, with an immigrant of the same name who appeared in America some months or years afterward, unless there exist contemporaneous proofs of their identity.

Identity of name is no proof, while it tends to show a probable connection. We shall therefore content ourselves with the facts about the Virginian Washingtons, and discard the myths and fables. Within the last year evidence has been discovered which establishes beyond doubt who John Washington, the emigrant to Virginia, was, from what part of England he came, and at what time he landed in Virginia. Records of Westmoreland County, lost ever since the Revolution of 1775-'83, have lately been discovered, deciphered, and disclosed, which identify John Washington beyond a doubt. He was major of the militia of Westmoreland on April 4, 1655, during the Commonwealth Government. His deposition, dated 1674, states that he was then forty-five years of age. He was therefore born in 1629, and in 1655, when he was commissioned major, he was twenty-six years old; which proves that he was a gentleman of consideration and proper political sympathies in the Dominion of Virginia.

He returned to England, and in 1656 was engaged by Mr. Edward Prescott to come over from England to Dunkirk (or Dantzic) and join Prescott in a trading venture in the North Sea, and to America, Prescott supplying ship and venture, and Washington to act as supercargo and first mate, and to share the

profits equally. He accepted Prescott's proposition, went to Dunkirk or Dantzic, Lübeck, Copenhagen, and Elsinore, selling tobacco, which appears to have been the cargo, and with the proceeds purchased goods for the outgoing voyage. They arrived in the Potomac early in 1657, and, having fallen out during the voyage, Washington tried to secure a settlement from Prescott of his share of the partnership in the trading operation.

Prescott did not deny Washington's claim, but one Sunday he set sail, and took himself out of the reach of the law or the reclamations of his first mate; whereupon the creditor began a suit by way of attachment in the court of Westmoreland County, and proceeded to take depositions to establish the facts, which depositions were duly recorded among the archives, and furnish us now the only authentic information we have of the first Virginian Washington. He was a cavalier in political affinities, or he would not have been commissioned major in 1655; or he may not have had any pronounced sympathy with either side, and the Government of Virginia may have selected him for that reason. He returned to England that same year or the next, and came out with Prescott in 1657 and straightway married.

In the following year he complained to the Governor and Council of Maryland that Edward Prescott, his quondam, fraudulent, and fugitive partner, had, during the voyage in the preceding year, been accessory to the murder of a poor old woman by permitting her to be tried for witchcraft. The trial consisted in throwing her overboard. If she floated, she would have been proved to be a witch; if she sank, her innocence would be demonstrated. She

naturally was drowned, and Major Washington protested that that was an outrage not to be endured. What his opinion of Prescott would have been if he had settled fairly he does not say, but we may imagine he would have had a much more tolerant feeling about the witch trial. There has always been a great deal of human nature in the Washington blood! The Maryland authorities, having taken the matter into consideration, ordered Mr. Prescott to attend them, and notified Major Washington to bring his witnesses with him to prove his charge.

The Virginian gentleman, whose traits neither time nor circumstance have changed, found pleasure a duty, and informed the Maryland Governor and Council that he was just about to celebrate the baptism of his eldest child, that the day was named, "the gossips bid," and that he could not break such an engagement for a mere witch prosecution over on the other side of the Potomac. He said he would come at a more convenient and comfortable season. The Marylanders dismissed Mr. Prescott, and bothered themselves no further about the matter.

It is reasonable to infer that at the time when the constituted authorities at home under Sir Matthew Hale, and their co-religionists in New England, were denouncing the crime of witchcraft and punishing witches, the new government of Maryland, recently established under the authority of the Commonwealth, should have hesitated and refused to antagonize in action and sentiment the powers that controlled "the State of England."

John Washington was chosen vestryman of Appomattox Parish, July 3, 1661, and was commissioned justice for Westmoreland, June 24, 1662. He was a

member of the House of Burgesses for Westmoreland from 1666 to 1677. He was colonel commanding the militia, the armed *posse comitatus* of Westmoreland County, and the responsibilities and labor of the position were incessant and severe.

The militia were the conservators of the peace and the wardens of the border. The settlements on the south side of the Potomac only extended a short distance beyond the bay, as they did also on the north side, for the Virginian and Marylander marched side by side, up the great river to the conquest of the pathless forest that extended from the falls of the Rappahannock and of the Potomac to the Pacific Ocean. The open highway of the river gave them easy means of constant intercourse for pleasure or for business.

When, therefore, news came, in the summer of 1675, that the "naked Indians were in the woods" and had killed a man in Stafford, the country rose. There was riding in hot haste from house to house on both sides of the river. Colonel Washington and Major Allerton drove the Indians from cover to cover, and forced them over the water. The Marylanders under Major Truman closed in on them, and the combined forces surrounded them in a fort at Piscataway, on the border of Charles County, in Maryland, not far from the present line of the District of Columbia. The Indians defended themselves with vigor, until at last a parley was held, under which five of the principal chiefs of the Susquehannas came out to discuss terms of peace, or surrender, when they were promptly put to death.

The Indians escaped from their fort, recrossed into Virginia, and revenged themselves a hundredfold for the loss of their leaders, for they sacked

every homestead on the frontier from the Potomac to the James. They were the moving cause of Bacon's rebellion, when Bacon roused the householders of Virginia first to defend themselves against the Indians, and next to march on Jamestown and extort necessary reforms from Sir William Berkeley, the high-tempered, generous, stupid cavalier Governor of the dominion.

There is some doubt about who was responsible for these killings. It is difficult now to get the point of view from which the frontiersmen and the original settlers regarded the Indian. He was an infidel, a savage, a wild beast. He had no soul. It was not only lawful but it was meritorious to kill him on sight, just as they would a panther or a rattlesnake. If you did not kill him, he would kill you, and therefore the thing to do was to strike first, and strike hardest. No faith was conceivable with animals, and therefore no truce was to be observed. The Marylanders had always been more punctilious about killing Indians—a policy impressed on them by the Jesuit influence under which their colony had been planted. But it had been policy alone, not humanity, that directed their action. Peace was more favorable to the growth and security of the young colony, and the policy of peace would render land more easily acquired and draw more adventurers to St. Mary's. They started with the purchase of an Indian town from the emperor of the tribe, and they acquired by willing conveyance from the natives such territory as they required for settlement, for cultivation, for hunting, and for protection.

No Indian massacre ever wiped out the infant settlements on tide water, on the Potomac, in blood

and ashes, as had happened on the James; and no devastating war had ever ravaged the border, and driven women and children back to the older settlements. Therefore the murder of the five chiefs at Piscataway roused the indignation of the Marylanders; and their General Assembly, acting as the Grand Inquest for the colony, examined into the circumstances and denounced the whole affair as brutal and barbarous. The depositions of witnesses are spread out in full on the records; they state explicitly that Colonel Washington refused to permit further talk, and ordered the five "to be knocked on the head," which was done at once. The lower House proposed to punish Major Truman, but the Governor and Council refused to assent to such action, and the matter was dropped.

In Virginia it was not considered in such a serious light. Sir William Berkeley ordered an investigation, and the depositions of the witnesses taken at the time under his orders are to be seen among the records of Westmoreland. They state distinctly that Colonel John Washington did not order the Indians to be killed, but that Major Truman took possession and control of them, and killed them. But this glimpse of the Washington nature in the great grandfather of George is much more vivid than the dim visions of De Hertburns and Wessington, conjured up by sentimental imaginations of admirers and worshipers.

The Virginian Washingtons were strong, hardy, manly people—hard riders, hard fighters, men of action, meeting and dealing with the responsibilities of life in a straightforward, positive, clear-headed way, without the least sentiment of any kind about

the hardships of life. Life was a fact. It required nerve, courage, fortitude, fidelity, to meet its trials on the frontier, and the English in Virginia transplanted the highest hereditary traits to the new conditions, and, in the environment of forest and savage, subdued Nature and man. They lived over again many of the circumstances which had developed nerve and muscle, for a thousand years, in struggle with the North Sea, and with Celt and Saxon, Goth and Northman.

It has been the fashion of these latter generations to designate the race which settled the Atlantic seaboard of America under English charters as the Anglo-Saxon. This is a curious error, for nothing is more certain than that the English adventurers, from Raleigh down, were in the main of Norman blood. Compare the portraits in Lodge's Gallery of British Worthies—which display the leaders of thought and action at the time of the settlement, and they show a race of long-headed, lean-faced, strong cheek-boned men—with the portraits in Brown's *Genesis of America*, of the Americans of the Revolution, and the remarkable likeness at once appears. The same gravity, the same contour of face and head, appear in the era of Coke and Raleigh as in that of George Mason, of Gunston, and George Washington, of Mount Vernon; and a visitor to any of the courts of the old counties of Virginia will see to-day on court day the same grave deportment, the same reserved carriage, the same courteous intercourse, as was exhibited by their ancestors of six generations ago; and the characteristics, physical and moral, of person and manners were and are Norman, and not Saxon.

The British race that has been created by the

Union there, by trade, by industrialism, has become more and more Saxon in its characteristics; but the people who settled Virginia, and have held it ever since, are the best specimens who now exist of the breed who roved the Spanish main under Hawkins and Blake, who with Raleigh sought El Dorado, and under Captain John Smith explored the Chesapeake, or who fought the Grand Armada under Lord Howard, of Effingham, and won for mankind the freedom of the seas.

The Washingtons, like their neighbors, addressed themselves to the duties of life with severe simplicity. The immigrant soon after his arrival married Anne Pope, daughter of Colonel Nathanael Pope; was a thrifty, energetic, public-spirited man; was colonel of the militia, vestryman of his parish, member of the House of Burgesses. Land then could be had for the asking, and it only required the courage and energy to examine it to select and locate the best. Before his death, in 1677, John Washington acquired large possessions and numerous servants, with horses and horned cattle and swine, and all the wealth of a new country. By Anne Pope he had Lawrence, John, and Anne Washington. His son Lawrence married Mildred Warner, by whom he had John, Augustine, and Mildred Washington. Augustine (pronounced Austin) Washington first married Jane Butler, who died in 1728, leaving two sons, Lawrence and Augustine. Augustine then married Mary Ball, of a well-known and established Westmoreland family.

The Balls were people of position and comfortable fortune, and Mary Ball's education was such as was appropriate to her station in life and to the

times in which she lived. Her father, whose estate was Epping Forest, engaged a tutor for his young family of boys and girls, who under his instruction acquired the arts of reading, writing, and ciphering. In the daily intercourse with their own family, and with their neighbors, they learned to love God and honor the king, to speak the truth, and be respectful to their betters and seniors, rendering to their parents affection and respect absolutely without limit.

In due time Mary Ball was introduced to the vice-regal court at Williamsburgh, where she observed and was instructed in and imitated the "mode" of the great world, and learned how to enter a room and how to leave it, how to make her courtesy, and how to manage her train and her fan. She made an impression on society as a beauty, as contemporary letters show, and after her "fling" of a season she returned, happy and contented, to her country home to take up her life as the wife of some honest Virginian colonel, to become the mother of his children and the manager of his servants, his estates, and of himself, as has always been the custom there, and to live serene, happy, and contented in that state of life into which it should please God to call her. Fulfilling her destiny, she married the widower Augustine Washington with his two sons, and bore him four sons and two daughters.

The eldest, George, was born at Bridge's Creek, in Westmoreland, on February 11, O. S., 1732; February 22, N. S. Three years after this event the house was burned, and Augustine Washington moved his family to another house and plantation in Stafford, on the north side of the Rappahannock, opposite the village of Fredericksburg. Here he died, in 1743,

leaving a large landed estate, stocked with servants and cattle, and this large family to the care of the young widow.

Much effusion has been expended over the wonderful traits of "Mary, the mother of Washington"; and her sagacity, her influence in forming character, her example in the way of method, order, and frugality, have been greatly exploited as having exerted a prodigious influence on the career of her illustrious son. But it is fair to say that Mary Washington was only a fair example of hundreds of Virginian widows, who, before and since her time, deprived of the support of a husband, have deliberately, seriously, and voluntarily dedicated their lives to the training of their children, and the preservation of their estates, committed to them by the devotion, the respect, and the intelligence of the father and husband who had gone. Such instances of self-sacrifice are usual in that society, and the example forms strong characters, brave and good men and women. Mary Washington was left in charge of several plantations, many servants, the two stepsons, Lawrence and Augustine, and her own children, George, Samuel, John Augustine, Charles, and Betty; another daughter, Mildred, having died in infancy.

Augustine Washington, after his marriage, had paid a visit to England with his wife, which has led to a tradition that his eldest son George was born near London. But it is certain that he was born in Westmoreland County, Virginia. By the will of Augustine his large landed estate was equitably divided between his children of the first and second marriage alike. To Lawrence he left the estate on Hunting Creek, in Fairfax County—afterward named,

by Lawrence, Mount Vernon, in honor of his old commander, Admiral Vernon—and to George the place on the Rappahannock. Mrs. Washington was made guardian of her own children, with control and management of their property until they became of age. She purchased a small one-story, three-roomed house in Fredericksburg, and moved from the plantation into the town. But she managed all her affairs herself; she did precisely what every lady in her station did then in that society, and does now.

Mrs. Washington had a large family of children, for her servants were her children, next to her real children. She watched them, guided them, controlled them, trained them in manners and in morals, in ideas and in faith, day and night, morning and evening. In due season the geese were to be plucked to provide for pillows and beds, the hens and turkeys to be set, the sheep to be sheared, the wool to be washed, carded, spun, and woven, the hides to be saved and tanned, the winter shoes to be made and socks to be knit, and clothes to be issued; and with this, the daily care of the plantation and the house, the weighing out of the "allowance" to each family, the examination as to the cleanliness of the persons and the houses of the "family." This was part of the domestic police, and every part and detail was executed under the direct eye of the mistress. In the garden and on the plantation the same method of personal superintendence was applied. The head gardener and the overseer every morning came to "the house" for "orders," and the mistress gave minute directions as to everything that was to be done by them during the day. And after the details of domestic housekeeping were through in the morning,

she would make a tour of inspection over the garden, and then mount a one-horse stick gig and cross the Rappahannock by the ferry, and see everything on the plantation. Such a life requires energy, intelligence, perseverance; it begets methods of order, frugality, and exactness; and with the constant example before his eyes, at home and everywhere he went, among his relations and friends, the boy Washington must have acquired habits which accompanied and controlled him all his life.

There were no schools, but Mrs. Washington understood perfectly the value of education to a young gentleman. Many young men of the neighborhood, her own brother Joseph Ball among them, had been sent "home" for education. Oxford was full of Virginians; Fitzhugh, Robinson, Randolph, Burwell, Wormly, and many others were represented there, and at the University of Edinburgh. It was impossible, with the limited means of the Washingtons, to send them home for education. Lawrence Washington had been sent home by his father for that purpose, and that was as much as was reasonable; the rest of the boys had to take their chances. So George was put in charge of William Hobby, an old fellow of the neighborhood, sexton and school-teacher.

It does not at all follow that because Hobby was a sexton that he might not also have been an M. A. of Oxford, or a gentleman by birth. After the rising of 1745 in England the adherents of the Stuarts were exported by the hundred to Virginia and sold at public vendue. A groom of the chambers, or a maid of honor, would get at court a grant of fifty or a hundred prisoners, captured by the Duke of Cumberland, and crammed into the jails of the northern

counties, where typhus and smallpox destroyed them by the score; and gifts of prisoners were negotiable property, a kind of sight draft directed to any jailer or sheriff in the kingdom, and were sold at a market price. So old Hobby may have been a gentleman although he was a sexton, and may have been a university man though he did keep an old field school. Hobby taught the three Rs, and George learned to write a good, legible hand, which must have been learned at that time, and which was not taught by an illiterate man.

When George was seven or eight years old, Lawrence returned from England a well-set-up, educated gentleman, and one of the finest traits of his character was the affection and interest he at once took in the little stepbrother. He felt what a difference there would be between his life and that of the unkempt country lad who followed him around with admiring eyes and affectionate docility. Big brother Lawrence was the hero of George's youth. Lawrence, with many young Virginians of quality, volunteered for the expedition under Admiral Vernon against the hated Papist and Spaniard in the West Indies, and was present and helped at the capture of Carthage. In due time Lawrence returned with the approbation of his commanding officer and the applause of his comrades, and the boy followed him around, fearful to lose one word of the wonderful story of hairbreadth escapes by flood and field. As the boy grew older he needed better instruction and training than Hobby could give him, and he was sent to his half-brother Augustine's, on Bridge Creek, in Westmoreland, to get the advantage of a neighborhood school kept by Thomas Williams.

When George was thirteen years of age, he did the things and developed the traits usual in a Virginia country boy of his age and period. A lad in that society rides a horse from the time he is five years old, and has a horse of his own, which he uses at his pleasure. He catches him at pasture, saddles and bridles him, and rides him everywhere—to the neighbors, on an errand for his mother, to borrow some sugar, for his father, to take back a bridle, to church on Sunday, to school on week days. By the time a boy is thirteen his horse becomes part of himself as much as his clothes, and he would as readily appear in public without one as without the other. In the country, boys find amusement and pleasure in the expenditure of the energy of youth and health. They run races, they wrestle, and they fight. In the society in which Washington was born, like the English society in the preceding century, of which it was a type, it was considered natural, proper, and healthy for boys to fight.

Quarrels were discountenanced, but mothers taught their sons that, if ever a falling out occurred between comrades, the best thing to do was to strip off their jackets and settle it—fight it out, and settle it, not quarrel over it. At a school where every boy's father had been shot at by or had shot an Indian, the athletic sports most affected would naturally be of a military cast. George, like every other healthy boy, had been playing soldier and drilling the little negroes on the plantation, and about the house, ever since he had donned boy's clothes; and at the Williams school a boy who had a brother who wore a scarlet coat and bore the King's commission, and who had heard from that brother glowing accounts of real

war under Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth against the Spaniards, was of necessity a leader, especially when that boy was well grown, muscular and strong, and quite prompt to enforce respect by a remarkably stalwart and ready right arm.

Lawrence Washington had married Anne Fairfax, the daughter of William Fairfax, of Belvoir, the cousin of Lord Fairfax, and was living on his estate of Mount Vernon in comfort, without ostentation, and plenty, without extravagance. He felt the inequality in social conditions between himself and his young stepbrother, and appreciated the immense advantage that social culture and elegant society gives a man in the world, and he made a point of having him at Mount Vernon as much as possible. There he was introduced at Belvoir, and a well-grown, handsome lad of fourteen is much more of a man in primitive societies than in older ones, where conventionalities thrust the young into the background. So young Washington was a favorite among the Virginian English society of the Northern Neck.

It has been represented that that society lived in semisavage profusion and pomp, surrounded by troops of slaves; that the planter lived in a house where the glass in the windows was often broken, though the sideboard groaned beneath the remnant of the plate, the rest of which had been melted down for the King, at home; that there were holes in the damask curtains, though the walls were decorated with Lely's masterpieces, portraits of ancestresses brought from home; that the women were ignorant, and the men were boorish examples of the day and manners of Squire Western. These views are as erroneous as this picture is false.

No Virginian ever spoke of "slaves." By a curious, unconscious cerebration, the word was distasteful to a people who valued liberty as their most precious possession, and the retainers of the family were called "servants." They were as much the family as the children, or the wife, or the mother. The relation of master and servant was not a property relation at all. It was the domestic institution as it had always existed in every primitive society, as it had been practiced by the patriarchs, and recognized and regulated by Moses and the prophets. A man's "wife, his manservant, and his maidservant," were placed in the same category in the decalogue, and it was the Virginians who prevented the appearance of the word "slaves" in the Constitution of the United States, where reference is made to the servile class of the population as "persons held to labor" and as "other persons."

"Slave" was a word tabooed in the language of ladies and gentlemen; it was vulgar; it was "common," to use the vernacular. It was not until the invention of the cotton gin led to a great development in the cotton-producing States that "servants" began to be "slaves," and to be considered on account of their mercantile value, and the consequent sectional jealousy which viewed with alarm the growth of the Southern section which threatened to transfer the power from east of the Hudson, that "slave" began to be a word in the common vocabulary, used on the one side as a taunt, on the other as a defiance. And there was no barbaric extravagance or savage profusion. The planter's estate furnished everything the family consumed except sugar and coffee; tea was practically unknown.



Bear, venison, wild turkeys, pheasants, partridges abounded in the woods; ducks and swans, oysters of the finest, and fish of every variety crowded the rivers and bays, and a huntsman and fisherman, detailed for the sole duty of stocking the larder, kept every household fully supplied. Beef, mutton, bacon, and hams were provided also, while the fields produced wheat and corn, from which bread of unrivaled excellence was made; nor were the manners most in vogue those of Squire Western.

The heir of every family was educated at home, and read his terms at Oxford. At the University of Edinburgh there was a club, requisite to the membership of which was the fact that the applicant must have been born in Virginia. Within a day's ride of Mount Vernon were a dozen country houses the masters of which were university graduates and had made the grand tour—the Fitzhughs at Eagle's Nest and at Marmion, the Masons at Gunston Hall, the Lees at Stratford, the Carters at Sabine Hall, the Fauntleroyes in Richmond.

All along the Potomac and the Rappahannock were large roomy, pretentious homes, some of which were on English models from Italian architects, the great majority simple and plain mansions, in which gathered and circulated a refined, elevated, traveled society. Colonel Lewis Littlepage, of New Castle, had been the chamberlain of the last King of Poland. Colonel John Parke had been aid-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough at Blenheim, and had carried the dispatch of victory to Queen Anne, and received from her fair hand, for reward, her miniature set in brilliants.

Colonel William Byrd, of Westover, had been the

intimate friend and was the constant correspondent of the Earl of Orrery, the inventor of the astronomical instrument which bears his name. Lord Fairfax had been one of the bucks of the court, the companion of Addison and Dick Steele, and had contributed to the *Spectator*.

As was and is the Virginia custom, the families of wealth in the Dominion were closely bound by frequent intermarriages, by ties of blood and friendship, and they constituted one large circle. One household would move over to another with servants, children, carriages, horses, and dogs, and, after a stay of two or three weeks, all would move to a third, and so go on accumulating as they went, until it became time for all to go home to arrange for the coming year. But home was the last place the Virginian wanted to go unless he was accompanied by a house full of cousins. This constant social intercourse, free but reserved, cordial but dignified, produced a type of manners of the highest grade; and the characteristics of Washington, which for these hundred years have been descanted upon as of phenomenal ceremony and extraordinary dignity, were the ways and manners of his class, with whom he passed his earlier years. He was an exemplar of the culture of his society, and in no remarkable way different from the gentlemen of his station in life all around him. He was a typical Virginian of his epoch.

At this time the experience of Lawrence prompted George to desire a commission as midshipman in the British navy; but Uncle Joseph Ball, who had studied law in London and who was settled there as a practicing attorney, discountenanced the idea with the stolid obstinacy of the middle-class English-

man, whose only idea of the naval service was derived from the press gang, and who thought it unbecoming for his provincial nephew to aspire to the position of a gentleman and to bear the King's commission. The instruction of Williams's school had imparted sufficient skill to make young Washington a competent surveyor. There are plats of surveys now in the General Land Office of Virginia made by him which would do credit to any youth of his age at the present day. Lord Fairfax had acquired all the land lying between the Potomac and the Rappahannock Rivers, and a right line drawn from the principal source of the one to the head of the other. This great principality was unexplored save by the trapper and hunter. Across it ran the great war trail of the Five Nations, passing northeast and southwest. In the spring of 1748, when young Washington had just passed his sixteenth birthday, Lord Fairfax employed him as surveyor to explore and locate his lands beyond the Blue Ridge, up to the principal source of the Potomac, his compensation being fixed at a doubloon a day, with the possibility of increasing it to six pistoles.

In March, he and George Fairfax rode over the mountain by Ashby's Gap and through the lovely valley of Virginia as far as the mouth of Wills Creek, on the Potomac, and on their return, in April, Lord Fairfax was so much pleased at their report of the country, that he moved over to a new settlement, in what is now the County of Clarke, and established a hunting lodge which he named Greenway Court. The ensuing three years were passed in the woods in this employment as surveyor. His earnings, which were very large compared with the price of land—one

day's wages sufficed to pay for many acres—were invested in land, the location of which to this day attests his admirable judgment. Probably this experience as a surveyor was the most valuable epoch of his life. He was taught self-control, alertness, quick decision, prompt action. Living in the woods, where a man's life is guarded alone by himself, teaches him to be on guard at all times, by day and by night; and in such a life every man's tomahawk was loose, every man's rifle was unslung, his bullet pouch was pulled around so as to be handy, and never for a moment was the guard relaxed. A watch was set every night, and on the march by day an advance scout was sent out, and a wary lookout kept up.

This life under the open sky, when a man carries his life in his hand, and a keen eye and sharp ear and quick hand are his surest safeguard, develops a self-possession, an endurance, a patience, and a perseverance unknown in other states of society. One who spends days in the forest, without exchanging an unnecessary word with a comrade, becomes a taciturn man; whose life every minute is only protected by himself, becomes of necessity self-reliant; whose time is passed in the solitude of Nature, absorbs the gravity of the woods and the mountains. In such a school George Washington passed the ensuing three years of his life.

Returning from his surveying expedition in the valley, Lord Fairfax procured him the appointment of public surveyor, which insured him steady employment, and gave his work the stamp of official authority. While thus employed, he enjoyed the benefit of the cultivated society assembled by Lord Fairfax at Greenway Court. There he found a library

of English books, and read the *Spectator* and the *History of England*, the only opportunity which he had had up to that time to read books. His education had been by action and by living, by observation of Nature and men, and thoughtfulness and analysis of what he had observed.

In September, 1751, Lawrence went to Barbadoes for his health, taking his young brother with him, and returned the following spring. He died in July, 1752, leaving his whole estate to his infant daughter, with the remainder, in case she died without issue, to his brother George, with the latter as guardian of the infant and executor of the will. This produced an entire change in the prospects and position of the young surveyor. His self-denial in working and in saving his earnings, and his judgment in investing them in well-selected and well-located lands during his experience as a surveyor, had made him a large holder of wild land along the Potomac and the Shenandoah. Lawrence Washington was a man of large views and forcible character.

The struggle that had been going on between England and France in Europe for centuries had been extended to the New World. The French settled Canada and held the Great Lakes and their outlet to the sea. The English planted colonies along the Atlantic seaboard, and began feeling out beyond the mountains toward the vast, unexplored wilderness which stretched in unbroken solitude toward the setting sun.

The French acquired the mouth of the Mississippi, and explored what they believed to be its source in Minnesota. They established communications between their northern and southern posts;

they navigated the Great Lakes; they pushed up the Ohio; and they were overrunning the country on the right bank of that river. If they were successful, Protestant Virginia would be walled in by the Blue Mountains, held by Catholic France, and confined to the narrow seaboard.

The English of Virginia, like their race everywhere, pushed their trade before them and followed it with their flag. They organized the Ohio Company, with men and means to settle the disputed territory, and made Lawrence Washington their general manager. No man could live on the frontier with the threat of Indian massacre ever present to him, and the Indian backed by the Frenchman; no man whose ancestor had fought under English Harry at Agincourt but must have felt that the question of English or French supremacy in America must eventually be decided by arms. Four generations of Virginian Englishmen had been fighting the brutes set on them by the French. No man could remember the time when the tale of Indian horrors had not been told by mother and grandmother around the fire, with bated breath, to the children.

Lawrence Washington, like most of the young Virginian gentlemen of his day, had seen service. He procured for his brother, aged nineteen, the position of assistant adjutant general for the Northern District of Virginia with the rank of major, and provided as instructors for him Adjutant Bataille Muse, a Virginian, who probably had served in the Low Countries, as many young Virginian gentlemen of the day did, and Jacob Van Braam, an old Dutch soldier, whom Lawrence Washington had picked up on the Carthagera expedition.

He was determined that his younger brother should be equipped for that stage of life to which it should please God to call him; just as our generation has seen young men prepared by military education, training, and discipline, for the trials that were to come to them.

Lawrence Washington's death, George Washington's reputation and experience as surveyor, his thrift and intelligence in the acquisition of wild land, his executorship and guardianship of the heir-ess of Mount Vernon, and his residence there, all gave him weight and consideration in the community; and when the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia—a choleric Scotchman, Dinwiddie—required a man to warn off the French trespassers from that part of Virginia which extended northwest of the Ohio, the master of Mount Vernon was pre-eminently the fittest man for the work.

A former envoy of the Governor had been stopped by Indian threats—instigated by French craft—far short of the French posts, and had turned back utterly unsuccessful. The service needed a man of varied qualities and acquirements; a man of will and force; a woodsman, for he would be required to meet and overcome many obstacles from man and Nature, and to face the perils of the wild woods which stretched unbroken from the Shenandoah to the Rockies and to Lake Michigan; a gentleman of culture and information, for he must meet, on equal terms, men trained at the Court of Versailles. What was the utility of sending a messenger hundreds of miles through the wilderness, in hourly peril of life, to warn subordinates from obeying the orders of their superiors, and carrying out a well-

considered, matured, and determined national policy, passes our comprehension. According to our modern lights, it seems a useless ceremonial that could lead to no possible useful result; but, according to the standard of the day, the way of doing a thing was quite as important as the doing of it. The ceremonial was an important part of the transaction.

Adjutant Washington then was selected by the Governor of Virginia for this delicate and dangerous mission. In October, 1753, he assembled a small party at the mouth of Wills Creek, on the Potomac, and pushed out toward the Ohio with Christopher Gist, an experienced woodsman and Indian fighter, as guide. His place of departure is the present city of Cumberland, in Maryland, named from the Duke of Cumberland. A great council of the Ohio Indians and the Iroquois had been called to meet at Logstown, an Indian town on the Ohio a few miles below the site of the present city of Pittsburg. Here the Virginian envoy met the chiefs in council, and, having induced them to enter into amicable relations with the English, pushed on to the French post farther west, near Lake Erie. There he delivered his message with great punctilio, and much ceremony, and was bowed out with courtly grace and diplomatic phrases, and sent back with the polite intimation that if the Virginians would mind their own business it would be better for them.

Winter was on them before they turned homeward. There would be no grass for the horses, and the tracks of the animals would mark too clear a trail on the backward march; so Gist and the major left their horses, and took to the woods on foot. Snow and ice encumbered their march, and through

perils of flood, and starvation, and of Indians, they successfully pushed their way. When the country is considered—the pathless forest, the flooded rivers, the ice on the mountain, the snow in the valley—this journey shows fortitude, perseverance, and promptness extraordinary.

Leaving Venango, the French post, on Christmas day, Washington and his comrade marched up the Alleghany to the confluence of the Monongahela and the Alleghany—the present Pittsburg; then up the Monongahela and across the mountain to Wills Creek; thence down the Potomac to Mount Vernon; thence across the Rappahannock, the Pamunkey, and the Mattaponi, to Williamsburgh, where they arrived on January 16th, just twenty-one days from the start. It would push two good men, and two horses, to cover the same ground now in the same time, over modern roads and with modern inns. The whole expedition was justly esteemed as an extraordinary exhibition of courage, sagacity, and skill. Washington had kept a careful and minute journal, which he submitted as his official report to the Governor, and which was published. It fixed the attention of the province upon the major commanding the Department of Northern Virginia, and thenceforward he was the hope and pride of all Virginia, trusted in trial, and her stay in the storm soon to burst.

CHAPTER II.

FORT NECESSITY.

IN recognition of his service on the expedition to the Ohio, Major Washington was promoted lieutenant colonel of a Virginia regiment, Fry being colonel, to be posted at Winchester, at the foot of the great valley of Virginia, and right across the great trail by which the Northern Indians had been used from time immemorial to communicate with the great nations which held the mountain ranges and valleys of the Carolinas, Georgia, and Tennessee. It was the highway of the Iroquois or Six Nations and the Cherokees.

It was plain to the Virginian intellect—English and Protestant as it was—that the Jesuits were scheming, and putting forward the Indians to exterminate the settlements of the Church established by Henry VIII, where traditions of Poitiers, and Cressy, and Agincourt stimulated confidence in themselves and contempt for Frenchmen, and hatred of the Pope and all his works. The old struggle between the lily and the rose was to be tried over again, and no Virginian gentleman doubted his duty, or the result. Dinwiddie, the Lieutenant Governor, was a narrow and bigoted Scotchman, greatly impressed with a sense of the dignity of his office, and of the inferiority of provincials to the home-born British subject. His Majesty's

commission, in his opinion, conferred a patent of superiority which brought with it wisdom and infallibility. The wrangle between the House of Burgesses, elected by the gentry of Virginia, and the Governor, appointed by a cabinet ignorant of the environment or the development or of the feelings of the provincials, of necessity impaired their efficient support of the defense of Virginia. But the determination to protect her ancient borders from encroachment was absolutely unalterable.

The tradition of the spoliation of Virginia, by the Penn and Calvert grants, was fresh in every one's mind, but while they proposed to be loyal to his Majesty, and yield obedience to his orders in council, they would in no wise suffer aliens in race and religion, with whom their ancestors had waged war for twenty generations, to extend their hold on the Continent, or to trespass on the ancient borders of the Old Dominion. Therefore this regiment, under Fry and Washington, was posted on outposts to break communication between the North and South, and to keep watch over the movements of the hereditary enemy on the Ohio.

The mouth of Wills Creek, on the Potomac, in Maryland, was the head of flatboat and canoe navigation, and the nearest point to the French posts. It was selected as a depot by Governor Sharpe, of Maryland, where he collected some stores, and whence was sent out by the combined authority of the Governors of Maryland and Virginia an expedition to seize the point at the confluence of the Alleghany and the Monongahela, where their union makes the Ohio—a position Major Washington had selected and reported as the proper place for an

advanced post against the French on the lakes. Captain Trent was pushed out to establish a post at the confluence of the two rivers. With the usual alertness of incompetency, Captain Trent differed from the judgment of Major Washington, and decided that a point below the junction was the best place for a fort, and set his men to work there with spade and pickaxe, and, mounting his horse, pushed back to the post at Wills Creek.

It was hard living and hard sleeping on the Ohio. Mere dying had no particular interest for the pioneer race; that all came in the way of business, and no one took any special pains to avoid it. It was like a mountain road—you might get through, and you might not; you tried it all the same.

The appearance of the Virginians, their digging of dirt, their cutting down of trees, their sharpening of stakes, all flew through the forest, in the spring breeze, and Captain Contrecoeur, a bright young Frenchman, at the nearest post, took upon himself to investigate them and to verify them.

So down the Alleghany he started with a thousand Frenchmen and Indians, in bateaux and canoes, and incontinently stopped the intrenching operations of the Virginians. Captain Trent was away. Lieutenant Frazier, his second in command, was at his home, ten miles distant—a matter entirely within his right, for he had entered the service and assumed the responsibility of command at the fort on the express understanding that he was to be permitted to remain at his own home, and only visit the fort weekly, or as often as he thought necessary. The Frenchman marched the Virginians out of the work with scant ceremony, and permitted them to

depart with their intrenching tools, on their promise not to come near the Ohio again for a year.

On the 2d of April Colonel Washington set out from Alexandria, with two companies of the new regiment, for the outpost on the Ohio. His supplies and baggage were pushed and hauled up the Potomac to the mouth of Wills Creek in bateaux and canoes. His whole force consisted of about one hundred and fifty men; but on arriving at Wills Creek, where Captain Trent was to have collected pack horses for him, he found Trent a fugitive—no pack horses, and no outpost on the Ohio. He decided to move out as far as possible and occupy the best position practicable, and therefore pushed into the wilderness beyond Cumberland, or Wills Creek, through the mountain defiles, over the mountain ranges, and through the forest with about three hundred men. Progress was necessarily slow, where a way for wheels had to be cut along the mountain side and a road cleared through the heavy timber.

In ten days they had not advanced more than twenty miles, to the Little Meadows. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the country, he marched forty or fifty miles farther north, to the falls of the Youghiogheny. There he heard that the French were coming, and had crossed the ford of the river eighteen miles off. He had only three hundred men, Virginian frontiersmen, and fighting men to be sure, but it was utter recklessness that pushed such a force out in the wilderness nearly a hundred miles from re-enforcement or support. Three hundred Virginians could march and fight their way from Winchester or Staunton to Lake Erie or Lake Michigan against Indians only, but nothing but the self-confi-

dence of Englishmen could explain why an inexperienced young soldier would undertake to penetrate a wilderness with a mere handful of men, in the face of the unknown force of Frenchmen, then the first soldiers of the age.

When, however, he learned that eight hundred French were marching on him, and only eighteen miles off, he promptly selected a position for a fight. At the Great Meadows he started to construct a fort. The locality was bad; it was too far out from his supports. The topography was worse. General Sharpe, of Maryland, a soldier of experience, of courage, and sense, criticised the whole performance with remorseless severity. "Fort Necessity," says Sharpe, "was a little, useless intrenchment in a valley between two eminences." It was, in fact, a meadow of no great area, surrounded by low hills covered with heavy timber. While he was at work at his "fort" news came that a hostile party was in his neighborhood, and his Indian ally—the Half King of the Senecas—wanted his assistance to attack it.

Washington started at once, with forty men, to find the enemy, surprised him in camp, and killed and captured Jumonville and the entire party save one, who escaped. This was Colonel Washington's first experience of the sting of a hostile bullet, and, being a healthy, strong young Virginian, it is reasonable to believe that he enjoyed it. His ancestors in Virginia for three generations had been fighting Indians, as in England for ten they had been fighting Frenchmen, and this combined operation of killing both Frenchmen and Indians must have been a reasonable, commendable, and agreeable performance of duty and pleasure.

Contrecoeur, with his French troops, pushed rapidly on him, to avenge the insult in the capture of his advance party, and the death of Jumonville, its commanding officer. He closed the Virginians up in Fort Necessity and took possession of the wooded heights surrounding it. Some nonsense has been written about Colonel Washington's gallantry in offering battle to his adversary outside of his trenches. Now, Washington, though reckless and overconfident in this first experience, has never been suspected of an utter lack of sense. In war it is business to kill as many of the other side as you can and have as few of your own people killed as possible; so you use every advantage to save your men and to destroy the others; and the idea of abandoning shelter, and offering with three hundred men to fight eight hundred "in the open," never did occur to any one but an idiot or a lunatic. Therefore Washington must be acquitted of the charge of offering to fight the French "in the open" at Fort Necessity.

The truth is, he and his Virginians stuck to their earthworks, and their ditch, and their stockade, as closely as bark to the trees; but the Frenchmen surrounded them, sheltered themselves behind trees, and fired over the walls of Fort Necessity into the uncovered troops there, with perfect security and comfort to themselves. This continued the whole day, in a drizzling rain. The Virginian loss was severe. Twelve had been killed and forty-three wounded; so when the French drums beat a parley at dark, the Virginian colonel was glad to treat for terms. His position was utterly untenable, and it was only a question of time when his entire force would be shot

down, and it was his duty to save his men for future use of the State.

No one among the Virginians could speak or read French. Old Jacob Van Braam, the Dutchman who had been pretending to teach Washington fencing and the sword exercise at Mount Vernon, had been commissioned major, and was present with the command. He was sent out to see the Frenchmen, and returned with several offers of terms, all of which were rejected by Colonel Washington. At last, late at night, Major Van Braam brought in terms of capitulation written in French. He translated them to the council of Virginian officers. According to his translation, they agreed to honorable terms of surrender; the defeated party should march out of their fort with drums beating and colors flying, should salute their flag, and carry off all their arms, military stores, and effects, except artillery, which they were to destroy. They pledged themselves not to erect buildings or to occupy land, or to approach near the Ohio for twelve months.

But the articles of capitulation also referred to the assassination of De Jumonville, and Washington was thus made to admit that he had murdered a French officer. This phrase Van Braam translated as "the death of De Jumonville," and thus its significance and intention escaped the Virginians. The terms of capitulation gave great offense in some of the colonies, and were sharply criticised at home.

Governor Sharpe wrote that "everybody was talking of the *unmilitary* conduct of Colonel Washington," and Horace Walpole said that the French had clipped the wings of that gay "fanfaron," Major Washington; but the Virginians had a truer

appreciation of youthful dash and imprudence, and through their House of Burgesses gave a vote of thanks to the officers, and a donation in money to the men, for their fidelity and gallantry in defense of their country.

This first campaign of Washington is a curious incident in his career, and gives an interesting insight into his character. A genuine soldier does not give great consideration to arithmetic. If generals never fought until success was demonstrably certain, there would be no pitched battles; but in the real soldier so much of imagination mingles with analysis and logic, and chance so often determines the event, that he is always ready to take desperate chances. Since the capitulation of Fort Necessity, the advance into the wilderness with so small a force has been considered the next thing to foolhardiness; yet Andrew Lewis afterward, with a few Virginians, fought more Indians with success than the French force that captured Fort Necessity; and George Rogers Clarke broke the Indian power and occupied the Northwest for Virginia with no greater force.

If Colonel Washington had surprised and routed Contrecoeur at Fort Du Quesne—as was entirely possible—his expedition would have been considered a dashing exploit, whose vigor and celerity would have redeemed its risk. Success is the only test of merit in military matters.



CHAPTER III.

BRADDOCK.

THE treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, while it settled all continental questions between France and England, left the great dispute between Catholicism and Protestantism on the new continent absolutely unadjusted. James I had granted to Sir William Alexander, his Scotch-English Secretary of State—created Lord Stirling—the great territory of Nova Scotia (New Scotland) lying on the north of the New England grant, together with the river St. Lawrence and a broad strip of territory along both sides of that river, and the north border of the Great Lakes, to the western extremity of Lake Superior, and thence in a wide belt across the continent to the Pacific. Lord Stirling had sold many baronetcies, with large estates appurtenant to the titles, in Nova Scotia, to raise funds to develop his great possessions. English gentlemen were settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and were building up in the wilderness a vigorous, robust British Protestant society. The French hemmed them in, the Jesuits surrounded them, and they incessantly demanded protection from home.

The French claimed the continent from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to the head of the Mississippi and thence to the Gulf of Mexico, and from

the source of the Ohio to the western ocean. The English held the Atlantic seaboard from the St. Croix to the Savannah; south of that the feared and hated Catholics had seized the country. It is difficult now to appreciate or sympathize with the terror, the horror, and the hatred with which the English nation regarded the Pope, and all his works and all his people.

In this generation we are accustomed to consider all such questions as matters of conscience, and, in the general latitudinarianism, look upon physical struggles over matters of faith as proofs of narrow bigotry and contracted zeal. But it was not so, in fact, then. England was the defender of the faith of the rights of man, of free thought, of free contract, of free labor, and of free commerce. The Pope was the incarnation of the philosophy of paternalism in faith, in morals, in conduct, and in trade. He had never obtained absolute control of the race of fair-haired, blue-eyed men in the British Isles.

From the day St. Augustine landed in Britain, the native race had stood firm on their principle that "the laws of England shall not be changed except by our own consent." We make our own laws, we execute them, and we receive no regulations for our lives, our property, or our morals from any foreign prince or power, pope or potentate. This was the spirit that had resisted the pretensions of the Roman oligarchy, from Alfred's time, to make laws for England in the convocations of the clergy; this the spirit that, directed by Henry VIII, had established a Free Church of England—free from the direction or domination of the Church of Rome. The fathers of the settlers of Virginia, of New England, and of New Scotland

had fought the Armada. Some of the original colonists had actually served under Lord Howard of Effingham against Medina-Sidonia and Guise in the struggle between the yeomanry of England and the chivalry of Spain; and when Englishmen were pressed and hemmed in by the Pope and his followers, in the new homes they had carved for themselves with their swords on the new continent, the old Berserker blood fired, and the word was passed that no Frenchman, Spaniard, or Papist should interfere with the rights of Englishmen.

But the provincials, with a clear view of what were their rights, had an equally distinct conception of the duties of other people. It was their duty to drive out the French; it was equally their right not to be made cat's-paws, but to require proper support to be given them from home; for it was the old home quarrel and the ancient British battle they were to renew on the Ohio.

The home government insisted that New York, Virginia, and the colonies should supply men, money, and subsistence for the war on France. The colonies as firmly required that British men and British money should support the British quarrel, while they furnished their fair share of the means. They were entirely willing to do most of the fighting, as they in fact did.

Just here came in another influence of potent force. It seems that all masterful races send out colonies, to subdue and conquer. It follows, as of necessity, that the sons look to their father for assistance and advice; and reverence for superior wisdom is added to love of home and of parents. Therefore the provincial always occupies a position

of inferiority to home people; and it is the peculiar trait of the British that they are utterly unable to comprehend that youth ever arrives at maturity; that colonies can develop into independent societies, capable of thinking and acting for themselves.

Acting on this general theory of the unapproachable superiority of the native-born and home-staying Briton, the connection between the royal military organization and the colonial establishments was firmly founded on the theory, principle, and practice that the provincial must be inferior to the home-born, and that a royal commission of any grade, from the very nature of things, must supersede and overtop any commission from a provincial governor; that an ensign, fresh from school, outranked a Virginia colonel of many campaigns.

Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie, acting on this theory, organized the new military establishment of Virginia into ten companies of a hundred men each, and offered the command of one of them to Colonel Washington. The result of this organization would have been that any understrapper from home, scion of the bastard of a duke's mistress, would have commanded the experienced soldiers Virginia had already produced and trained for her defense. Washington—with the rank of colonel, which he had won by arduous service, and decorated with the thanks of Virginia, though her representatives—promptly resigned his commission and retired to Mount Vernon.

The administration at home prepared a campaign for America which would relieve them from pressure on the continent. They proposed an attack on Nova Scotia, directed from New York, and one on the Ohio, moving from Virginia. Governor Horatio Sharpe,

of Maryland, was commissioned major general, to command all the provincial troops raised, and to be raised, for the war against the French on the Ohio. Major-General Edward Braddock, an experienced soldier in the wars in the Low Countries, was sent out with two regiments of regulars, and the proper train of artillery to support it. He established headquarters at Alexandria, on the Potomac. There, on April 14, 1755, he called a council of war, which was presided over by himself, and attended by Admiral Keppel, commander in chief of the navy in America, and the Governors of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Major-General William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, had been designated by the home authorities to rank next to General Braddock, and to command the forces to be directed against Nova Scotia. Major-General Horatio Sharpe, Governor of Maryland, was to command all the provincial troops under General Braddock.

It was determined that Wills Creek, at its junction with the Potomac, should be the base of operations. Supplies could be boated there from Alexandria, and collected from the rich valley of Virginia and the fertile lands of western Maryland, just then being occupied by emigrants from Alsace-Lorraine, who had made homes in the wilderness, fugitives of Protestantism from the Catholic King of France.

Governor Sharpe promptly prepared proper support for the movement. He secured from the General Assembly of Maryland sufficient supplies of money to construct on the Potomac a substantial bastioned work which he called Fort Frederick, and his flatboats and canoes pushed up the Potomac,

which sometimes presents rapids difficult to surmount and then for many miles flows in a deep and sluggish stream through mountain passes and primeval forest. The Maryland part of the arrangement was thoroughly carried out.

Colonel Washington of necessity was drawn from Mount Vernon to the gay life of a garrison town. He was a soldier of some experience ; he had led in person a surprise party on an all-night march, and had held an indefensible position to the verge of rashness against an overwhelming force, and he had seen some soldiers among the French ; but he never before had seen "real soldiers"—British soldiers, whose invincibility for a thousand years was as well established a fact as sunlight to the loyal mind, who on every field had proved their superiority to Frenchmen. He had commanded frontiersmen, the lean, gaunt, sinewy, bony Virginian of the woods and the mountains, who knew as little of the manual of arms as he did of fighting by word of command, and it can well be imagined with what interest the bush-fighting Virginian colonel inspected, observed, and pondered the operations of that intricate machine, a regular army.

The form and ceremony must have been a revelation. The dress parade, the guard mounting, all the minutiae of camp life, presented to him many problems. What was the reason of those ponderous movements by which a column was displayed into a line, and a front of a few was spread out into a line of many ? To the untutored Virginian there must have appeared a great loss of time and prodigious increase of risk, and a consequent useless expenditure of life ; and during that short time of observation,

and criticism of soldiers in camp and of officers at mess, curious comparisons must have been made by the provincial, and grave doubts arisen as to whether such a machine would work in the woods.

The rank and dignity and state of the commander in chief required that he should be conveyed in a coach-and-six. Colonel Washington made no speculation about that, for he knew that that would cure itself. If the coach ever got as far as Fort Cumberland, he was sure that its wheels would never go farther except as wheels of ammunition tumbrils, or provision carts.

Colonel Washington was a gentleman of distinction in the neighborhood. He had the handsomest estate next to Lord Fairfax in the Dominion. He was a man of the world, had been to the West Indies, and thanked by the General Assembly of his colony for gallantry in action, and was withal a gentleman of force and experience beyond his years. Commanding generals like smart, active, brave, useful young men about them, and they are glad to attach them to their service when they can do so as volunteers, without rank or pay, where gallant conduct in action often wins promotion and fame. It would have been remarkable if General Braddock had not invited Colonel Washington to accept the position of volunteer aid-de-camp on his staff. He did so, tendering him the rank of captain by brevet, the highest rank he was authorized to confer on a volunteer aid. Captain Washington at once accepted the honor, and was the most valuable man on the staff.

He knew the country and the people between Alexandria and Fort Cumberland; he had ridden or marched over every foot of it. He knew the fords

on the Shenandoah and the crossings of the Potomac, the trails through the woods as far west as the Monongahela and to the Ohio, and he knew what could be done and what could not be done in that country. He knew that a rapid march from Cumberland, of a column of a thousand men in light marching order, carrying ten days' rations and their ammunition in packs on their backs, each man for himself, might get through the woods so fast as to strike Du Quesne before re-enforcements could be hurried to it from Lake Erie ; and he also knew that no troops whose march was regulated by a six-horsed coach could do any efficient work.

In the woods, fighting is done quite as much with the legs as by the arms, and no soldier can, in the nature of things, accomplish much who is tied and shackled hand and foot by a cumbrous uniform. The shako of the British grenadier will of itself break down the best line of battle of its wearers, lose a position, end a war, and settle a boundary.

Sir John St. Clair, Deputy Quartermaster General, had come out to assist in the campaign, which was to save a ministry and settle the dynasty on the throne of Great Britain. Fort Cumberland was selected as the base of military operations against western Canada, and Governor Sharpe had collected magazines of provisions and munition there. He had drawn to him many hardy and enterprising pioneers, who made contracts to supply beef on the hoof, and wagons and horses. Sir John St. Clair required the Governor of Pennsylvania to construct a road from Philadelphia to Fort Cumberland, and from Fort Cumberland west to the great crossing of the Youghiogeny.

Braddock, upon the rising of the council of war, moved his force from Alexandria up the south bank of the Potomac, above the mouth of Rock Creek, where he crossed into Maryland with the Forty-eighth Regiment, Colonel Dunbar, the Forty-fourth Regiment moving on to Winchester. He camped for six days at the new palatine settlement of Frederick, and became very indignant at the neglect of the Pennsylvanians to construct the road and to supply the two hundred wagons demanded by Sir John St. Clair as necessary for the transportation of the expedition. He proposed to send out into the country, and impress wagons and teams under the direction of the quartermaster general. Captain Washington, and Benjamin Franklin, postmaster general of the colonies, defended their countrymen, and excused the lack of provision made for the army. But Franklin, with that shrewd insight into common human nature which was to make him the philosopher of the commonplace, at once discerned the opportunity to make influence for himself and money for his people. He noticed that Sir John St. Clair wore a Hussar uniform. The German settlers of Pennsylvania, by experience and by tradition, well knew the atrocities of the Hussars in Germany and the Low Countries, in the wars, from which they had fled, and from which their ancestors had suffered for generations.

"Hussar" was a name of terror to them—the embodiment of war, of rapine, of fire and sword, of famine and death. So, from Frederick, Franklin wrote and published a letter to the inhabitants of the counties of Lancaster, York, and Cumberland, in which he informed them that the British officers

“proposed to send an armed force immediately into their counties, to seize as many of the best carriages and horses as should be wanted, and compel as many persons into the service as should be necessary to drive and take care of them.”

He showed that if they furnished teams and wagons and drivers voluntarily they would receive in wages fully £30,000 in gold and silver of the King's money. “If you do not come forward and do your duty,” said he, “I shall be obliged to inform the general in fourteen days, and I suppose Sir John St. Clair, ‘the Hussar,’ with a body of soldiers, will immediately enter the province, which I shall be sorry to hear of.” The glittering suggestion of £30,000 in gold and silver acted in an agreeable and persuasive manner on the bucolic mind; but the touch of Nature, the sly insinuation about “the Hussar,” was convincing. The roads were crowded with four-horse teams, to earn the pay, and to escape “the Hussar,” all of which reported at Fort Cumberland about the last of June.

On April 30th Braddock left Frederick in the chariot he had purchased from Governor Sharpe; and, escorted by his bodyguard, a troop of Virginia Light Horse—the only cavalry in his command—passed over the mountain north of Frederick, across Middletown Valley, through a gap in South Mountain, which still bears his name (over what, in subsequent years, became the battlefield of Antietam), to the mouth of the Conococheague, where he crossed the Potomac. The town of Williamsport is now at the ford where he crossed, and Williamsport long afterward became one of the principal competitors for the site of the federal city. In the order of the day of April

27th the route is published, providing for the march to Wills Creek, a total of one hundred and twenty-nine miles to be made by May 9th.

The Forty-eighth, Colonel Dunbar, moved out on the 29th and made the route as by orders directed, first across Middletown Valley, then to Conococheague; there it crossed the Potomac, thence up the south bank of the Potomac by the mouth of Little Cacapon to Old Town, where it recrossed to the north bank, and thence to Fort Cumberland, where it reported May 9th, according to the route and time set out in orders.

A few miles below Wills Creek the command was halted, and brought to a present, as the commander in chief whirled by in his coach-and-six. The drums beat the Grenadier's March, the colors drooped, and all "the pomp and pride and circumstance of glorious war" was displayed. At the fort this gorgeous apparition was saluted with seventeen guns—the number appropriate to the commander of an army in the field. In the afternoon the whole command was assembled, the Forty-fourth, Sir Peter Halkett, having arrived from Winchester; and on the 10th it was announced in the order of the day that "Mr. Washington is appointed Aid-de-camp to His Excellency General Braddock." On the 12th the troops were brigaded, and the general order in Braddock's orderly book, the original of which is in the Congressional Library at Washington, gives an accurate statement of the troops present for duty, and their number of effective men.

The First Brigade, under the command of Colonel Sir Peter Halkett, consisted of—

	MEN.
Forty-fourth Regiment, Grenadier Guards.....	700
Captain Rutherford's and Captain Gates's independent companies of New York.....	95
Captain Polson's company of Carpenters	48
Captain Peronnu's and Captain Waggoner's Virginia Rangers.....	92
Captain Dagworthy's Maryland Rangers.....	49
Total, First Brigade.....	984

Second Brigade, Colonel Dunbar :

Forty-eighth Regiment	650
Captain Demerie's South Carolina detachment.....	97
Captain Dobbs's North Carolina Rangers.....	80
Captain Mercer's company of Carpenters.....	35
Captain Stevens's Virginia Rangers.....	48
Captain Hogg's Virginia Rangers.....	40
Captain Cox's Virginia Rangers	43
Total, Second Brigade.....	993


There was also a train of artillery and a force of engineers, and a detachment of thirty sailors from the British fleet. It was provided with one hundred and fifty wagons and two thousand horses.

The First Brigade marched on June 8th, and the next day the Second followed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gage, of the Forty-eighth. The performances of that march, if they were not proved by absolutely indisputable proof, would be simply incredible. But Braddock's road is now (March, 1894) perfectly well defined, north of Cumberland. It looks as if intelligent purpose had exerted itself to waste time and labor. It is located without the slightest regard to grades or obstacles. Instead of blasting rocks—or, still better, avoiding them whenever possible—the engineers seem to have tried to

leave monuments to their own stupidity. Great bowlders in the road, instead of being rolled or blasted out of the way, are carefully hewed down so as to present no obstruction. The third camp was only five miles from the first.

In seven days they reached the Little Meadows, twenty miles from Cumberland. Here a council of war was called by the commanding general, and he decided to move out with a light column of twelve hundred men and twelve guns, leaving Colonel Dunbar in charge of the reserve, the wagons, and reserve artillery, to push on as rapidly as possible. On the 23d of June the advance reached the Great Crossing of the Youghiogheny, thirty-seven miles from Fort Cumberland—fifteen days for thirty-seven miles. On the 8th of July he arrived at the Monongahela, fifteen miles below Fort Du Quesne. A defile on the north or right bank rendered it necessary to cross the river, and then recross eight miles farther down the stream. During the day before, small parties of the enemy had been hanging on the flanks and picking up stragglers, thus showing that the movements of the invading force were known and accurately observed.

The passage of the river then became a delicate and difficult operation. At 3 A. M. of the 9th Lieutenant-Colonel Gage was sent with a detachment of the Forty-eighth Regiment to occupy the crossing and cover the movement. An hour later Sir John St. Clair moved out with a working party, to construct roads, and make the fords practicable for wagons and artillery, by cutting down the banks, and at 6 A. M. the main body, under command of Braddock, took up the route. He intended to take Fort Du



Quesne that day, and proposed that it should be done according to the rules and regulations of civilized war—by troops on dress parade, with colors flying, drums beating, and trumpets sounding—and not in a disorderly chance medley of wood rangers and hunting-shirt-clad, moccasin-shod hunters and scouts, who knew no more of the minutiae and elegances of war than they did of Almack's or of White's celebrated club.

After passing the first ford they reached the second about noon. The low land on that side of the river was level, open woodland, of heavy walnut timber, and no undergrowth, the ground well covered with grass. The enemy were frequently visible on the heights on the other side, and Braddock, to impress them with the kind of war they were to expect from him, spent an hour in putting his troops through battalion movements, in full sight of the French and Indian scouts, and his men were given their dinners.

A recent publication of the memoirs of Charles de Langlade, the French officer who led the attacking party, gives us a graphic description from their point of view. When information of the approach of Braddock with an army of over two thousand men came, the commander of Fort Du Quesne was in doubt whether to fight, to surrender, or to evacuate and destroy the post. The first course was decided on, and for this purpose De Beaujeu was ordered to take a party out and attack the enemy before he could invest the fort. He organized a force of two hundred and fifty French and six hundred and fifty Indians. Moving out at 9 A. M. of the 9th, De Beaujeu found himself at the ford of the Monongahela

at 12.30 P. M., just as Braddock was going through his battalion drill, and witnessed the dinner of those well-trained troops.

On the north side of the Monongahela there was an open meadow or wooded glade, level, and without undergrowth, spreading back a quarter of a mile from the river; then the high ground usual in river formations begins to ascend until it rises into a ridge, covered with heavy timber, bushes, and thick undergrowth. From this ridge run two ravines several hundred yards apart down to the river's edge.

The column was put in motion about 1 o'clock, the guides in front, then the engineers, with six light horsemen; then Lieutenant-Colonel Gage, with the Forty-eighth Regiment; then Sir John St. Clair, Quartermaster General, with two six-pounder guns and the men, wagons, and tools of the working party; then General Braddock, with Colonel Sir Peter Halkett and the Forty-fourth; then the artillery and wagons; then the provincial troops for rear guard.

While the advance was crossing the ford and moving into the forest the rear was cooking rations; for the column moved so slowly, the head would some days go into camp about the time the rear was moving out of the camp of the day before. De Langlade took in the conditions at once, and urged his superior to attack, which was done with energy and promptness. The first known by the British was that the guides saw a force of French and Indians, led by a Frenchman, De Beaujeu, gayly uniformed in hunting shirt and gorget, charging on them out of the woods in front. At the same instant a fire broke out of the ravines on each side of the column.

Captain Washington, the volunteer aid, would

have committed a grave breach of the proprieties if on the field of battle he had volunteered to his chief advice unasked ; but the emergency was so pressing, and time so precious, that he begged his commanding officer to let him bring up the provincials, and cover the front and flank with skirmishers, until the position and numbers of the enemy could be developed.

The trained soldier could not consent to veterans being protected by undrilled, half-armed, savagely clad countrymen, and said that his men should fight in line or not at all. The provincials had required no orders ; the first shot told the whole tale to them ; they were in the presence of the enemy in force, for half a dozen Indians alone would never fire at such a force. Killing was in order, and they proposed to be killers and not killees, and do their part of the work. Without waiting for word or order, they broke and took to the trees. Braddock was loud in damning their cowardice ; but before one of his staff could ride up to Colonel Gage, the provincials knew all about it and acted accordingly. They covered the rear of the army, and the artillery and wagons. The French attack spread with the rapidity of fire in the dry grass. It ran along both sides of the English column and closed round the rear. The British stood in a road twelve feet wide, falling in their tracks without firing a shot in reply. Braddock sent an aid to the front to find out from Colonel Gage what was the matter.

Struggling through a huddled column in a packed road is slow work for man and horse, and it took time to get forward, and as much to get back. The fire in front increased, and Braddock, all afire, spurred

forward, assumed command of the Forty-eighth, and ordered it to form by platoons, and charge the woods to the right and left. A platoon can not be formed in a wood road twelve feet wide. Each flank will extend into the woods, and the line be pinioned, as if its arms were tied.

In the confusion the men fell by rank. The French account says that many officers were killed with their dinner napkins pinned to their breasts. This one incident lets in a clear beam of light over the tragedy of folly and incompetence. When it was once reported to "Stonewall Jackson" that his adversary was marching up the valley attended by a herd of four thousand beef cattle, his reply was, "Good! we can beat people who have to drive their rations on the hoof with them." And he did.

So the Frenchman might have said: "We can beat any soldiers who require dinner napkins on the eve of battle." Napkins imply cooks, cooks require cooking utensils, wagons, all the vast impedimenta of a luxurious and overfed army, and prove lack of endurance. But they do not imply lack of courage. That the British breed has never shown, and the gamest, most gallant, most daring, most chivalrous class that ever lived is the English gentry, of which the officers of the army were then composed, and their American kin. On that field they proved themselves worthy of their blood. They showed every soldierly trait except sense.

Braddock was on his horse in front of the column, directing movements, shouting, gesticulating, swearing at the stupidity of his men, who would not form and would not charge. Said the men in the ranks, "We'll fight men—we can't fight bushes," and as the

slaughter increased they became rattled. The line officers tried to lead squads into the bushes.

Colonel Gage planted the colors of the two regiments in the road, to form on. Still the men fell, and Braddock stormed. The line officers, "with dinner napkins pinned to their breasts," formed squads of officers by themselves, and showed the way to death. The bush fighters in the rear never lost their self-possession for a moment. They were at their accustomed work, and they went at it like days' labor. Many of them knew Captain Washington personally and had served under him, and all of them knew him by reputation.

Hurrying up and down the narrow road, when the commanding general rode to the front and took command there, his provincial staff officer naturally was sent back to direct the provincials, and represent the general on that part of the field. As the French fire poured in on his flanks, Washington rushed Captain Waggoner's two Virginia companies by the right down into the ravine, faced to the left, and then charged straight up it, driving everything before him, and relieved that flank of the British column.

In so doing, the command got up in advance of Gage's column, when Braddock was swearing and the line officers dying. As they passed the English in the road, the latter, misled by the hunting shirts and head gear of the Virginians, poured a volley into their rear, and killed and wounded two thirds of them. That ended all check to the French, and the rest of it was merely a *battue*, where the hunter shot his game from cover, without risk, and hardly with any excitement.

The English, huddled up, fired into the groups in

front of them, fired in the air. In the region of the battlefield, tradition to this day alleges that Braddock was not killed by Indian or Frenchman, but by Tom Fossit, a private in Captain Cholmondeley's company of the Forty-eighth Regiment. Fossit had been enlisted at Shippensburg, Pa., and had a brother in his company, who was killed in the battle. He lived for many years, and doubtless enjoyed many a "treat" in exchange for his fable.

His story was that Braddock killed his brother for dodging behind a tree, and that he avenged his brother on the spot. This story is merely incredible. Braddock had five horses killed under him, and in the close fighting all around him the miracle is that he lived as long as he did. A mounted officer of the striking appearance, with the conspicuous uniform of a major general attracted a hundred bullets before the fatal one hit; and it is incredible that a private soldier should be guilty of the dastardly treason of killing his commanding general in battle. The military profession evolves a respect for rank as representing power, that increases and intensifies as rank rises and power enlarges, and in battle the commanding officer is the god, the human providence of the private soldier. He holds his life in the look of his eye or the crook of his finger, and can order the private to instant death by a wave of his hand, and *does* it constantly. Therefore no private soldier who ever carried a musket or drew saber, ever, anywhere could or ever did, in the heat of battle, with death looking right into his eyes, conceive of killing the superintending power which absolutely controlled his destiny.

If Braddock did kill Fossit's brother—which is

quite probable, for the general was likely to do so foolish a thing—it is almost certain that Tom broke for the nearest tree, and kept that between him and the general until he had an opportunity to escape official recognition. At last Braddock fell mortally wounded. That ended it. Most of the field and line officers were already on the ground, and when the general in front of or up with his first line fell over the neck of his horse, the first line broke and went back on the second, they two on the third, and the whole went sweeping down the road like a stampeded herd of buffalo. There was no withstanding the tornado. Washington afterward said that it was as impossible to stop them as to stop “a gang of wild bears from the mountains, or a mountain torrent.”

It bore everything before it, and ran over horses, wagons, and men of the rear guard. Captain Washington held his provincials with a cool and steady hand until the torrent rushed by, and then deployed them across the road, and on each side of it, to check the pursuit. He pushed back to where some soldiers were struggling to carry off the heavy and cumbrous body of their general. Jumping from his horse, he jerked the official silk sash from the waist of the commanding officer, and using it as a litter, pushed the carriers behind his line. He then doggedly gave ground, for all that was left to be done was to gain time and save Dunbar.

As the stampede swept by the wagons, the wagoners cut their horses loose and whipped for their lives. After every great disaster the most frightened are the fleetest, and they invariably spread the news as they fly that “All is lost! Everybody is killed! The command is cut up!” So when the ter-

rified wagoners flew through Dunbar's camp, not a word of explanation was needed. The harnessed horses, the riders belaboring them at every jump, as they sped toward Fort Cumberland, told the story of rout and flight without words.

Colonel Dunbar by strict discipline held his command firm. He was forty miles in rear. As soon as the remnants of the army recrossed the Monongahela that evening, Braddock sent Captain Washington back to Dunbar to bring up wagons and provisions. The old soldier was thinking more of his wounded than of himself, and he sent back the best man about him to get help for them. His other aids were killed or wounded.

Captain Washington rode back that night on one horse, when the darkness was so intense, and the road so obscure, that he passed much of his time leading his horse and kneeling on the ground feeling for the road. Notwithstanding this, he and his two orderlies reached Dunbar's camp at sunrise, and immediately returned with supplies and re-enforcements to the army. He met it at Gist's plantation, and, returning, reached Dunbar's camp that night, where they halted for two nights and a day.

Then continuing the retreat on the 13th, they reached the Great Meadows, where Braddock died and was buried before day next morning in the middle of the road, Captain Washington reading the service of the Church over him. The wagon train was driven over the grave to save it from the Indians. From Little Meadows Washington wrote to Colonel Inness, at Fort Cumberland, asking for aid, which that officer promptly dispatched to him. The melancholy party arrived at the fort on the 16th and 17th.

Dunbar arrived there on the 20th, and was obliged to stop until August 2d to take care of the wounded. On that day, with his entire command, consisting of the survivors of the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Regiments and of the Virginia battalion, and of the independent companies, numbering in all about fifteen hundred men fit for duty, he left the fort and marched eastward to Philadelphia.

He left Fort Cumberland in charge of Colonel Innes, with one company of Virginians and one of Maryland Rangers. About 1824, what were supposed to be the remains of General Braddock, were found by some workmen repairing the National Road. They were removed, reburied near the road under an oak, and marked Braddock's grave. Some years afterward, English gentlemen visiting the spot caused a plain fence to be erected around it, and thus it stands now, after nearly threescore and ten years.

This affair began about 1 P. M. and ended by five o'clock. It was short and sharp. De Beaujeu, the French commander, was killed early in the action. There were two hundred and fifty French and Canadians and six hundred and fifty Indians in the attacking force. On the English side were the two regular regiments of seasoned veterans of five hundred each recruited up to seven hundred, five companies of Virginia troops, fifty Maryland Rangers, one hundred South Carolinians, one hundred North Carolinians, but in the advanced column actually engaged only twelve hundred men were present. There were no Maryland troops in the expedition except Captain Dagworthy's. The French account says they counted thirteen hundred and fifty dead on the field and on the retreat. There is no doubt

that all they did count were *dead*, but only twelve hundred were engaged.

Colonel Sir Peter Halkett, of the Forty-fourth, his son, who was brigade major, and William Shirley, son of General and Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, were killed. Colonel Burton, of the Forty-eighth, and Sir John St. Clair, were wounded. Of eighty-nine commissioned officers in the two regiments of regulars in the fight, twenty-six were killed and thirty-seven wounded; four hundred and thirty-seven men were reported killed and three hundred and eighty-five wounded—a total loss of eight hundred and fifteen men.

All the wounded who were left on the field were killed by the Indians, with the exception of two remarkable men, Dr. Hugh Mercer and a comrade, who, left wounded, made his way through the woods to give up his life, as General Mercer at the battle of Princeton, fighting the king he came so near dying for at the battle of the Monongahela. The opposing force lost not thirty men and their commander.

Captain Washington was untouched, although he had two horses killed under him and several bullets through his clothes. He reported to the Governor of Virginia that his rangers had “fought like soldiers and died like men.” Beyond a peradventure, his coolness, his self-control, his will saved all that was saved. If it had not been for him, every British soldier would have been scalped. Twelve of them, taken prisoners, were burned alive at Fort Du Quesne the next evening.

And the endurance of the Virginian captain is wonderful. After the entire day, from four o'clock in the morning of the 9th until dark of the 10th, in the

saddle, four hours of it under the fiercest fire, which is the most exhausting excitement known to man, he rode and walked all night back to Dunbar's camp and returned at once to his wounded chief, and from the 9th until the 16th never took his clothes off or laid down to sleep undressed. The iron will was equaled by the iron frame and the iron constitution, and this prodigious effort was made by a man who had been left behind at Dunbar's camp, too ill to accompany the command, and had only reached the army the evening before the battle, hauled in a wagon because he was too weak to ride. The exhibition of endurance by Captain Washington for seven days after the battle exceeded that of courage, coolness, and self-control by him on the disastrous field. He was then in his twenty-fifth year.

The immediate consequence of the rout of Braddock was a more vigorous effort on the part of the Government, which resulted in the Treaty of Paris of 1763, whereby Canada and Florida were both ceded to Great Britain, and the Roman Catholic power was eliminated as a political element on the North American continent from the Arctic circle to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi River. West of that river the Spanish Americans claimed jurisdiction to the Pacific—a claim to be entirely extinguished in the next two generations.

The far-reaching results of that campaign were, first, the annihilation of British prestige among the provincials; second, fraternity and a tendency to co-operate among all the English in America; third, a distinct bias toward independence of the mother country. The seven years' war in America was dis-

tinctly a war of race and religion. The English Protestants were pressed on the North by the French and on the South and West by the Spaniards, both adherents of the Church of Rome.

The conquest of Canada and the cession of Florida immediately relieved the provincials from the hostile pressure of the Roman Catholics and the Indians, and from their dependence on home. They had co-operated together during the war, each province by its own General Assembly voting men and money for the common defense, according to its judgment of what was just and necessary, and at the battle of the Monongahela with the two regiments of British regulars there were present companies from Virginia, New York, Maryland, and the Carolinas, who in the North had fought the French and Indians, and in the South the Spaniards and Indians—all Roman Catholics.

An extract from a newspaper of the day will give some idea of the sentiment pervading the English in America, for in the Catholic province of Maryland, the birthplace and nursery of freedom of thought in all the world, the fire of bigotry burned as fiercely as in Massachusetts Bay, where the idea of liberty of conscience had as yet never penetrated. In Green's Maryland Gazette, published at Annapolis on July 31, 1755, is contained an account of Braddock's defeat on July 9th, three weeks previous. "After the engagement," says the newspaper, "the Indians pursued our people to the Monongahela, and scalped and plundered all that were left on the field, except five or six, who, not being able to keep pace with the victors in their return to the fort, were all treated in the same manner, one Virginian only surviving it.

[Oh, horrid barbarity, to kill in cold blood! But, Protestant reader, such is the treatment we may expect to receive from his most Christian Majesty's American allies if ever we should be so unhappy as to fall in their hands, except we give up our religious liberty, and everything that is dear and valuable, and submit to be his vassals, and dupes of the Romish clergy, whose most tender mercies are but hellish cruelties, wherever they have the power to exercise them.] ”

The French Minister of War began immediately to intrigue to stir up dissension with the mother country, and to encourage the growing feeling of strength and maturity which began rapidly to pervade the English in America. The New England colonies had never been loyal to the Crown or to the traditions of their ancestors. Planted by refugees from social and religious ostracism, they had always been in sympathy with discontent at home. Enterprising, energetic, and intellectual, the necessities of their environment, the rigors of their climate, and the constant struggle with the forces of Nature, had developed a character which for self-control and concentration has rarely been equaled, and never excelled, in the history of the world. Their position had created a trade, arising out of natural conditions, which was very profitable. They smuggled sugar from the West Indies, converted it into rum in New England, carried the rum to Africa, where they bartered it for negroes, and the negroes to Virginia and Maryland, where they exchanged them for tobacco, which they sold at their home.

The breaking up of this profitable exchange by the enforcement of the regulations of trade between

the colonies and the mother country, whereby all products of any colony could be shipped to any other colony only through home ports in home bottoms, naturally and justly enraged the New Englanders. They had never been monarchists, and they had become hostile to aristocratic institutions.

But in Maryland and Virginia the social organization was entirely different. Many cadets of noble families had settled in these colonies, or been provided with offices under the provincial governments. All their sympathies were with the established order at home. They were the pets of the monarchy. The trade regulations did not disturb them; they had no ships or commerce of their own, and there was no radical reason why they should participate in a movement that must, beyond a doubt, result in a separation from the mother country.

And there existed a sentiment in the two colonies on the Chesapeake widely differing from the sympathies of New England. Jacobitism, sympathy with the Stuarts, had never been extinguished in the old cavalier colonies. Their leading families were almost all cavalier. George Mason's grandfather had commanded a royalist troop at Marston Moor, and Washington's ancestor had held Worcester for the King. The grandfather of Thomas Johnson, a leader of the Revolution in Maryland, who nominated Washington for commander in chief, came over in 1690, and in 1693 was arrested and recognized for good behavior by the Governor and council for saying, "The people are all rogues to the King, and that he would swear to no king but King James."

Charles II was proclaimed King as soon as the news of the death of his father reached St. Mary's,

and Charles was King of Maryland eleven years before he was King of England. The ancestor of Richard Henry Lee, author of the resolution of independence, had been sent by Virginia to Breda, to induce Charles to come to Virginia and establish his government there; and although the Commonwealth did send a fleet "to reduce the settlements on the Chesapeake," and the old governments were reconstructed and Commonwealth governments actually set up by the bayonet in these two provinces, they never had the respect, sympathy, or support of the body of the people. They fell as soon as the prop was removed.

When New England began to move in resistance to the royal authority, the first impulse of the English on the Chesapeake was to stand by them, for with them and their ancestors, from time immemorial, the controlling element of character has been that "blood is thicker than water"; and the next feeling that stirred the people was that now they could get rid of the House of Hanover and all its disgusting surroundings.

Dr. Hugh Mercer, of the Braddock campaign—afterward General Mercer, of the battles of Trenton and of Princeton—had been on the staff of Prince Charles at Culloden, and both colonies were full of the defeated and disappointed adherents of the Stuarts. It is not probable that sympathy for the Stuarts and dislike to the House of Hanover was the dominating force that created the revolution, but it was one of the forces.

The Jacobite sentiment was strong on the Chesapeake, and led men more easily to recur to the fundamental principles of English liberty. Their ancestors

had always insisted that they would be governed only by laws of their own making, made by their representatives in Parliament assembled. Every Englishman's house was his castle. Every man's property was his own, and no part of it could legally be taken for public use, to defend the State, or to support the Government, without his consent, freely given by his representative.

The belief was firmly imbedded in their hearts that there could be "no taxation without representation." And another right, the inheritance of Englishmen, was the right to resist illegal government, by force and arms. The right of rebellion was as well defined as the right of representation, and rebellion was not necessarily revolution. Rebellion corrected the abuses of government; revolution overturned government itself. Rebellion secured new guarantees for liberty; revolution created new government.

Thus had the barons wrung from John the guarantees of the great charter—a grant from the Crown of security for rights to a class. Thus had the Parliament resisted the exactions of the Star Chamber and its attempt to levy ship money, taxes without the consent of the taxed. Thus had the body of the people overthrown the Commonwealth when it attempted to govern England without a king or House of Lords, and thus revolutionize the ancient constitution of the realm; and thus had the grandfathers of the leaders of the American Revolution expelled James Stuart when he purposed to establish absolute government in England. The idea of forcible resistance to illegal government was deeply imbedded in the American heart.



The convention between the Commonwealth and Virginia, in 1651, secured to the Virginians the right to make their own laws and to tax themselves. The charter of Maryland guaranteed to the people of that province the same rights; and when the Governor attempted to levy taxes by proclamation, fixing the fees of the land office, the General Assembly promptly denounced the illegal act, and, in a report on the inalienable rights of Englishmen—which, it has been said, was worthy of the most distinguished statesman of England—demonstrated that taxes could only be legally levied by the representatives of the people who were taxed.

When the Governor of North Carolina attempted to coerce the North Carolinians into paying taxes without their consent—disguised as illegal fees—they promptly applied the ancestral remedy, and in arms resisted the King's Governor and the King's troops at the battle of the Alamance, in 1771. They were defeated with heavy loss, and some were promptly hung as traitors; but that only proved that the King's troops were better armed, better disciplined, and better commanded than the regulators. It settled nothing as to the right of taxation and the right of rebellion. In 1772 the people of Rhode Island captured and burned to the water's edge the Royal armed vessel the *Gaspé*, in Narragansett Bay, for attempting to enforce the revenue laws; and Stephen Hopkins, Chief Justice of Rhode Island, refused to issue warrants for the guilty parties or to recognize their arrest as legal.

When the Stamp Act was passed, in 1765, requiring that all process of courts, conveyances, and legal papers should be on stamped paper, the County

Court of Frederick County, Maryland, in November, 1765, decided that the act did not bind the freemen of Maryland, who had had no voice in its enactment, and committed their clerk to prison for contempt in refusing to obey their order to issue process without stamps. Thus in all the English colonies the right of resistance and rebellion had been claimed, asserted, and exercised.

A common sentiment, a common danger, and a common cause are potent forces toward creating sympathy and concerted action. The hearts of men are more efficient allies than their heads, for they do not calculate consequences. With the destruction of British prestige came of necessity the obliteration of provincialism—the admitted superiority of everything home-born or home-produced to everything colonial. Thackeray faithfully paints the picture of the time when he describes the young Virginian visiting the home of his fathers as regarded as a young Mohawk, and an object of surprise because he was white. Braddock himself and his officers did not measure up to the colonial standard of manners, of education, or of intelligence. Their superiors in every respect could be found in the routs at Williamsburg and Annapolis, or the parlors of Philadelphia, New York, and Boston; and in place of the provincial feeling of inferiority, rapidly developed a continental sentiment of present equality, with a swelling sense of a great destiny, when America would fill and act a great part in the future of the human race.

When the Stamp Act was passed the continent called the comrades of the battle of the Monongahela to come together and consult as to what the

common right was entitled to, and what the common interest required to be done. The Braddock campaign was the author of the Stamp Act congress, as that was of the Articles of Confederation, and they of the Constitution of the United States. They were all the product of great historical forces which direct the march of nations and the development of races, and lead to results beyond human prevision, human fears, or human hopes.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PLANTER'S LIFE AND MARRIAGE.

DURING the years prior to the breaking out of the rebellion, Washington devoted himself to his large estate on the Potomac, his servants, his crops, and his stock. The most curious disquisitions have been written and most extraordinary analyses been made as to the wonderful traits of this astonishing youth. He is a prig, or a phenomenon, according to the point of view and the medium through which he is examined. In one of his youthful letters, unfortunately preserved, reference is made to a "lowland beauty" to whom his adolescent fancy had turned; and half a dozen Virginian families still claim that their ancestress was the lowland beauty. He fell in love with Mary Bland, of Westmoreland; with Lucy Grimes, who afterward married "Light Horse Harry" Lee, and became the mother of Robert E. Lee—greatest of the line of Lees; with Mary Cary, of Vacluse; with Betsey Fauntleroy, of Richmond County; and with Mary Phillipse, the heiress, of New York—not to mention the hundred other girls from Boston to Annapolis with whom the young Virginian colonel flirted and made love.

There is a portrait of Colonel Washington, painted by Charles Wilson Peale, at Mount Vernon, in 1772, as colonel of the Twenty-second Regiment,

Virginia Militia. It is in the uniform of a Virginia colonel—blue coat, scarlet vest and breeches, and represents a young man. His smooth-shaven face and natural hair show a complexion as clean and clear as perfect health, happy surroundings, and good habits, with constant life in the open air, can give, and is as fine a specimen of manly beauty as is ever seen. The frontispiece to this volume is copied from Peale's admirable portrait. The caricatures of Stuart and Trumbull, and the rest, when life had become a burden to escape the portrait painters, give no idea of the young Virginian of 1756-'72.

The Virginian way always has been to make love to every pretty girl with whom he was thrown. Young, handsome, with the second fortune in the province, and family as good as any—for Lord Fairfax's Scotch barony did not outrank, in the estimation of the cavalier Virginians, the position in society and claim for respect of the descendant of that Colonel Washington who held Worcester for the king and for so long answered to every summons for surrender "at his Majestie's pleasure"—with the first military reputation among the soldiers Virginia's wars against the French and Indians had trained—with the grave, decorous manners of his generation, no man in Virginia would naturally be received by the matrons and maids who clustered at the country houses along the Potomac, the Rappahannock, the Pamunkey, and the James, with more cordial welcome than Colonel Washington, of Mount Vernon.

At Belvoir with the Fairfaxes, at Vaucuse with the Carys, at Eagle's Nest with the Fitzhughs, at Stratford House with the Lees; with the Carters at

Sabine Hall, and with the Fauntleroy's in Richmond, then as now, a well-born and agreeable, handsome, rich, distinguished young gentleman was a welcome guest, and George Washington became the toast of the tide-water country. What wonder, then, that he fell in love with every pretty girl and told her so, in his visitings among his neighbors, and on his official journeys to and from Williamsburgh, when his habitual stopping places were at these very country houses, and his customary hostesses these girls and their mothers!

Washington was a man all over—a man with strong appetites, fierce temper, positive, belligerent, and aggressive. The quality in which he differed from almost all men was his absolutely perfect control over his passions and his mind. In his boyhood he appreciated the weak points of his character—his tendency to be moved by impulse and sudden tempests of emotion—and he set himself deliberately to work to correct these infirmities. His fortitude, his patience, his perseverance, his tenacity, were all the result of this introspection, and, taken with the severe physical training of his youth, in the woods with his horse and gun, in the forest with his hatchet and surveyor's compass, fitted him for control over the wills of other men, and rendered him capable of dealing with great affairs, when the time called for those qualities. As soon as Fort Du Quesne fell he resigned his commission and returned to Mount Vernon. On January 6, 1759, he married Martha Dandridge Custis, the widow of Daniel Parke Custis, a Virginia gentleman of family and estate, and herself of a well-established Virginia family. Daniel Parke Custis was the grandson of John Parke.

By one of those curious turns of fortune, Mrs. Custis and her children—she had two by her first marriage—were possessed of the estate of the White House on the Pamunkey River, which had been originally granted to William Claiborne, once Secretary of the province, to whom it had been given for a great victory over the Pamunkey Indians. He had been expelled from his legal possession of Kent Island, in Maryland, by the Calverts, and for eight generations has been stigmatized as “rebel.” “Rebel” is one who has unsuccessfully resisted wrong. It always has been so, and always will be so. The defeated are always wrong, and there is no greater crime in the category of politics than failure. The estate of the White House passed from the Claibornes to the Parkes, to the Custises, to Washington’s stepchildren, and through them to the Lees, where it now vests.

The marriage took place at the little church near the White House, near Tunstall’s station on the York River Railroad, from which the site of the original White House may still be seen embowered in trees on the south bank of the Pamunkey. The wedding was attended by Governor Fauquier and all the gentry from Williamsburgh and the Northern Neck, with all the bravery of London coaches and new London liveries, and, as may well be imagined, was a social event of the first magnitude. After the wedding the newly wedded couple drove to Mount Vernon in their coach and four, bright with the Washington colors of red and white, and attended by a troop of friends—for a Virginian wedding is not a brief ceremonial; it is a prolonged festivity, and every relative, friend, and well-wisher is expected to enjoy

the hospitalities of all the family within practicable distance.

A man on horseback would be sent ahead, from stopping place to stopping place, to notify the cousin, or the uncle, or the aunt, living on the route, that the party would be there at such a time. And so they went, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty kinspeople, with their horses, their dogs, and their servants, and with them came mirth and jollity, innocent and simple pleasures, enjoyed by healthy, robust natures, absolutely devoid of selfishness and intrigue.

By day and by night the girls enjoyed themselves in dancing and flirting, and the men were hunting the deer or the fox, or shooting the Virginian partridge, or the ducks, geese, and swans with which the waters were thronged. At night the younger men courted the girls and the older ones played cards, until the day wound up with a supper of game, fish, oysters, ham, turkey, beef and mutton home-raised, with plentiful bowls of punch, apple toddy, and egg-nog in season. While these people drank freely and frequently, the life in the open air, the constant exercise indoors and out, prevented or cured excess, and drinking brought no ill effects, physically or morally. When the newly married couple were settled at Mount Vernon, they entertained, as was the custom of the country, frequently and generously. Colonel Washington understood that hospitality was one of the customs and the duties of his station, and he ordered his life to do his duty by his position, his wife, his servants, his property, and himself.

The management of a great estate of necessity must require organization and order. Everything must be done in the proper way and at the proper

time, and a record must be kept of all the events of the little world—the microcosm of the plantation. Every marriage among the dependents must be duly recorded in the Almanac or the Farm Book; every birth must be put down; every increase or diminution of stock entered; all crops raised and all expenses accounted for, and a diary kept preserving a statement of diurnal transactions.

It has been the fashion to depict Washington as a young man of preternatural pomposity and gravity, of ponderous courtesy, and prodigious and elaborate manners. But he certainly was neither. He was a Virginian gentleman of his epoch, with all the characteristics of his day and generation. He loved a glass of wine, a game of cards, a pretty girl, a good horse, a fast run after the hounds, and a rattling rush through the woods after the deer—and he loved these animal pleasures intensely. He was grave and decorous in deportment—so was every gentleman; he was careful and painstaking about his property affairs—so were many heads of families. But he was absolutely and perfectly self-controlled. He never let go his hand on himself for an instant. Several times during his life the fiery temper got away from the hand of iron—as with the Connecticut colonels at New York, with Charles Lee at Monmouth or with Hamilton at Philadelphia; but generally the control of his strong nature was entirely unshaken.

The government of a plantation was like the discipline of a regiment. Without firmness, intelligence, and order everything goes to pieces; and what might with proper direction and control be made to accomplish useful purposes, becomes a broken, dis-

arranged machine, with every part misfitting and out of order. The estate of Mount Vernon was no such mismanaged organization. Its master and mistress were both capable, courageous, and conscientious people, who did their duty most fairly and fully by themselves, their men-servants and their maid-servants, their oxen and their asses, and everything that was theirs.

Colonel Washington was the representative of Fairfax County in the House of Burgesses at Williamsburgh, and a vestryman of Truro Parish on the Potomac. As vestryman, he did his part toward overseeing the comfort of his neighbors by giving them good roads, and administering proper police regulations against the roaming of servants from plantations after nightfall.

When he attended the House of Burgesses, soon after his marriage, Mr. Speaker Robinson, says tradition, upon calling the House to order, took occasion to thank "the gentleman from Fairfax for his service to Virginia"; and the gentleman from Fairfax, rising in his seat to make his acknowledgments, was so overcome with bashfulness that he could not speak. Whereupon the Speaker called out, "Take your seat, Mr. Washington; your modesty excels your valor, and that exceeds the power of language to express."

Like many of the demigod myths and fables of Washington, this story smacks of the incredible. In the first place, those people at that time, as now, were not inclined or partial to dramatic performances by themselves. Among the Virginians there has never been the slightest tendency toward *gush*. With the deepest feeling of love or resentment, of

devotion or of hatred, they never make public demonstrations of them. Pickett's men marched up the slope at Gettysburg without a cheer, right into the jaws of death.

And, further, the Speaker of the House of Burgesses was an experienced and well-read parliamentary lawyer, and he knew that for the Speaker to compliment or reprimand a member in his place was one of the highest prerogatives of the House, and could only be done by express authority of the House. When, therefore, the Speaker by order of the House presented its thanks to Colonel Washington, the dignified and becoming thing for Colonel Washington to do was to rise in his place, bow to the Speaker, and take his seat as he did. The idea of his attempting to "answer back" originated in another latitude—never among Virginians.

Everywhere in Virginia he was of the first reputation and of the highest influence. One of the local stories is that, the parish requiring a new church, the question was much debated whether it should be located at a more central place, or the ancient one preserved. George Mason, one of the vestry, was ardent, enthusiastic, and eloquent in urging them to stand by the old landmarks, consecrated by the ashes of their worthy ancestors and sacred to all the memories of life, marriage, birth, and death.

Colonel Washington replied by producing a plat of the parish, drawn by himself with his well-known accuracy, on which every road was laid down and the house of every gentleman was marked, and which showed that the new location advocated by him was more convenient to every member of the

parish, and that the old one was exceedingly inaccessible. The parochial meeting decided in favor of the new location and the plat. George Mason put on his hat and stalked out of the meeting, saying in not smothered tones, "That's what gentlemen get for engaging in debate with a d—d surveyor!" But notwithstanding this little tiff, the owners of Gunston Hall and of Mount Vernon had the highest respect and warmest affection for each other.

Mason was much the older man, a scholar and a student rather than a man of affairs. He regarded his young neighbor, soldier-planter, manager of the Ohio Company, projector of the transcontinental water line by the Potomac, the Monongahela, the Ohio, and the Wabash to the Lakes, with the respect and admiration with which the man of ideas looks upon the man of affairs; while Washington revered the older man with the veneration with which the youth with life and the world before him regards the sage who lives in the past.

Mason was well known in the Dominion as a man with the highest ideals of duty and of character, of vigorous intellect, a student of men and books. He was the author of the Bill of Rights of Virginia, wherein, following the example of his ancestors in the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights, he furnished the precedent for all American commonwealths up to this time. It is unfortunate for posterity that he refused to participate in Continental politics. Elected to Congress, he declined to accept the place; and although he served in the Constitutional Convention, he failed to procure acceptance of his ideas by that body, as experience has proved, greatly to the injury of posterity.

When, following the lead of Virginia and Massachusetts, committees of correspondence were formed all over the country, county committees were organized for the purpose of disseminating information and educating the people. The county meeting is the descendant of the folkmote, and is as old as the race. Whenever and wherever any attack has been made on the common right, the neighborhood meets in council for co-operation and organization. The county committees in England assumed the government of the counties in 1641-'45, disciplined the "disloyal," and made the disaffected contribute to the support of the common cause against the king.

The very first movement of sedition and rebellion in America was made in the county committees and town meetings. In New England local government was administered by town meetings. In Virginia and the South it was by the vestries, which met every month for the purpose of regulating the police affairs of the parish.

The first step in rebellion was to substitute county committees for vestries, so that the whole *posse comitatus*, the entire power of the county, might be centralized and wielded by one authority. The meeting of Fairfax County was presided over by Colonel Washington, of Mount Vernon, and adopted a declaration of the right of the people of each province to govern themselves, a protest against the vindictive treatment of Massachusetts, and a recommendation that the Continental Congress should forward a petition and remonstrance to the king, and pray him to reflect "that from the king there was but one appeal."

No gentleman of Washington's position in the

community could afford to threaten or bluster. The language of the vestries and county meetings in Maryland and Virginia was calm, clear, and positive. They said exactly what they intended to say—no more, no less—"From the king but one appeal." What was that? The appeal which their ancestors had made against John, against Charles I, against James II—an appeal to the *God of battle!*

That was the alternative presented by the English on Chesapeake to the British beyond sea—an admission of the right to govern themselves as they saw fit, forever and forever, or war! Directly after the passage of the Fairfax resolutions, Colonel Washington set out for Williamsburg to attend to his duties in the House of Burgesses.

That body promptly backed the county meetings, called a Continental Congress to meet in Philadelphia, and chose six delegates to it, of whom Washington was one. In the discussion as to measures to be taken for the support of Massachusetts in the position she had taken, and the relief of Boston from the attack made on her liberties by the British, he said: "If need be, I will raise one thousand men, subsist them at my own expense, and march them to the relief of Boston."

And he could have done so by the raising of his hand. "Rally to Colonel Washington!" would have been the slogan. Up the Potomac to Fort Cumberland, across the mountains to Fort Pitt, down the Ohio to the Kanawha, up the Kanawha to the Gauley, the word would have passed by fleet runners, and the hunters under Michael Cresap and Mordecai Gist would have flocked to him over the Blue Mountains, down the river valleys, up from tide water in Mary-

land and Virginia, and twenty days would have given him more than one thousand men such as General Morgan afterward led at Saratoga or Lord Stirling at Long Island. He was promptly in his place in Philadelphia at the opening of Congress.

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION.

THE failure of the Americans to adequately support with men and money the campaigns against the French in Canada created the idea at home that proper means should be taken to compel them to do so. It was decided that they could not be trusted to raise money by taxing themselves to support imperial objects, and therefore it was necessary to devise methods by which they could be made to do their duty to the empire. The method proposed was by imperial taxation, imposed by the imperial Parliament.

In the Parliament America was not represented, and it was perhaps impracticable to grant the provincials representation there. Such a measure was suggested, considered, and rejected. The plainest, simplest form of taxation, and one which was familiar to the English, was to require all legal process, papers, conveyances, and wills to be written on stamped paper which was supplied by the Government. This form of taxation does not incommode the great body of the people, but touches mainly the class which deals with purchase and sale, with exchange, with transactions in money, and with the business of the people. But, like all taxation, it distributes itself through the entire community, and

falls equally on all property and on every class. It had been in force in England for generations, and was acquiesced in as just, equal, and convenient.

The idea of a central government for the New England in America had been conceived and discussed by statesmen on either side of the Atlantic long before the pressure of New France brought the question of continental union up for decision. As far back as 1701, Robert Livingston, of New York, had suggested that all the colonies should be united under one government; and, in 1752, Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia, urged upon the Lords of Trade the establishment of two separate confederacies in the North and South. It was agreed on all hands that concentration of the resources of all the colonies was necessary for the common defense; but it was with equal unanimity that each colony claimed the sole right to regulate all of its internal affairs.

In 1754 the impending war with France brought this question to a decision, and several of the royal governors, upon the recommendation of the Earl of Holderness, Secretary of State, called a congress of all the colonies to be held at Albany. The object was to secure co-operation of the colonies against the French and the alliance of the Indian tribes, and thus divide the hereditary enemies of the English in America, and also to prepare and propose for adoption some plan of confederation which would be accepted by all the colonies. Only seven out of the thirteen sent delegates—New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.

On the 4th of July, 1754, this congress adopted

a plan of union proposed by Benjamin Franklin, a deputy from Pennsylvania. This plan provided that a Federal Grand Council should meet every year at Philadelphia, to be composed of "members" from each colony, proportioned to its military strength, which was to elect its own officers. The Grand Council was to be elected by the General Assembly of each colony selecting "members of the Council" to which the colony was entitled. The plan is particular to designate them "members of the Council," and nowhere "representatives, delegates, or deputies," so carefully was it guarded from possible inference from designations or words. After the first term, "members" were to be selected for three years, proportioned to taxes paid into the common fund.

The government was to be administered by a president-general to be appointed by the Crown, who was to appoint all military officers subject to the confirmation of the Grand Council and to have a veto on its acts. The Grand Council was to have entire control over the questions of peace and war, defense against and trade with the Indians. As to Continental matters, it could raise armies and impose taxes. The plan utterly failed, and was nowhere received with favor, except by Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts. Neither to the provincial nor to the home government was it acceptable. But notwithstanding this futile attempt at union the fact was as imperative as ever.

The French in Canada barely exceeded fifty thousand souls—men, women, and children; the English on the Atlantic numbered nearly eleven hundred thousand; but the French, scattered over a wide



territory, were controlled by one will and wielded by one arm—a governor, always a soldier; while the English were divided into thirteen separate governments, each independent of all the rest, and only connected by the ties of common blood, laws, race, and language. Thus the first movement for a Continental union for defense against the Indians and Roman Catholics failed; but the germ of the movement was planted, and as soon as necessity arose for united action, co-operation was had.

When the Stamp Act was passed, in 1765, Massachusetts promptly called a Congress to meet at New York, the headquarters of the British army in America. There the deputies from nine colonies out of the thirteen met, each colony having an equal vote. They were from Massachusetts, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. The Governor of Virginia prevented that province from being represented by refusing to convoke the General Assembly, and by executive influence New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Georgia were also unrepresented. But the people everywhere were in full accord with the sentiment of resistance to the illegal act of government.

This Congress, under the lead of Christopher Gadsden, of South Carolina, asserted in moderate but positive terms that the English in America were entitled to all the essential and common rights of Englishmen at home. "We should stand," said Gadsden, "upon the broad common ground of those natural rights that we all know and feel as men, and as the descendants of Englishmen."

This was the keynote, this the general feeling

through all the colonies, "that we are Englishmen," and entitled to equal rights with Englishmen at home, greatest and chiefest of which was the right to enforce, obtain, and defend those rights, with arms, at the expense of life, blood, and fortune. The pure-blooded race of English in New England and on the Chesapeake were unanimous for resistance in arms. The mixed population of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were neither unanimous nor determined on such a course. In North Carolina the English were for resistance, and the Scotch Highlanders, the representatives of the Jacobite feeling, many of whom were fugitives from Culloden, were zealous in the support of the House of Hanover, for the overthrow of which they had given fortune, blood, and native land. But they held themselves bound by their parol and their oath of allegiance, and the bloodiest conflicts of the Revolution were to take place between the friends and kinsmen of Flora McDonald in North Carolina, where she lived, and the descendants of the English who fought them or their ancestors in 1715 and 1745. The Irish everywhere were prompt for rebellion, and the Roman Catholics, principal of whom were the great landholders and leaders of Maryland, were firm in defense of their rights as Englishmen.

There has never been a day in which the English Roman Catholic has not been clear in claiming hereditary rights and courageous in defending them. Whether under Lord Howard of Effingham, against Medina-Sidonia, and Guise, and the Grand Armada, or against the Scotch irruptions under the Stuarts, or against threats of invasion by Napoleon, whenever and wherever the rights of Englishmen have

been threatened or the integrity of the realm endangered, the English Roman Catholics have been foremost in defense of them.

The ultimate consequences of the Braddock campaign, therefore, were to relieve the colonies from the pressure of threats of invasion from the French in the North and the Spaniard in the South, and to impel them toward Continental union to defend themselves from the inroads of the Indians from the West and the English from the East.

The rebellion of 1775, the Revolution of 1776-'81, were the logical consequences of Braddock's defeat, which made the conquest of Canada, or the loss of North America, the sole alternatives to the English nation, and which produced the supreme effort which resulted in the subjection of the continent to the English, and, as a consequence of that, the independence of the English in America, of the English beyond sea.

It was just and proper that the English in America should provide means and men for their own defense. They had done so from the first settlement, raising and subsisting their own troops; but they had done so by their own legislatures, themselves being judges of what was necessary and proper to be done. The taxing power was retained in their own hands. When, therefore, the British ministry proposed in Parliament to raise funds for the common defense by imposing a stamp tax on the colonies, the proposition was met by indignant protest all the way from Boston to Savannah.

Washington, at Mount Vernon, engaged in the supervision of his plantation, his family, and his servants, was deeply impressed with the prodigious

importance of the proposition. His neighbor, George Mason, of Gunston Hall, the profoundest political thinker of his generation in Virginia, thoroughly informed as to history, and especially the history of the English race and its reiterated struggle in arms against unrestrained absolute power of government, thoroughly sympathized with him.

He demonstrated to the self-contained soldier-planter the inevitable consequences of yielding to the first encroachment of power on liberty, and that only two courses were possible—prompt and early resistance or abject submission. And he foresaw that resistance meant separation. Freed from the threat of the French and the Spaniard, abundantly able to deal with the Indian, he knew that when once the issue was joined the provincials would promptly vindicate their ability to meet the British regulars in the field, and the colonies their capacity for governing themselves, and that thereafter it would be impossible to reconcile them to subordination to the British Parliament.

Washington was, before everything, a Virginian; but he was an Englishman as well. The Braddock campaign had emancipated him from that provincialism which exaggerated all the high characteristics of the home people, and he appreciated them at their fair value. He considered the Virginian Englishman the equal in every way of the Briton at home. The Stamp Act, therefore, shocked him, and the repeal of the law, with the reservation of the power and right of Parliament to tax the American colonists, filled him with gloomy forebodings.

He did not want a separation from friends and kindred at home. He was not in favor of secession,

and it was not until flagrant war demanded all the assistance that could be brought to support it that he consented to the Declaration of Independence. He was a member of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, from which, under the lead of Patrick Henry, came the first defiance of the British Parliament and the first assertion of the principle on which resistance to it was to rest. "The taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen to represent them, . . . is the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, without which the Constitution can not exist," was the declaration of Henry's resolutions passed by the House. They further declared that any attempt to vest the power of taxation in any other body than the Colonial Assembly was a menace to British no less than to American freedom; that the people of Virginia were not bound to obey any law enacted in disregard of these fundamental principles; and that any one who should maintain the contrary should be regarded as a public enemy.

But, looking back over the century and a quarter that has intervened, it is still impossible to understand the utter fatuity which controlled the British Cabinet in the twenty years that passed before the Declaration of Independence. Deep down imbedded in the heart of the race, from its emigration from Germany to the British Isle, was a conviction that no man should be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by the judgment of his peers and the law of the land. His peers were his neighbors impaneled into a jury of twelve men, who, sitting in judgment, administered justice in the light of his life, his character, and his career, more or less known to them.

In the reign of Charles II a law had been passed to enforce revenue laws—that when smuggled goods were suspected to be concealed in any house, a writ of assistance might be issued from the admiralty, commanding the marshal to search all suspected places and seize all suspected goods and arrest all suspected persons, and, if necessary, to summon to his assistance such force as might be in his judgment necessary. An act of William III granted to revenue officers in America all the powers they were entitled to in England. In addition, an act was passed to preserve timber for the royal navy, and many trees were blazed and marked with the broad arrow in the forests of Maine, the two Carolinas, and Georgia, and thus dedicated to the use of the navy. Any trespass on this royal preserve was punished in the admiralty by stripes, fine, and imprisonment.

By the Statute of Treasons of Henry VIII, all treasons committed anywhere under the British dominion were triable in England. On the charge that American juries could not be relied on to convict their fellow-subjects for violation of revenue laws, the old statutes of Henry VIII and Charles II were revived to secure convictions and deprive them of trial by jury. All ordinary offenses against the revenue laws were triable by one judge, without a jury, in admiralty. All extraordinary offenders were to be deported to England and tried by a jury, when conviction was sure. Thus the right to tax themselves, and the right to trial by a jury of their neighbors, were alike denied by the British Government to the provincials. The writ of assistance authorized the marshal to search every suspected place for proof

of suspected crime. It laid every house open to the menials of the admiralty. His house was no longer a man's castle, but was open on demand to any officer of the Admiralty Court.

The attempt to extend the admiralty jurisdiction, and thus deprive freeborn Englishmen of their hereditary right of trial by jury, the assertion of the power of the writs of assistance, which were general warrants authorized to search *all* suspected places, seize *all* suspected goods, and arrest *all* suspected persons, roused the people like a fire-bell by night, and the coast, from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico, blazed with bonfires burning in effigy the obnoxious admiralty judges and minions who sought to perpetrate this outrage on the freeborn.

The controversy between the common law and the admiralty courts had raged in England from the time when the Count of the Saxon shore was necessarily vested with authority to call out all the power of the sea and land to resist invasion by Saxon, or Dane, or Norseman ; and only as the power of the central government of king, lords, and commons was crystallized into regular forms and developed into governing force to establish security for home, life, and property, were the King's courts of sufficient authority to protect the King's subjects against the usurpations and aggressions of the admiralty ; and it was not until the time of Lord Coke that his rugged English brain and courage established on immutable foundations the principle that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was bounded by the tide, and controlled only the doings of men on the great deep.

So deeply seated is this desire of power to ex-

tend itself on the one side, and the desire of the freeborn to resist usurpation on the other, that the struggle between the admiralty and the common right has been continued from the colonies to the States, until the fourth generation after the Declaration of Independence has not been able sufficiently to check or bridle the admiralty jurisdiction within the limits established by Lord Coke.

The use of stamps was so universally repudiated, the law requiring the use of them so generally ignored, that they passed out of existence and made no sign. The stamp officers everywhere were forced to resign their offices, and the stamps were burnt or reshipped home. The stamp officer for Annapolis in Maryland escaped to New York, where, under the guns of the British fleet and the protection of the British army, he hoped to live in peace. But the irate Marylanders pursued him there, and a committee from Annapolis forced him, at the point of the sword, to resign his place. The courts of Maryland required public and private business to be transacted without stamps, and the bar of Charleston, South Carolina, unanimously signed an application to the court that the law should be ignored in that jurisdiction, because it was manifestly contrary to the fundamental rights of Englishmen.

The repeal of the Stamp Act amounted to nothing. It reasserted the right of Parliament to tax the colonies, and while experience had just proved that this right of taxation would never produce revenue, for it could not be enforced, the insistence on this theoretical right gave grave offense to the English in America. It is the peculiarity of the race that they feel ideas like facts, and the assertion of

an obnoxious principle is with them as bad as the enforcement of it.

The levy of a few shillings ship-money on John Hampden did not inconvenience him, nor did it threaten his neighbors, but the assertion of the right to take his property without his consent implied the right to take the property of any man for any purpose, and thus no man's home was safe, and he held everything at the pleasure of the King. On that issue the English took arms, overthrew a dynasty, and after many battles on many bloody fields have established a government where security for life, liberty, and property has never been exceeded in the history of the world.

In 1761 the revenue officer of Boston applied to Chief-Justice Hutchinson for a writ of assistance—that is, a general warrant to search all suspected places for all suspected goods and persons, specifying none of them. James Otis appeared before the court as counsel for the people, and with fiery eloquence demonstrated that general warrants were contrary to the Constitution, and that no one was bound to respect them. He did not point out the logical consequence—the common sense of the people did that—that no man could interfere with any other man's rights of person or property without the authority of the law, and that whoever did so, without legal warrant, was a trespasser, and might legally be resisted by force.

If a private trespass might thus be met by force—and that has been a maxim of the common law from the time “beyond which the memory of man runneth not”—so much the more was it the duty of the loyal subject as of the free citizen to take

arms to resist trespass on the common right, the right of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The British Administration withdrew the stamp tax. It cost more to collect it than it could be made to yield, but it put in a "continual claim" of the right to tax the provincials, and arranged to enforce the regulations of trade more rigorously.

Under the British navigation acts—remnant of the Commonwealth and of Cromwell's policy—all trade with the colonies was required to be carried on through home ports in British bottoms. Thus sugar from Jamaica to Maryland must first be shipped to Bristol or London or Portsmouth in British ships, and thence to the James River or the Potomac. It was this violation of the natural laws of trade that forced the traders of New England, who flew as free and fearless sails as any Viking under the raven flag, to defy the law and run sugar into home ports.

But, as population increased in the intervening century, the navigation acts operated in unforeseen ways, and imposed unheard-of burdens on the people. In York, Pennsylvania, there was a manufactory of beaver hats, which were needed in Maryland. They could not be wagoned to Baltimore, forty miles off, because direct trade between the colonies was forbidden. The Virginians on the Rappahannock produced a high quality of pig iron, which was needed in Baltimore and elsewhere, to be manufactured into plows, axes, and hoes. But the same law prevented the direct trade. And, ten thousand times worse, from the minute either hats or iron started on their roundabout journey to the consumer, they became subject to admiralty law and were deprived of the

right to a trial by jury. A dozen hats smuggled across the border rendered every house liable to search, every box to seizure, and every person to arrest. Every province was surrounded by an iron wall of protection; interstate trade was absolutely prohibited, and the interchange of products among neighbors was forbidden.

Under natural conditions, the great fisheries of the Chesapeake would have been the source of untold prosperity to their possessors and their neighbors. Their rich yield could have been exchanged for the hats, cloths, leather, and industrial products of Pennsylvania, and both sides made a profit and prospered. But the British intellect is incapable of taking in the idea of the equality of other men.

Though the provincials were in the main of their own blood, they never did understand, never could appreciate, the fact that societies are born, grow, develop, and arrive at maturity precisely as men do, and, *as men* require different treatment from boys, so mature provinces occupy different positions in the world from infant colonies. It is this incapacity that is now risking the British hold on her colonies, and which will certainly lose her Canada and Australasia, unless she recognizes them as her equals and associates with them on terms of equal rights.

The pretensions of the admiralty were steadily resisted. James Otis's attack on general search warrants, or writs of assistance, was followed up in every other colony except Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Perhaps the inducements of trade were more dominating in those colonies, and peace and thrift were preferred to the tempestuous struggle of civil war for the preservation of hereditary rights.

During the discussions about the stamp tax, the provincial governors had represented to the Lords of Trade that, while the Americans would resist every attempt at direct taxation, they would be satisfied with indirect contributions to the imperial treasury for the common defense, raised by means of regulations of trade—tariff taxes, as we now understand them. Accordingly, the Administration, under the lead of Charles Townsend, Chancellor of the Exchequer, imposed a tax on glass, paper, lead, paints, colors, and tea, imported into the colonies. This act was to be enforced by a board of revenue commissioners for the whole country, to sit at Boston, and general writs of assistance were expressly authorized. That is, that a board at Boston was to issue a general warrant to search all houses in Maryland, to seize all property, and to arrest all persons that the revenue collector for the district chose to search, seize, and arrest.

The King was to appoint governors and judges and create a general civil list, and grant pensions in every colony, all of which were to be paid out of the fund raised by tariff taxation; that is, that the people were to be deprived of all influence over their executive and judicial officers, as their legislatures were superseded by the imperial Parliament, and they were to be delivered into the hands of the Crown, with life, liberty, and property absolutely at its disposal, utterly stripped of their right of trial by jury.

No such scheme of absolutism was ever applied to people of English blood before. Not Strafford, in his wildest dreams of "thorough," ever imagined such a plan of subjugating a freeborn people to

absolute authority. The tariff on imports was promptly met by the colonists by agreements among themselves not to import anything from home, or purchase or use anything imported. The Townsend Tariff Act was passed in 1767, but so fierce was the opposition to it, that in 1769 Parliament repealed all except the duty on tea.


Tea was probably selected because a tax on it would be the least annoying, and would touch fewer people than any other tax whatever. The retention of it would assert the right of Parliament to tax the colonies. The tax would not produce over three hundred pounds; and as tea was unknown to the great mass of the people, and used only by the few rich and traveled families, it was supposed that a tax on it would pass unnoticed, and the principle asserted be universally acquiesced in because it inconvenienced nobody. So little was the use of tea known, that tradition says that a gentleman in Virginia gave his overseer a pound of tea as a present to his wife, who, thinking it was some new-fashioned "greens," promptly boiled the whole of it in a pot with a big ham!

At this period few people anywhere meditated secession, and independence of the home government. It was dimly crystallizing in the mind of Patrick Henry, but without definite form. Samuel Adams, of Massachusetts, claimed that from the passage of the Declaratory Act asserting the omnipotence of Parliament, he became fixed in purpose and clear in intention to produce a complete separation, as the only defense from the constant intermeddling of the mother country with the affairs and domestic rights of the provincials. But George Mason, George

Washington, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, Thomas Johnson and Charles Carroll, of Maryland, Richard Caswell, of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina, all patriotic Englishmen, all devoted to the traditions and the institutions of "home," the birth-place and grave of their ancestors for generations, had no desire for separation, and certainly no intention to prepare for it.

George Mason was of too philosophic a mind not to understand that a combination by people to resist law—law enacted with all the guarantees, securities, forms, and sanctions ever thrown around any law—on the vague ground that such a law was no law, because contrary to common right and the fundamental principles of justice, Mason was too well read in history, and too sagacious, not to appreciate that the first step was being taken to arouse resistance to government; that such rebellion was very different from the rebellion against Charles I and the Star Chamber, and that against James II, when the result of resistance must of necessity be not a revolution in the principles, but a change in the administrators, of government.

The combination against law, beginning with the repudiation of the Stamp Act, followed by the non-importation agreement, organized in provincial congresses, could only result in absolute defeat and subjection to the will of Great Britain, when the colonies would be governed by military law applied by soldiers, as the Southern States were while under the reconstruction governments, or in complete success, which would secure the colonies absolute control of their own destinies, and this, once secured, must result



in independence, for the victor never yet has submitted to the sway of the vanquished.

But while a few prophetic and enthusiastic minds and hearts, aflame with the divine frenzy of passion, of sentiment, of devotion to high ideals, felt that the issue was between subjugation and slavery or liberty and independence, the great mass of the property holders, the churchmen, the landholders, were faithful in their love of home and kin, and had not the remotest idea that they were being led in the path of a separation, to be achieved at the expense of so many tears and lives and so much blood and property.

The tariff on tea, therefore, though it touched nobody or annoyed any one, was taken by the leaders North and South to be more insidious and more dangerous than an open notorious violation of common right. A tax levied and collected by the King's tax-gatherer from door to door would have aroused the people like the fiery cross of Clan-Alpin, and the representative of the royal authority would have been booted from the mountains to the sea. But in order to confuse the question of right, the import duty paid by the East India Company on tea imported into England was remitted to the company on tea exported to America, so that the price of tea, with Townsend's tariff on it, was no greater than before it was imposed.

Tea was made the test, and when, in the fall of 1773, vessels loaded with tea were sent to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, preparations were made to prevent the landing of the cargoes. At Boston, after a public meeting called to prevent the landing of the tea, a party of men, disguised

as Indians, at night threw the tea overboard in the harbor. At Charleston the tea was landed, but compelled to be stored in damp cellars, where it was speedily destroyed by mold.

But at Annapolis the boldness of the rebels surpassed all experience. On the arrival of the ship *Peggy Stewart* in that port, consigned to her owner, one Stewart, a Scotch factor, the Whig Club of Anne Arundel County were convened by their president, Dr. Charles Alexander Warfield, and with hatbands inscribed "Liberty or Death," they rode on Annapolis, and in open day gave Stewart the alternative of being hung before his own door or of firing his own ship with his own hand. He naturally chose the latter, and the *Peggy Stewart* was burned at her wharf in open day, by the direction of the principal people of the county, without disguise, who acted openly, and assumed the responsibility for their acts.

The tax on tea was, therefore, as conspicuous a failure as that on stamps had been, and it was abandoned. But Boston was required to pay for the tea destroyed by her mob, and did pay for it. A demand for payment on Maryland would have met with prompt refusal. Theirs was not the spirit to temporize, nor to draw back from a position deliberately assumed. But while the commercial sense of Boston led it to seek to obviate the consequences of the acts of its people—extra-legal, illegal, or rebellious—the body of the people, when their spirits are aroused, never temporize. On any question of right or honor, of faith or trust, the mass of feeling, in the mass of free people, may always be counted on as being on the right side, as they understand it.

And the people of Massachusetts were far above

the traders and business men of Boston in their standard of the rights of Englishmen, and their willingness to make sacrifice of property to maintain them, and their unselfish devotion and faith in the eternal truth and life of them. Boston was selected by the ministry at home for the *experimentum in corpore vili*. Her port was closed by act of Parliament, and her commerce obliterated. Major-General Gage, who had commanded the Forty-fourth Regiment as Lieutenant Colonel in Dunbar's Brigade of the rear guard at the Battle of the Monongahela, was sent to restore order in Boston with four regiments of regulars.

The provincial authorities would make no provision for billeting the troops. The experience of James II in billeting troops on the people in time of peace was too recent for the royal governor or royal general to dare to billet troops on Boston, so they lived under canvas on Boston Common, all through a Boston winter. The unnecessary hardships to which the soldiers were exposed, their consequent rheumatism and pleurisy, were not calculated to beget or to cultivate good feeling between citizens and soldiers, and consequently there were collisions, attacks on single soldiers, or on detached parties of them, until at last, in an affray in open day, the soldiers shot down several citizens who were leading the mob which was driving them into their quarters.

This was called "the Boston Massacre." Six men lost their lives in it. It is a miracle that every red-coat in Boston was not shot down that night. There were plenty of old soldiers of Louisburgh and old sailors of Marblehead in Boston, and they could have wiped out the British garrison as completely as

that other British garrison was wiped out at Delhi. But for self-control and prudence the men of New England are unsurpassed. Gage arrested the officer and his detachment who fired on the mob, and turned them over to the civil authority for trial. James Otis and John Adams defended them, and they were acquitted on the plea of self-defense. This remarkable though proper verdict may perhaps be explained on the ground of a healthy respect for General Gage's guns, and a reasonable doubt whether any other verdict would have been carried out.

During the days of reconstruction, while Virginia was Military District No. 1, a Federal sentinel shot and killed a citizen for not respecting his challenge on post. The man was doubtless amenable to the articles of war, but the commanding officer preferred to turn him over to the civil courts for trial and punishment. He was defended by an ex-Confederate officer. The Hustings court of the city of Richmond promptly acquitted him, on the ground that as a soldier he was bound to obey orders, and that the officer who gave the order was responsible, if anybody was; and, further, that the officer of the guard was not subject to civil jurisdiction during the military occupation of a conquered territory. So the coolness and judgment of the Boston jury may have been tempered by some like considerations to those which controlled the Virginia court.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS—NEW ENGLAND IN THE WAR.

ON September 4, 1774, the first Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia. Eleven colonies were there, North Carolina delegates not arriving until the 16th, and Georgia was not represented at all. Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was chosen president, and their first resolution was to reassert and indorse the Massachusetts declaration that a king who violates the chartered rights of his people forfeits their allegiance; that an act of Parliament contrary to the common right was void, and ought to be disregarded. This was another way of asserting the duty of the people to resist invasion of their rights by arms. It was the first act of nullification in America. The Congress agreed upon and passed a declaration of rights which claimed for each colony the exclusive right of control over its police, its taxation, and its expenditure, echoing the sentiment of the Fairfax resolves, and sent out addresses to the King, to the people of Great Britain, and to the other British colonies in America.

With the English race the appeal to reason has always preceded the appeal to force, but time and again in its history, resolves, remonstrances, and declarations have been backed by the sword in

manly hands. There was not unanimity in the desire for the accession of the Canadas, for twenty generations of struggle with the Roman Catholic and the Frenchman at home or in America had left feelings not to be obliterated at once.

But the desire for the purely English colonies of the Bermudas was strong, and it was not until long after, when experience had demonstrated that control of the sea guaranteed possession of the islands to Great Britain, that the statesmen of the Continent gave up all hopes of their joining the Confederacy. In fact, the address to the people of Great Britain enumerated as one of the grievances for repair of which they appealed to their fellow-subjects at home, that the Quebec Act, regulating the government of Canada, guaranteed security to the Roman Catholic Church, its priests and property, and protected them in the free exercise of their religion. Of course, when the Congress afterward sent commissioners to Canada to solicit co-operation and union, with John Carroll, Provincial of the Society of Jesus in North America, at their head, the commissioners were met by the solid opposition of the Roman Catholic Church, clergy and laity, and made an utter failure.

Nothing further was done, but this meeting still further mingled the spirits of the different colonies into a medium which prepared crystallization. The personal association between John Adams, of Massachusetts, Patrick Henry and Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, Thomas Johnson and Mathew Tilghman, of Maryland, and Christopher Gadsden, of South Carolina, in the daily intercourse of a month gave them better appreciation of the personalities

which would be united in their undertaking of resistance, than correspondence of a year would have afforded.

By the written word, ideas are expressed and imparted ; by the spoken language, force, intelligence, sympathy, directness, manliness, are understood, and the controlling powers of life lie much more in personal qualities than in intellectual ones. The faculty of expression lessens the power of force of will. No great orator or philosopher ever was a great soldier, and a great soldier rarely is a great thinker. The sphere of physical action and intellectual effort lie in different planes. These are unlikely to cross. When they do, a phenomenon like Moses, or Alexander, or Napoleon Bonaparte is produced.

Leaders of revolutions do not create them. They express in words, or in action, the common feeling, and are successful just in proportion as they faithfully, accurately express the emotions which stir all hearts. Samuel Adams may have foreseen the necessity for separation, Patrick Henry may have declared the duty of resistance by force, but neither created the idea of independence, nor originated that of revolution.

The sentiment was in the hearts of the English in America. They felt that they had grown up ; that they were men, and had the right and duty to control their own destinies, and the logic of Nature marched with irresistible and inevitable steps to resistance and separation. General Gage had occupied Boston and sought to intimidate Massachusetts since the previous April, 1774, when he had been appointed military Governor of the colony, turned into a military district, just as Virginia was in 1867-1870.

During the summer the colony nullified the act of Parliament known as the Regulating Act, which assumed to control the legislative power of the colony by vesting in the Governor appointed by the Crown the power to appoint councilors to the Governor, to hold during the pleasure of the appointing power and to be paid by it.

Committees of correspondence were organized throughout the colony and with all other colonies, and careful provision of gunpowder and lead began to be made. On every village green the young men and boys began to be drilled by the old soldiers of Pepperell, Wolfe, and Prescott. During the winter Washington occupied himself in arranging his affairs for a long absence. He committed the Mount Vernon estate to the care of Battaille Muse, his old adjutant of Fort Necessity. In April, 1775, he attended the second Congress at Philadelphia.

It has been remarked that he wore to the sessions of this Congress his uniform of a Virginia colonel of blue and buff, as significant that in his opinion the time for action had arrived. The uniform he did wear was of blue coat and scarlet waistcoat and breeches, as proved by Peale's portrait, and the reason he wore it is probably that it was the best suit he had. It had been made by a London tailor. The Articles of Nonimportation which he had signed, and of which he was a conscientious observer, had cut off supplies of appropriate dress from home, and the uniform of a man's rank was considered the dress suit for occasions of ceremony in the society to which he had been accustomed.

The military preparations in Massachusetts had occasioned discussion as to the organization of a

Continental army, and it was the clearest policy to commit Virginia fully and completely to the movement of force. Consultations by correspondence were going on through the winter between the leaders in all the provinces as to the proper person to be placed in command. The only ones who could furnish soldiers of experience and reputation for command were Massachusetts and Virginia. While Massachusetts had Ward and Prescott, who had served against the French, Virginia had Andrew Lewis and Washington.

Lewis, at the battle of Point Pleasant, with Virginia militia alone—the veteran and seasoned rangers of the border—had defeated the allied forces of the Indians, shattered their power, and driven the demoralized fugitives beyond the Ohio. But Thomas Johnson, of Maryland, was the neighbor and friend of Washington. He had been associated with him since 1762 in the Ohio Company, and in the great enterprise to secure a free water way from the head of tide on the Potomac, where Washington now stands, by the Potomac, the Monongahela, the Ohio, and the Wabash, to Lake Erie. Johnson, better than any man of his cotemporaries, knew the broadness of view, the grasp of mind, the tenacity of purpose, united with self-control, concentration, and physical fortitude and endurance of Colonel Washington. It may well have been, as John Adams claims, that he indicated the choice of Washington as commander in chief on account of his conspicuous position and the considerations of policy. Johnson, however, took the initiative, and on June 15, 1775, moved in the Congress that that body assume the responsibility for the army which the affair of Lex-

ington had assembled before Boston, and that Colonel George Washington, of Virginia, be appointed to the command in chief.

Johnson says that on going into the hall, on the morning of the 15th, he met Adams and proposed to him the nomination of Colonel Washington for the supreme command, and that Adams turned off impatiently, as if the subject were distasteful to him. Therefore the deputy from Maryland proceeded to make the motion which had been agreed upon. As soon as Colonel Washington's name was mentioned he withdrew from the hall, as was decorous and proper, and upon being informed of the passage of the resolution he resumed his place, where he was informed by the President of the action of the body.

He at once arose and thanked his colleagues for the confidence they had reposed in him, assured them of his unfeigned diffidence as to his ability to justify their action, for he thought that there was another gentleman better qualified and more worthy of the great responsibility, and stated that, as no pecuniary inducement controlled him in the matter, he would receive no pay or allowances as attached to his place, but would keep an exact account of his expenses, which he would rely on the justice of Congress to reimburse.

The habit of the Plantation Book, and the attention to detail of every kind, stood him in good stead in the business of governing an army of ten thousand men in the field, as it had done a detachment of five hundred inferiors on a plantation; and after the war was over the account of Washington's expenses, kept in his own handwriting, was submitted to Congress and the sum total reimbursed him.

These autograph accounts may still be seen among the archives of the United States at Washington. He never received a shilling of pay. Immediately on his appointment, without a moment's delay, he began to prepare for the field. He sent home to Mount Vernon for money and horses, and supplied his wardrobe for the campaign. He bought five saddle-horses, and sent his carriage and its horses back to Virginia. On June 23d he left Philadelphia on horseback to ride to Boston. He was escorted by the First City Troop—a troop of cavalry well mounted, well drilled, well equipped, and well officered, consisting of the *jeunesse dorée* of Philadelphia. He was accompanied by Generals Charles Lee and Philip Schuyler. Lee was a lieutenant colonel in the British army, but this did not prevent him from accepting the rank of major general in the Continental army, third in rank to the commander in chief, Ward, of Massachusetts, being second.

Twenty miles from Philadelphia they met the courier bringing the news of Bunker Hill. "Did the militia fight?" was the Virginian's first inquiry; and when it was made clear to him that they had held on to their rude earthworks with rifles and shotguns against the British bayonet, until their last cartridge was fired, and had been pushed out only after inflicting a loss of thirty-three per cent on the regulars and suffering a loss of twenty-five per cent in their own ranks, he rode on, perfectly satisfied that latitude and climate had not modified or lessened that solid English pluck that had saved the routed, frenzied fragments of the regulars on the Monongahela. He was everywhere welcomed with cordiality and distinction, for he represented chivalrous aid to kith

and kin in a cause in which they had not so close material interests.

Washington arrived in Boston on July 2, 1775, and the next day assumed command of the army, displaying for the first time the Continental flag bearing the scarlet and white bars from the Washington arms, thirteen in number for the thirteen colonies, and in the union the red cross of England and of Scotland, of St. George and of St. Andrew, forming the Union Jack of Great Britain. Under this flag, emblematic of the united colonies and of their relation to the mother country, General Washington asserted the right of war in defense of hereditary rights and ancestral liberty.


The army at Boston consisted of eleven thousand five hundred men from Massachusetts, two thousand three hundred from Connecticut, one thousand two hundred from New Hampshire, and one thousand from Rhode Island—sixteen thousand in all. They were the levy *en masse* of New England in response to the guns of Lexington, of farmers' sons, of city and town clerks, of the enthusiasm and ardor of the English of New England. They were sent by county committees, and town meetings, on all sorts of terms of enlistment, and on all kinds of promises of pay. They were armed with the old weapons of the Indian and French wars, and clothed with the products of their fathers' farms and their mothers' looms and fingers. In an outburst of enthusiasm, when aspiration and devotion to duty absorbs every energy and overwhelms egotism, selfishness, vanity, and self-assertion, push themselves to the front, assert control, and require to be repressed, as they always are repressed, by the stern reality of action.

In the radical democratic society of New England, where social distinctions had for generations been resented as remains of aristocracy, and where universal equality was recognized as the only rule of life, the military organization necessarily reflected the conditions from which it arose. The men elected their officers, from colonel to junior lieutenant, and in the inexperience of men, the result of youth and a country life, frequently made great mistakes in their selections. The Virginia soldier, accustomed to the discipline of the border, the campaign, and the plantation, found his army a mob, courageous, earnest, and ignorant. Very many of the officers of the line were utterly worthless.

Cowardly, thieving braggarts, they were peculating in the provisions and clothes sent from home to the boys in the field, and defrauding them of their pay. The commander in chief at once inspected his command, organized a staff, and made himself master of details. He broke two captains for cowardly behavior in the action at Bunker Hill, two captains for drawing more pay and provisions than they had men in their companies, and one for having been absent from his post when the enemy appeared and burned a house just by it. In addition, he put under arrest and sent before a court-martial under charges, one colonel, one major, one captain, and two subalterns. He set himself to stamp out selfishness and self-seeking, and to imbue his command with a high sense of patriotism, a love of liberty and of country, and devotion to duty, as the vital forces which should control and direct every member of it, from the highest to the lowest. But among the officers were some of the highest merit.

BOSTON

WITH ITS ENVIRONS



REFERENCES.

- 1 State (Formerly King) Street
 - 2 Fanenit Hall & Dock Square
 - 3 Old South Meeting House
 - 4 Beacon Hill
 - 5 Fort Hill
 - 6 Cops alias Cops Hill
 - 7 Fort on Noddle's I. erected after Boston was evacuated
- Places Remarkable for Battles,
Sieges &c. indicated by a Flag.



Israel Putnam, Benedict Arnold, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, and John Stark were all there, whose names were afterward to become illustrious from great and distinguished service, the second unhappily infamous by an unparalleled act of treachery. During July Congress re-enforced him by the addition of three thousand Virginian and Maryland troops under Morgan and Cresap—that Indian fighter who has come down to us unjustly branded with the murder of Logan's family, a crime with which he had absolutely no connection, and of which he was entirely guiltless.

The summer was passed in drilling and organizing the troops, and collecting ammunition. He sent a swift vessel to Bermuda to capture a cargo of powder there, which was done. He strengthened his lines around Boston. The lesson of Fort Necessity had been beneficial, and experience had taught him what immense advantage topographical position gives in war. Here he began to develop those great conceptions of conditions in which he excelled all men in America. From his youth accustomed to great distances, and to appreciate the advantage of grand operations as manager of the Ohio Company, he had, by personal observation and constant intercourse with scouts and traders for twenty years, arrived at Continental ideas of the strength and the importance of the "back country," the Western lands.

The Quebec Act had added the valley of the Ohio to Canada, and Washington was the first American thoroughly imbued with the fatalism of "manifest destiny." He understood, as no man else in America did understand, that civilization seeks and will obtain the nearest, easiest access to the sea—the com-

mon highway of communication among nations in all ages—and that the people who in time must dominate the shores of the Great Lakes and banks of the rivers would seek their outlet to the sea by the flowing water, the St. Lawrence or the Mississippi, unless they were bound to the English on the Atlantic by short and easy means of access.

New York was the vulnerable point of the confederation. The capture of the line of Lake Champlain and the Hudson would separate New England and the South, and leave each section an easy victim to the British arms. The military instinct of the people had sent Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen to capture Ticonderoga and Crown Point before the Congress at Philadelphia had moved in the direction of a Continental army, and the New Englanders had secured their communications with the South by seizing the line of New York.

As soon as his command was in any condition to work, Washington sent Montgomery by Ticonderoga to Montreal, and Arnold by the forests of Maine to Quebec, to force co-operation between Canada and the confederation, thereby relieving "the Western lands" from the pressure of Indian domination and Canadian influence. The conception was a grand one. Montgomery captured Montreal, and the campaign would have been a success save for one of those accidents which so often in war determine the event of a battle and the fate of a government. Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded at the head of their respective storming parties at Quebec, and by these chances Canada was saved to Great Britain.

Had Quebec been captured, Canadian deputies

would have been sent to the Continental Congress, and Canada would have been the fourteenth "free, sovereign, and independent State" acknowledged by the treaty of 1783. As it was, Canada sent two regiments to the Continental army, which were mustered into service as "Congress's Own." The death of Montgomery saved Canada to the British, and changed the course of history; but the campaign originated by Washington will be carried out by some future generation of Americans, who will not permit the flanks of the great republic to be threatened forever. As the army became more soldierly and manageable, the commander in chief became more impatient for action. Armies are made for fighting, and soldiers to be killed, and long periods of inaction seriously disorganize the one and destroy the other.

The debating society at Philadelphia was constantly urging an attack on Boston. Gage had twelve veteran regiments, supported by a well-armed fleet in the harbor, and an attack on the city would have resulted probably in the loss of the attacking force, and certainly in the destruction of the town. But "On to Boston!" was the cry in Philadelphia, just as "On to Richmond!" was the cry in Washington in the other rebellion. The Virginian commander in chief of 1775 was made of stronger material than the Virginian of 1861, and no urgency or appeals could make him move until his judgment decided that the time was propitious. He could not neutralize the British fleet without heavy artillery. The only heavy guns within the control of the Continentals were at Ticonderoga, from which there were neither roads nor transportation. When the snows came and the ground froze hard, ox-teams

could drag them on sledges over the fields to the camp, and then something could be done.

Washington also had knowledge the Congress could not have. He knew Gage. He had served with him in the Braddock campaign, where he commanded the Forty-fourth Regiment as lieutenant colonel, Colonel Sir Peter Halkett being in command of the brigade. He had seen Gage at mess, at drill, on the march, in camp, and in battle, and had measured every faculty and quality. He understood how much intelligence, fortitude, pertinacity, and patience he had, and how much he had not. He knew Gage's hand, and he played his own accordingly, just as Lee afterward played his against McClellan, Pope, and Grant. But while the weather was open, sledges were prepared in the woods of Vermont, and animals collected at convenient depots. Of this no one knew but the commander in chief. To communicate it to the Congress would have been to inform Gage, and bring on an attack before he was prepared. Congress was very leaky, and several members were inclined to make things easy by hedging, and by keeping open the door of reconciliation.

In August he was called upon to define the relations the two armies should occupy to each other, and to settle the question once for all whether the conflict should be war, regulated by the rules of civilized warfare, or whether the one side should treat it as an insurrection, to be suppressed by any means the loyal side deemed necessary. The solid sense of the English had long before settled all questions growing out of the right of armed resistance to illegal laws and wrongful usurpations of authority, for an act of Richard II had declared that adherence to

the King *de facto* should not be considered to be treason.

But Gage, with that fine contempt for the rights of others which has always distinguished a dominating race, decided that all Englishmen taken in arms against their lawful King were rebels, and were to be treated as criminals, imprisoned in jails, tried by loyal juries, sentenced by loyal judges, and hung by loyal sheriffs. Acting on this plain proposition and simple axiom, he had confined in the common jail of Boston some officers of the Continental army who had fallen into his hands, and treated them with great indignity. The commander in chief at once called General Gage's attention to this conduct as contrary to the rules which controlled officers and gentlemen, in war.

The ex-lieutenant colonel of the Forty-fourth took occasion to read his ex-provincial militia comrade a lecture on the iniquity of rebellion and the impiety of treason, and to suggest that the halter was the only logical, just, and necessary way of dealing with such conduct. Washington first put his British prisoners in jail, and then gave Gage a little lesson in manners by showing him that gentlemen do not scold nor vituperate, but that they act. The act of retaliation settled the question. The status of war was conceded and acknowledged, and there was never thereafter any question of rebel or traitor, treason or rebellion, between the British and the Continental authorities.

The Continental line extended around the west, south, and northwest sides, of Boston, about sixteen miles in length, and was defended by a series of forts, redoubts, and earthworks, held by sixteen thousand

men—a man to every six feet. It was vulnerable at several points. It was pierced about the center by the Charles River, a navigable stream, practicable for General Gage's fleet.

He had been re-enforced up to twenty veteran regiments, and could at any time, from July until November, have moved a force up the river, pierced the center, and rolled back the left wing, under Major-General Charles Lee, or the right wing, under Major-General Artemus Ward, on itself, and destroyed Washington's army. But the lieutenant colonel of the Forty-fourth had had a lesson on the Monongahela, and another one at Breed's Hill, of the fighting qualities of the militia, and was disinclined to risk an enterprise against them. He was roundly denounced in England for his inaction and cowardice, as they stigmatized it, and in October was relieved by General Sir William Howe, the brother of Lord Howe commanding the fleet. The Howes were grandsons of George II by Miss Kilmansegg, commemorated by Hood, and nephews of the king, and connection, not merit, gave them these important commands, the most responsible at that time in the British army and navy.

The Congress chafed greatly under the delay, but made no impression on Washington. In September he proposed an attack on Boston by means of boats, in co-operation with an attempt on the British lines at Roxbury, but the council of war unanimously agreed "that it was not expedient to make the attempt at present at least." Washington wrote to Congress communicating this decision, and said, "I can not say that I have wholly laid it [the attack] aside; but new events may occasion new measures."

The pugnacious disposition of the man was not satisfied with the inaction of a council of war, and as soon as the Charles River froze over he proposed to cross on the ice and attack. The council of war again thwarted him. But he was determined to get at the enemy by water if he could not reach them by land. He fitted out and commissioned six armed vessels to operate in their rear on their transports and storeships. The militia of Marblehead and the fishermen on the coast of New England supplied the bravest, most daring sailors that ever flew a flag since the British buccaneer of the Spanish main, and for a time the commander in chief of the army was also lord high admiral of the sea force, just as his British ancestors had been a thousand years before, to defend their homes and altars from the Saxon and the Dane. He was chief judge in admiralty as well, and decided all questions of prizes and contraband of war, and distribution of prize money. His ships were called pirates, but they were not treated as such.

During the winter the accumulation of ammunition and collection of siege guns continued, until early in March, 1776, he was ready to strike. Dorchester Heights is an elevated piece of ground to the south of Boston, and commands the harbor and south side of the city. The possession of it is absolutely essential to the security of the port and it passes comprehension why Gage did not occupy and fortify it during the six months he was penned up in Boston. Washington had seen its dominating importance on his first ride along his lines. Its possession was of no use to him without heavy artillery. Held with long-range guns, it made Boston and Boston harbor untenable. It neutralized both army

and navy at one move, and for months the resources of the quartermaster and commissary's department were taxed to their utmost to supply means for this checkmate.

By March the guns of Ticonderoga had arrived, hauled over the snow and ice and frozen ground by oxen, and some ammunition had been collected and prepared. There was not enough to carry on a prolonged cannonade, but Washington knew his man, and judged rightly that the moral effect of the exhibition of force would be sufficient. Consequently, on the night of the 4th of March all his guns from Roxbury to East Cambridge, everything north of Charles River, opened on the redoubts and forts opposite them, and kept up a noisy demonstration all through the night.

The British commander concentrated his troops behind the expected point of attack at the place of firing, and Washington placed two thousand men with proper intrenching tools on Dorchester Heights, where before day they had covered themselves with sufficient intrenchments and the heavy guns of Ticonderoga. As daylight disclosed the disaster, the commander of the fleet in the harbor sent word to the commander of the troops on land, that if the Americans stayed where they were he could not stay where he was.

General Howe prepared at once to storm the threatening intrenchment, and ordered out Lord Percy with three thousand men to take the works. A storm came up, the assault was abandoned, and Howe decided to evacuate his untenable position. He informed some of the principal inhabitants of his determination; they conveyed the information to

the camp at Cambridge, and Washington, acting on the maxim of a bridge of gold for a flying enemy, forbore to molest or hinder the movement.

On March 17, 1776, the British general embarked his troops on the fleet of transports in the harbor, and, carrying with him nine hundred of the principal inhabitants, sailed to Halifax. Sir Henry Clinton in the preceding January had carried off a part of the force to subjugate North Carolina. In the abandoned town Washington secured two hundred cannon of various calibers, and an immense quantity of small arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind. The British army was liberal in the supplies furnished to equip its adversary, and the ammunition captured in Boston was larger in amount than all that had been collected and used by the Americans in the process of their expulsion.

CHAPTER VII.

WAR, AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

FOR twelve months the colonies had resisted the Government troops, nullified the Government laws, defied the Government, Governors, and courts. They had met the King's troops at Lexington and Concord, hunted them back to Boston, and then bottled them up in that town until by force they had expelled them from the colony. In Virginia, the royal Governor Dunmore had been defeated at Great Bridge in a battle on December 9th, 1775. In North Carolina, Richard Caswell had met the Highland Tories under Donald McDonald at Moore's Creek, February 27, 1776, and routed them with a loss of nine hundred prisoners, two thousand stand of arms, and £15,000 in gold. Connecticut and Massachusetts had captured and held Crown Point and Ticonderoga, the gateway to Canada. On May 10, 1775, Montgomery had captured Montreal, and the conquest of Canada was averted only by the accident of the death of Montgomery and the wounding of Arnold.

The rebel flag was flying on the Atlantic from Bermuda to Newfoundland, and British commerce was dominated in the North Atlantic by piratical cruisers. In the summer of 1775 Gage had been

made by Washington to recognize belligerent rights in treatment of prisoners of war, but the British Government still insisted upon regarding the movement as rebellion. Now, in rebellion—resistance to the laws—every individual is held responsible for his own action, in his own person and his own property. The status of war changes all that, and transfers responsibility from the individual to his government, or supreme authority, which is waging the war, and responsibility ceases to be personal and becomes national.

Considering the rebellion as necessary to be repressed, the Government first read the Riot Act to the rebels in the way of the Boston Port Bill, then sent in the troops to disperse disorderly assemblies and suppress turbulence. The disorderly assemblies at Bunker Hill, at Moore's Creek, at Great Bridge, all refused to disperse, and, after a manner, mainly dispersed the *posse comitatus* sent against them. Therefore, without recognition and acknowledgment, the *fact* of war made itself known and appreciated, and it got to be understood in London that a *fact* can not be waived or suppressed by a preamble of Parliament or an Order in Council, or by a decision in the Court of King's Bench. War must be met by war, and war is not only fighting and killing and burning but requires thinking and brains, reason and intelligence, a directed plan, a method, to accomplish results. Over such a territory as that occupied by the colonies, the possession of certain positions were necessary in order to dominate it, and the control of certain lines of communication imperative.

Geography remains unchanged from century to century, and the same geographical conditions will

require substantially the same movements. The advance of the Russians on the Bosphorus is by the same lines that Alaric and Attila marched to the west. Napoleon's inroad into Italy was on the track of Hannibal. The same things to be done, the identical obstacles to meet with, the means employed will always be the same in substance, whether in the first, the twentieth, or the thirtieth century. The invasion of Europe by the hordes of Asia will be round the eastern shore of the Black Sea; and the mountain ranges of middle Europe will be used and held as defenses against them, just as they were against the Huns and the Goths.

The physical conformation of the United States, as long as Canada is occupied by an alien power, renders the line of Lake Champlain and the Hudson its weakest point. A force moving down the lake could easily unite with a force coming up the Hudson, and thus isolate New England. In the summer of 1759, the British, under General Amherst, had secured Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and thus closed the postern by which the French could move between the middle, southern, and eastern colonies. The possession of Canada gave assurance of the control of this outwork. But the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point by Allen and Arnold had nearly neutralized the position of the northern province, and destroyed the great advantage the St. Lawrence secured.

With the control of deep water, British arms would threaten the northern settlements, and the troops of Vermont and New Hampshire be called back to defend their homes and their farms. Howe and Gage had both served in this campaign on

Champlain, and had an idea of the importance of the line. Whether they suggested it or not, the ministry at length arrived at the determination to treat the insurrection as war, and to operate against it on defined lines of strategy. They proposed to move Howe from Boston to New York, take possession of the sea and the city, and move up the Hudson to Albany, to meet a force coming down Champlain under command of General Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Canada, which was to retake the lake forts, and complete the British line from the Atlantic to the St. Lawrence, and separate New England from Virginia.

Sir Henry Clinton had taken off two thousand men from Howe at Boston to reduce the Carolinas, but the Highland rout at Moore's Creek gave him check on the Cape Fear, and his prompt repulse by Moultrie in Charleston harbor made him pause in his campaign of subjugation. Howe had moved to Halifax, but the military instinct of Washington convinced him that Clinton could not stay South, nor Howe North. They could not remain idle after their repulse at Boston, at Great Bridge, at Moore's Creek, at Sullivan's Island; to do so would be not only confession of defeat, but defeat itself. In the game that Washington had been playing for ten months in the trenches at Boston, he had foreseen the next move, and had provided against it as far as his means would allow. New York and the line of the St. Lawrence—the lake and the river—must be the next move of the enemy. At least it ought to be, for it was the proper move to make.

Therefore, when Washington occupied Boston on March 17th, he put his entire energies to work in

stamping out smallpox there, and collecting the arms and munitions of war left by the enemy, and on the 20th started his advance on the march for New York. He himself set out on April 4th, and on April 14th reported to Congress the arrival of himself and army at New York on the day before.

His army present for duty was 8,101; aggregate present and absent 10,235; which shows a high standard of discipline and efficiency in an army of green troops after a year's service in camp without marching and fighting, and after a long march of twenty-four days. Under such circumstances, a loss of only twenty per cent of the aggregate present and absent and the number for duty proves fidelity and devotion in the troops, and firmness and capacity in the commander. A march of twenty-four days by troops not inured to the discipline, the fatigue, and the customs of the march, fresh from ten months' camp duty, was a severe test for men and officers, and the way they stood it was in the highest degree satisfactory. This was the end of the war in New England. With the exception of Stark's fight at Bennington, August 16, 1777, and Sullivan's abortive attempt on Newport, August 29, 1778, the scene of war moved south and west of the Hudson.

It was a fixed delusion of the British mind that the insurrection in America was instigated, organized, and supported by a small minority of malcontents composed of ignorant agitators and needy adventurers. The gentry, the property holders, the educated class, were all believed to be "loyal," and rebellion to be promoted in the main by the "low Irish" and the radical descendants of the Puritans of the Commonwealth. This conviction constrained action and

directed sentiment in the great mass of the English people. Disunion was to them the direst disaster, for it would bring the loss of the American trade, and with it the downfall of British dominion of the seas. But added to this material consideration was the honorable sentiment that it would be base to desert kith and kin engaged in a death-struggle with faction in defense of the rights of the mother country, when desertion meant defeat, and defeat destruction of life, liberty, and property.

Although in England there was a large and influential sentiment against the coercion of America by arms, there was absolutely none in favor of dissolving the union and permitting the colonies to establish an independent and separate government. Every party was agreed upon the necessity of bringing them back—George II and Lord North by force of arms and by conquest, the Earl of Chatham and the Duke of Richmond by conciliation and guarantee of local self-government. But this extraordinary delusion on the part of the mother country, like the identical one believed in by the Northern States toward the Southern States in the war of secession, 1861-'65, was absolutely unfounded in each case. The resistance to British laws did not mean, in the first place, revolution. The right of rebellion had been always the right to resist illegal acts of government by arms, and was the method by which the balance of liberty had been preserved and the English Constitution developed. It was the check on absolute power.

The men of New England and of Virginia were close to the Revolution of 1688. They were only four generations from that of 1649, and they under-

stood that the right of petition was backed by the right of resistance. "Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God," had always been the foundation creed of the race; and when the King's officers attempted to do illegal things in Boston, or in Norfolk, or in Alamance, or on the Cape Fear, or on Sullivan's Island, the English took arms and resisted. The affairs at Lexington and at Breed's Hill, the attacks at Great Bridge, at Moore's Creek, and at Fort Moultrie, had developed the rebellion into war, and the English colonies were almost unanimous in support of it. They were led by no minority. It was an uprising of the whole people. New England rushed to arms as one man at the sound of the guns at Lexington. The countrymen of Virginia, from the Blue Mountains to Old Point Comfort, marched on Lord Dunmore when he attempted to incite their servants and negroes against them and add the horrors of servile to the barbarities of savage warfare.

The conditions in North Carolina were peculiar. After the rebellion of 1745 large numbers of the followers of Prince Charlie had been deported to the Cape Fear, and had been voluntarily followed by their friends and relatives. They were entirely Jacobite and bitterly anti-Hanoverian. But they had been spared death and confiscation on condition of taking the oath of allegiance to the House of Hanover, and had given their paroles never to take up arms against the Hanoverian King. When, therefore, the question of resistance came up, the inflexible Presbyterian conscience controlled them, and they were bound by their oaths and their paroles.

This was true of the Highlanders. The Scotch-

Irish of the western part of the colony about Mecklenburg took up the question of conscience and solemnly debated it, and decided that, inasmuch as the King of England had broken his oath to do justice and obey the laws, their oath of allegiance bound them no longer. They arrived at the same conclusion that the Virginians under Patrick Henry and the Massachusetts men under James Otis and Samuel Adams did, that protection and allegiance are reciprocal, and that the failure of the King to do his duty absolved them from all obligation to him.

It became manifest to all that the condition of resistance to law must of necessity be temporary; that either the Government must abandon its pretension of the right to make laws for the colonies, and that they must govern themselves, or that they must be reduced to the condition of conquered provinces. They must be governed by England, or they must govern themselves. The logical result of the situation was, that victory was absolutely necessary to success. It was clear that victory could not be achieved by the colonies alone. The sea was entirely controlled by the British. Every port, bay, sound, and river could be closed by their fleets, and while they could be prevented from penetrating the country, as long as they held the sole means of communicating with the world at large no recognition of the right of self-government could ever be wrested from them.

Samuel Adams says that from the beginning he saw clearly that the only safe and permanent security from the aggressions of the mother country was disunion and a separate government. It is certain that Virginia did not enter into the war with any such

view or intention. She intended to resist usurpation until usurpation ceased, and she desired to go no further. The first and second Continental Congress had no other view. They sent petitions to the King and addresses to the people of Great Britain, of Canada, and of Bermuda, insisting that their cause—the preservation of liberty and the right to be taxed only by their own representatives—was the cause of every British freeman at home and in every colony.

As events unfolded, and the great exhibition of military force in the occupation of Boston and the concentration of troops and ships against the colonists got them to understand that war was being waged against them, they fully appreciated the necessity and the duty of meeting war with war; and war could only be carried on by a state—a government; therefore it became necessary that the colonies should become States, should undertake the responsibility of war, and should protect their citizens from the penalties of rebellion.

The movement of public opinion in the colonies had tended to this conclusion, since the passage of the Boston Port Bill and the affair at Lexington. The garrison of Boston with an army had arrayed all New England in armed resistance. The proclamation of Lord Dunmore, offering liberty to servants and slaves in Virginia, was followed by the victory at the Great Bridge. The rising of the loyal Highlanders on the Cape Fear was dispersed at Moore's Creek, and the attack on South Carolina had been defeated at Fort Moultrie. New England, Virginia, and the Carolinas were at war with the mother country. Between the two sections the Middle Colonies lay neutral.

Maryland was contented with her government and her charter. She felt secure in her right of local self-government, and had asserted it in her General Assembly from the foundation of the colony. The right of free thought secured by Cæcilius Calvert, and never impaired while the proprietaries and the native Marylander controlled the Government, had evolved a type of character distinct and sharply defined. The delightful climate of the bay, and its great rivers, the picturesque scenery of meadow and forest, of plain and of mountain, made life one continual delight, cultivated an æsthetic enjoyment of beauty and pleasure, and produced a race liberal in thought, tender in sentiment, brave, chivalric, and generous. It was frank, manly, courageous, and determined. When its rights were infringed by the Stamp Act, the county court of Frederick County decided that the law was void, because contrary to common right, and required its officers to disobey and ignore it, by its recorded action. When tea was attempted to be imported on the 19th of October, 1775, at Annapolis, the Marylanders burnt ship and cargo in open day, and no attempt was ever made to extort from them apology or compensation. No British garrison ever affronted their borders, no British soldier ever trod their soil; but when Boston was attacked and New England invaded, the chivalry of the race rose at once, declared that the cause of Boston was the cause of all, and, feeling that "blood is thicker than water," rallied from mountain to sea, and marched to the relief of their kin beyond the Hudson. And from the hour Cresap marched from Frederick to the day of the surrender at Yorktown, the Maryland line on every stricken field—at Long

Island, at White Plains, at Brandywine, Germantown, Trenton, and Monmouth, and the long roll of Southern battles—bore the standard of the black and gold in the front of fire, sometimes to victory, oftentimes to defeat—always to glory.

But Maryland loved the mother. The ties of blood were as close to her as to brethren in New England. They were faithful to their friends, and they stood fast by them in the test of trial. No Tory regiment was ever raised and served in Maryland. One was organized on the eastern shore, but it was promptly moved to New Jersey, and soon afterward to Nova Scotia and dispersed. The pressure of the war drove all men's minds in the same direction. The Scotch-Irish of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, first reached the logical conclusion that final separation and disunion could afford the only guarantee of future peace, and security for local self-government.

A meeting at Charlotte, on the 20th day of May, 1775, solemnly resolved "That we, the citizens of Mecklenburg County, do hereby dissolve the political bands which have connected us to the mother country, and do hereby absolve ourselves from all allegiance to the British Crown, and abjure all political connection, contract, or association with that nation, which has wantonly trampled on our rights and liberties, and inhumanly shed the blood of American patriots at Lexington. That we do hereby declare ourselves a free and independent people; are, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and self-governing association, under the control of no power other than that of our God and the General Government of the Congress, to the maintenance of which

independence we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual co-operation, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred honor." And they adopted a rule of law, and organized a government to enforce the law and carry out their determination. The similarity of some expressions of this declaration with those of the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776, has led to vehement denial of its genuineness, and the overwhelming proof of there having been a meeting at Charlotte in May, 1775, which made some hostile declaration, has been sought to be met by substituting the action of a meeting which, it is conceded, did take place there on May 31st, but which did not declare independence.

But the evidence that Mecklenburg County did declare independence in May, 1775, is absolutely conclusive. The contemporaneous records of the county court show more than twenty deeds recorded between 1785 and 1793, which date the independence of North Carolina from May, 1775, and of the United States from July, 1776. Patents for land, issued by the Governor of North Carolina about the same time, date the independence of the State from May, 1775. Therefore, though much denied, it must be agreed that Mecklenburg County did declare independence on the 20th of May, 1775. A copy of their resolutions was sent to the Provincial Congress at Halifax, which promptly passed resolutions directing their deputies in the Continental Congress to vote for independence and to form foreign alliances. Events had lagged for a year. At Lexington, on April 19, 1775, and Breed's Hill, June 17, 1775, at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, May 10, 1775—New England had made the issue of war. The summer

was occupied in carrying on correspondence, discussion, and conference.

The Continental army, under its Virginian commander, held Gage fast in Boston. In November, Dunmore offered freedom to the servants of Virginia. The Virginians rose, drove him from his fortification of Great Bridge, December 9, 1775, and on New Year's day, 1776, he burnt Norfolk. On February 27, 1776, the Whigs routed the Highlanders at Moore's Creek. On June 28, 1776, Rutledge and Moultrie defeated Sir Henry Clinton on Sullivan's Island, in Charleston harbor. These fast following events were heating the hearts of the people.

In May, 1776, Virginia instructed her deputies in Congress "to propose to that respectable body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States, and to give the assent of the colony to measures to form foreign alliances, and a confederation, provided the power of forming governments for the internal regulations of each colony be left to the colonial legislatures." Maryland, on June 28th, instructed her deputies to assent to a declaration of independence, and to foreign alliances, and on July 3d issued her solemn declaration that Maryland was, and of right ought to be, a free, sovereign, and independent State. On May 4, Rhode Island omitted the King's name from all writs and proclamations, and the May town meetings throughout Massachusetts declared for independence. In June, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, all declared for independence.

On June 7th, Richard Henry Lee, a deputy from Virginia, submitted to the Congress a resolution "That these United Colonies are, and of right ought

to be, free and independent States ; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown ; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is and ought to be totally dissolved. That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign alliances. That a plan of confederation be prepared, and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration and approbation." This resolution was promptly seconded by John Adams, of Massachusetts, and opposed by Dickenson and Wilson, of Pennsylvania, and Robert Livingston, of New York. The issues presented were, first, Independence ; second, Foreign Alliances. Attachment to home, home people, and home ties arrayed a large section of public sentiment against the first. Inherited race antagonisms of a thousand years forbade sympathy with the second. There never had been a time since the Crusades when Englishmen were in alliance with Frenchmen and Spaniards. They were the natural-born enemies of the English race, and it was just as natural for Englishmen to attack them on sight as to kill a snake.

The grandfathers of many of the colonists had won fame and fortune by the plunder of treasure galleons on the Spanish main, and the present generation had fought them and their savage allies from the Lakes to the Gulf, on the Ohio, along the French Broad, the Chattahoochee, and the St. Mary's. The very idea of foreign alliance was distasteful and hateful to very many earnest Englishmen who sincerely desired to preserve their rights, but they doubted whether such alliance would not lead to subordination to their hereditary foes. The Congress

was divided. Independence with alliance, subjugation without alliance, undoubtedly led to future danger ; but subjugation was present and pressing. In the debate the aggressive, radical thought—as it always has and always will—prevailed over the conservatism which is in the main timidity. Action, which is courage, must overcome non-action, which is always cowardice.

And therefore the timid counsels of New York and Pennsylvania were overridden by the positive enthusiasm of Virginia, backed by Massachusetts, and on July 4, 1776, the Declaration of Independence was adopted. The whole weight and influence of Washington were thrown on the side of action. With patient, persistent correspondence, he urged on the governors of the States the necessity of foreign alliance to prevent subjugation, and the necessity of a declaration of independence to secure alliance. It is not just to say that his influence contributed largely to secure the declaration. It did not—nor did any one man's, nor any one State's. Independence was the necessary consequence of armed resistance to the laws ; and when the issue was made between the supremacy of the law or the supremacy of force, one or the other must prevail. If Great Britain was resolved to hold to the right to make laws for the colonies, she alone would have the power to decide what laws she would make. If, on the other hand, it be held that the colonies had the right to make their own laws, that fact made them independent.

The supreme intelligence of a race, of a great mass of people, takes in and appreciates such an issue, as clearly, as strongly, and as vividly as the

highest intellect or the most vigorous mind, and the people think with their hearts. They arrive at conclusions independent of and superior to ratiocination and to logic. They knew that they must be free—free to govern themselves according to their own ideas of justice—or that they must be governed and controlled by the ideas of Great Britain. All along the seaboard, in the township meetings of New England, in the vestries of Maryland and Virginia, in the county meetings of the Carolinas, the body of the people were meditating, ruminating, discussing, debating these problems. What Henry, and Lee, and Adams, and the leaders did, was to point the way. The people had resolved on independence before the Congress acted or the provincial assemblies had taken ground.

Independence was a popular movement, originating among and propagated by the great mass of the people, and it is error to think that any one man, or set of men, contributed largely to it. It would have come if the leaders had never lived; it would have created leaders. If Washington had not lived at that particular epoch, the rebellion of 1775-'76 would probably have failed, but it would have arisen again and been successful in the next generation. For when men mature from boyhood, they must emancipate themselves.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NEW YORK CAMPAIGN.

WHEN Washington arrived at New York his situation was still most unsatisfactory. He was to hold a position on deep water, without ships, without heavy artillery, without scientific or skilled engineers. Though his own genius and experience showed him the points to occupy and fortify in order to control the waters around New York, he was utterly unable to accomplish what was absolutely necessary for success.

The British vessels could anchor within easy gunshot of New York, and with the means at his command the occupation of Long Island afforded the only chance for delaying them. Delay was the only thing possible for the Americans. The war was greatly opposed at home. The Continental nations were slowly awakening to the fact that a tremendous blow impended over Great Britain, and that a wound was threatened which would seriously impair her prestige, inflict great loss of material resources, and, by the creation of a great maritime nation such as the Americans of the seaboard—with their bays, their rivers, and their fisheries, must of necessity become in course of time—would neutralize her supremacy on the high seas. The French had seen this from the first, and industriously fanned

the flame of discontent by emissaries in the colonies, by sympathy in Paris, and by secret and adroit subventions of money. It was the counter move of the French Minister in retaliation for the loss of Canada.

Washington understood, as few Americans of his day did understand, that the way to win respect is to compel it, and that his first duty was to show the world that the Americans could fight, that he could lead them, and that their resistance would be long and obstinate. The control of the deep sea gave Great Britain absolute control of the coast from Halifax to Florida, and largely that of commerce on the high sea. It made the occupation by the Americans of any position within reach of the guns of the fleet precarious. The strategy of the war, therefore, must of necessity be defensive. Allies and reinforcements were sure to come from the ambition, the necessities, and the antipathies of Continental Europe. They would certainly embrace this opportunity to humble the mistress of the seas, if it was an opportunity. But to secure allies, the colonists must prove that they could furnish a solid basis for alliance; to draw reinforcements, they must show armies to re-enforce.

Therefore Washington's business was to fight enough, but not too much; to retreat when he could not help it, but not too far or too often; to keep his troops encouraged by enough taste of blood to brace them up; and to satisfy Europe that there was a prospect of success. To do this required an army, ordnance, arms, ammunition, men, rations, wagons, horses, and forage. Some of these requisites were furnished by the colonies to their own troops. The Maryland Convention, for instance,

appointed a committee to inquire, report, and contract for as many rifles, muskets, and bayonets, with belts and cartridge-boxes, as could be furnished by the mechanics of the colony. They reported the name of every gunsmith, and the number of guns, bayonets, cartridge-boxes, and belts that each could furnish per month, and contracted with every man who could wield a hammer or a file, from Penn's line to the Potomac and from the Susquehanna to the Pocomoke, for all the guns and accoutrements they could supply. This system was pursued through the whole war. The Maryland line thus was kept armed whenever it was possible to manufacture arms. But the energy of the rebellion was in the army and in the colonial congresses or conventions.

The Congress at Philadelphia did not attract the best men. It had no power; it could do nothing. The places where work was done were Annapolis, or Williamsburg, or Halifax, or Charleston, or at Salem. It could and did issue at times promises to pay, which were promptly repudiated by the general sense of the community, but in the whole course of the war the Continental Congress never raised a man for the army nor a dollar by taxation of the people. It was a league of independent colonies differing widely from each other in race, affinities, and traditions, in political institutions, and in religious faith. The Puritan of New England was permeated with an intense conviction of the solemnity of life—a "little space of time between two eternities"—and was impressed with a profound sense of the duty of preparing himself, his family, his friends, and everybody he could make do as he thought proper, for this eternity of torture and suffering.

This theological creed or subjective training has made the Puritan type a distinct one in the evolution of races. His super-abnormal conscience, added to severe rigors of climate, have produced a character which, for self-reliance, endurance, courage, and perseverance, is unequaled in history, though it may lack the graces and decorations which alleviate the troubles of life. The Cavalier population, on the other hand, on the Chesapeake, on Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, and on the Cape Fear, the Ashley, and the Cooper rivers, regarded life not as a gloomy preparation for a future state—the terrors of which could only be escaped by skillful avoidance of the decrees of Providence, or by constant and stern adherence to duty—but as a bright and beautiful garden, full of lovely flowers, delightful odors, fragrant herbs; where the rose, when plucked too roughly, avenged the indignity with its thorns; and the bee, when robbed of his honey, punished the marauder with his sting; where the pleasure of living justified “life”; where every sensation was a delight and every sentiment a gratification.

Love, charity, gratitude, friendship, were the cardinal virtues. Revenge, malice, hatred—ignoble vices. They lived to live; they loved to love; they enjoyed being friends. Between these two civilizations there could never be sympathy entire and cordial. It was the feeling of family, blood, race, that first drew the Cavalier to the side of the Puritan to defend him and his rights from aggression; and once there, it was contrary to every theory of his life ever to leave it. Loving ease and pleasure, self-indulgent to a degree, they sacrifice everything they have for kin or friends, and stake everything on the

side they espouse. These two diametrically discordant societies could not possibly be welded into a perfect union. They were jealous of each other, and each was too suspicious to trust any neighbor with any influence over its destinies.

North Carolina and South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, New York and New Hampshire, had bitter boundary disputes, and all were watchful, lest alliances might sacrifice some of their charter rights instead of strengthening them. Therefore the Continental Congress lacked coherence, force, power, and enthusiasm. It had the jealousy of small men against military dictatorship, such as was subsequently felt against McClellan, Grant, and Sherman by the Congress of the United States. It passed resolutions calling upon the colonies to furnish men and means. It had no power to enforce its own requisitions. It left to the colonies the power to appoint regimental officers, and assumed to itself that of selecting general officers. It appointed generals, but it could not enlist a man. It selected commissaries, but could not provide a barrel of beef. It sent out quartermaster generals, but had not a wagon or a horse of its own.

Therefore the war and the strategy of the war was to be devised and executed by Washington, and this labor was far more arduous than the marches, the bivouacs, the battles of the ensuing five years. It is a fact that the Continental Congress was a hindrance and not a help. Many members were ardent patriots; they risked their lives and their fortunes for the cause. But not a few were time-servers, patriots for the present, to avoid risk to person and property, but prudent as well to keep up a secret tie

with the mother country and its friends in this. With such a body behind him, utterly useless to help but quite efficient to hinder, Washington was forced to rely on himself. He was one of the greatest letter-writers that ever lived. The last collection of his letters contains six or seven thousand in fourteen good-sized volumes, and still it is very incomplete, having left out hundreds as yet unpublished.

But from the day Washington left the Congress, on June 22, 1775, to December 23, 1783, when he resigned his commission at Annapolis, not a day passed without his addressing a long letter to the Congress, to the Governor of one of the States, or to one of the leading men in the respective States, pointing out the means by which the common cause could be furthered, and urging persistently, with never-failing patience and courage, that these means and measures be utilized to the last degree. When, therefore, the army was collected at New York, everyone knew that the position was untenable. Sir William Howe had gone to Halifax with the great body of the garrison of Boston, and Sir Henry Clinton had sailed south with another part of it, to reduce the Carolinas. Georgia gave no trouble.

The affair at Moore's Creek had warned Sir Henry out of the Cape Fear, and he proceeded to Charleston, where he lay until the fleet of Sir Peter Parker, from Ireland, re-enforced him. On June 28, 1776, the Palmetto Fort on Sullivan's Island, commanded by Moultrie, colonel of State troops under direction of John Rutledge, President of South Carolina, drove off the British fleet and British troops landed by Clinton, to carry it by assault. Therefore early in July Washington knew

that the inevitable was about to take place. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Canada, would move down Lake Champlain, Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton, re-enforced by Sir Peter Parker, would concentrate in New York harbor, sail up the East River, cut off the Long Island garrison, and then proceed up the North River, communicate with General Carleton at Lake George, and cut the rebellion in half.

It was the business of the American general to checkmate this game, and to do it without fighting, for a pitched battle would have been swift, certain ruin; but to do it also without fleeing, for that would have been equally disastrous. He was to handle green troops so as to blood them sufficiently, and then get them out without destructive loss. Therefore when his army reached New York, on April 23, 1776, he placed half of it—nine thousand men—under command of Putnam, on Brooklyn Heights, on Long Island, which dominated New York city and bay, just as Dorchester Heights had controlled Boston. But the position on Long Island was surrounded by deep water. Sir William Howe, the British commander in chief, had more than twenty-five thousand veteran troops, and an efficient fleet carrying as heavy guns as were then used in maritime war. The East River, between Long Island and New York, is a mile wide, and navigable for the heaviest ships. It is approached from the lower bay of New York through the Narrows, or from Long Island Sound through Hell Gate.

On August 22, 1776, Sir William Howe, landed twenty thousand men at Gravesend Bay. On the 26th he sent the fleet under command of his brother, Admiral Lord Howe, to make a feint on New York.

On the 27th he moved on the American position, which he had flanked in the night. General Grant, with the Highland Regiments, advanced on the coast road, the outposts of which were held by the Maryland line under command of Major-General William Alexander, of New Jersey, who called himself Lord Stirling, after a Scotch earldom of James I's creation which had lapsed, and was claimed by the New Jersey Alexanders, and the claim disallowed by the Scotch courts. The Marylanders were the first Americans who ever met the British in line of battle in the open field. Handled skillfully, and gallantly led by Alexander, Smallwood, and their regimental and line officers, the Marylanders, by reiterated charges, checked pursuit until nightfall.

Washington saw the engagement from the Brooklyn side. The result was anticipated and provided for, and two nights afterward the whole American army was safely ferried over the East River and at once marched north, clear of the town. This movement was going on all night on the water, where sound travels easily and far. The British man-of-war Roebuck lay off Red Hook, just below Governor's Island, and why her lookout or watch did not hear this movement of nine thousand men, their artillery and their transportation, is one of the unexplained mysteries of the time. Howe pushed into the city of New York. Washington withdrew to the line of the Harlem River, the northern boundary of Manhattan Island, and the movements were so rapid on both sides, that Putnam, with a detachment of four thousand men, was isolated in the lower part of the town.

Washington, in person, led two New England brigades down the streets to rescue Putnam, but on the appearance of fifteen or twenty red-coats, eight regiments ran like quarter horses; whereupon the commander in chief, failing to make the colonels stop stampeding, belabored them with much energy and profuse emphasis, with a cane he was riding with. Neither cane nor malediction stayed the courant colonels; but a lady—Mrs. Murray—with a fine residence on what is now known as Murray Hill, knowing the weakness that commanding officers have for the good things of the table, prepared an elegant and substantial lunch, and invited Sir William and his staff to alight and enjoy it. No soldier who ever rode a horse ever refused an invitation to eat, and the British general stopped to refresh while his enemy escaped. Putnam rejoined the army at Harlem, and Washington was extricated by the very difficult feat of withdrawing an inferior army from its environment by a superior army and fleet. Washington took position along the line of the Harlem River, across the upper end of the island, and the next day Howe attempted to storm the position. The attack was repulsed.

The Hudson River was defended at the Palisades above New York, on the east side, by Fort Washington, under command of Gen. Putnam, and on the west by Fort Lee, under Gen. Greene. Howe's next move clearly was to force the two forts with the fleet, while at the same time he landed an infantry force by way of the East River and pushed it in Washington's rear. He began on October 9, 1776, by driving two frigates over Putnam's and Greene's obstructions in the river and between their forts, and

on the 12th he landed the larger part of his army at Throg's Neck, to move in behind the American, and cut his line of supplies from Connecticut.

Washington, fully anticipating the movement, had destroyed the bridge across the creek at the place of landing, and posted a sufficient force behind the marsh across which the British must move to attack him. Howe wasted six days trying to get at him, and Washington moved back up the river to White Plains, abandoning the whole of Manhattan Island except Fort Washington. Howe pushed on after him, and on October 28th carried an outpost at Chatterton Hill. The Maryland line, which under Lord Stirling had won its spurs at Brooklyn Heights, gathered fresh laurels here. Attacked by the Hessians under Rahl, it held on until surrounded, and then forced its way out with clubbed rifles under Griffith. It fought six to one, and lost one hundred and forty, to two hundred and twenty-nine lost by the enemy. This affair is known as the battle of White Plains. The attack was not pressed, and Washington fell back to a strong position at North Castle, where it was useless to think of attacking him.

These movements and the resulting position made the two forts untenable, useless, and mere traps. The Congress and the New York Convention protested strongly against abandoning them, as local authorities always do against abandoning territory to invasion; but Washington ordered Putnam and Greene to get their troops and munitions away without delay, allowing Greene, in whom he had great confidence, a discretion as to the time and the necessity of evacuation. Congress sent Greene a peremptory order to hold on save on the direst extrem-

ity. Washington was absent, superintending the fortification of West Point, higher up the river. Greene believed that Fort Washington could be held, and so re-enforced it. Washington returned on the 14th, but that very night several British vessels passed up between the forts, and on the 15th Howe moved on the place with an overwhelming force. He carried it by assault on November 16th, after a gallant defense, when the British lost five hundred men, to the American loss of one hundred and fifty; but the British general captured three thousand of the best troops the Americans had in the field, and an immense quantity of artillery and small arms.

Washington was on the Jersey side of the river with six thousand men, and Lee on the east side with seven thousand. He ordered Lee to join him, but Lee, then senior major general and next in rank to the commander in chief, dallied, and lost time in obeying. His own ambition and his own promotion were the only motives for his conduct, and he was engaged in exaggerating his services in the Southern campaign and aggrandizing his reputation among the inefficient Congressmen at Philadelphia. He was a traitor in his heart then, as he was certainly a traitor in fact and deed soon after; but no proof has yet been discovered as to his treachery at this precise period. It seems as if he intended by his desertion of his commander in chief to secure his destruction in New Jersey, when he would have certainly succeeded to the chief command, and then might have enacted the *rôle* of General Monk and become the Duke of Manhattan, as that traitor became the Duke of Albemarle.

But neither "malice domestic," nor treachery, nor

cowardice in subordinates, nor incompetence in Congress, could shake the will, the patience, the fortitude, or the courage of the man who had spent four days and nights in the saddle in saving Braddock's rout. The American forces were nearly disarmed by the losses at Fort Washington. It was almost dispersed by the capture of men there, and by Lee's desertion. If Howe turned shortly across the river and pressed rapidly on Philadelphia, the rebel capital would be captured and the rebel Congress dispersed, and the nucleus of rebellion destroyed. It was impossible to save Philadelphia, but it was possible to interpose an army as a protection to Congress and as a rallying point for the country. Sir Guy Carleton had gone into winter quarters at St. John's, on Lake Champlain. The campaign of division had failed.

CHAPTER IX.

THE NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN—THE DICTATORSHIP.

THE conditions which confronted Washington, then, were the necessity of saving New England and covering Philadelphia at the same time with an army demoralized by defeat and retreat, starvation and physical want, reduced by the expiration of enlistments, and without hope or expectation of final success. A new expedition, under Sir John Burgoyne, was being prepared in Canada to move on the old French line of invasion by Lake Champlain. Lord Cornwallis was placed in command of a flying column, to operate in New Jersey by a move on Philadelphia, while Sir William Howe was collecting a fleet at New York for an object as yet unrevealed. It was so clear that he ought to have moved a land force up the Hudson, convoyed and supported by his fleet, and joined Burgoyne, who was marching south, that Washington could not persuade himself that he was not about to do so. His observation of General Howe during the campaign on Long Island, and the subsequent operations on Throg's Neck, White Plains, and Fort Washington, had convinced him that the British general was quite as likely to make an improper move as a proper one, and he was therefore much puzzled to divine his intentions.

Burgoyne captured Ticonderoga without a strug-

gle, and the northern line was opened. On November 21st Howe crossed his infantry over the Hudson, and then had the shorter line to Philadelphia. He started Cornwallis toward that place, and nothing could be done but to interpose the American army between the attack and the objective. Washington fell back until, on December 8, 1776, he crossed the Delaware into Pennsylvania with three thousand starved, naked, and badly armed men—the remnant of the army of Boston and New York, but with all his ammunition intact. He destroyed all the boats on the river for miles up and down. When Cornwallis came up, the evening of the crossing, he was for pushing on at once; but Howe, who had joined him, thought it not worth while, as the contest was virtually ended, and it was useless to expend unnecessary energy in pursuit of an enemy whose army had nearly dissolved in the preceding twenty days of pursuit and retreat.

Congress fled to Baltimore, where they passed a resolution making Washington dictator, and then waited, panic-stricken, for what might happen. At this time an incident occurred which might have been disastrous, but was rather fortunate to the American cause. Lee followed Cornwallis, on his flank, through New Jersey. He would not help Washington. He could not desert openly, for that would have destroyed his value, and he would have commanded no price for his treachery. An interview with the British commander in chief was absolutely necessary to arrange the terms of what was to be sold and what to be paid. A conference under a flag of truce would have attracted attention and required explanation. Written communications were tedious

and dangerous, as was afterward proved in the case of André and Arnold.

So Lee, with that profuse versatility of resource and that wide experience of expedients which service under many flags and divers religions and in various countries had given him, resorted to the simple one of camping outside his picket lines and sending word to the nearest British picket where he was. He was, of course, gobbled up by the cavalry, and the second in command of the Continental army became a prisoner. He had his conference and arranged his terms. What they were has not yet been discovered, but Time, the inexorable foe to secrets and concealments of state matters, will surely reveal his entire turpitude. Within this generation there has been discovered among the family papers of Sir Henry Strachey, General Howe's secretary from 1775 to 1778, a document in Lee's handwriting and indorsed by Sir Henry—"Mr. Lee's plan, March 29, 1777." *

In this paper Lee shows that, if Maryland could be overawed and the people of Virginia prevented from sending aid to Pennsylvania, then Philadelphia might be taken and held, and the operations of the "rebel government" paralyzed. The Tory party was known to be strong in Pennsylvania, and the hesitation and tardiness of Maryland in acquiescing in the move for independence seemed to prove that the loyalist feeling was very strong there. Lee asserted, of his own personal knowledge—he owned a plantation on the upper Potomac, in Virginia, on the Maryland border—that the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania were nearly all loyalists, who only

* *Vide* Appendix A.

awaited a British army to declare themselves for the Government and King George.

He therefore recommended that fourteen thousand men should drive Washington out of New Jersey and capture Philadelphia, while the remainder of Howe's army, four thousand in number, should go by sea to the Chesapeake and occupy Alexandria and Annapolis. Four days after the date of this remarkable document Howe wrote to Lord George Germaine that he had another expedition in mind, which might modify the plan of the campaign of the Hudson. With this paper in the hands of the British commander in chief, Lee was exchanged, and received in the American army with distinguished honors. All the general officers went out to meet him and escort him to headquarters, and the entire body of troops was paraded to salute him; and he in the pay of the enemy, with the commission of second in command of the American army in his pocket!

Whatever judgment posterity and the world may pass on the motives or the conduct of the actors in the great war between the States of 1861-'65, Americans at all times will be proud of the great pregnant fact, that when the men conspicuous on each side in that Titanic struggle had once taken sides not one ever faltered in his faith, but all were firm to the end. Among the million of Americans in that war, arrayed in arms, not one Charles Lee or Benedict Arnold ever lived or died. This proves that the American has, in the intervening century, developed a higher standard of duty, a nobler ideal of fidelity to honor, than prevailed with the generation that made and fought the War of the Revolution.


The capture of Lee was a great surprise to, and

made a profound impression on, the Americans. He was a showy, noisy swash-buckler, and his loud voice and blatant braggadocio had imposed on the public. He had been a lieutenant colonel in the British army, had served under kings and emperors, and was decorated with sundry ribbons and brummagem stars and crosses, and the simple-minded country folk thought he must of necessity be a great soldier. This provincial admiration for the ways and habits and manners and morals of the aristocracy is not yet extinct among Americans, and may still be observed flourishing on Manhattan Island, or at Newport, Rhode Island.

Washington was absolutely destitute of it. His experience in the Braddock campaign had obliterated the sentiment of reverence and admiration for home people and home ways in which he had been bred, and he believed and knew that Americans were in heart, brain, muscle, fidelity—in every intellectual and moral attribute—the peers of any race who ever lived. He considered Arnold, Morgan, and Greene as good soldiers and as qualified generals as Sir John Burgoyne, or Lord Cornwallis, or Sir Henry Clinton. Rank and titles did not confuse his mind in the least, and he looked straight through all embellishments into the very hearts of men and of things. Lee was, however, second in command, and the cause would lose prestige, and the army *morale*, if its second officer were permitted to remain a prisoner of war. He therefore exchanged Lee, not because he considered him of value, but in loyal discharge of his duty to his comrade and the cause.

By the middle of December, Howe, believing that the rebellion was crushed, withdrew to New York, leaving strong detachments at Trenton and

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Burlington. Cornwallis accompanied him, with the intention of carrying the news of the great achievement to England. After the capture of Lee, Sullivan and Gates promptly reported with his command to Washington, who was thus re-enforced to about six thousand men. But he dare not remain idle. Congress had dispersed, and the army was dissolving. He determined on an aggressive movement, the daring of which would greatly increase the chance of success. He arranged a plan of attack—for Gates to cross the river and attack Donop at Burlington; Ewing to cross directly on Trenton; while he, with twenty-four hundred men, was to pass the river nine miles above and move down to support Ewing in his attack on Rahl and his Hessians. Gates begged for a leave of absence, and left his command in charge of John Cadwalader, while he posted to Baltimore to intrigue for promotion into Congress.

Washington proposed to move on Christmas Day, 1776; but the weather became very cold, the river filled with floating ice. Cadwalader tried in vain to get over, but the ice prevented. Ewing, deterred by the weather, did not attempt to move, and by evening the commander in chief knew that the attack must be abandoned unless he attempted it unsupported either on his right or his left. It was a condition which required the greatest risk; for to do nothing was defeat, and to fail was nothing less. During the night of the 25th he crossed in a blinding storm of sleet and snow, and led his forlorn hope in person. He reached the other bank, nine miles above Trenton, and pressed swiftly down by two roads on the point of attack. Sullivan led one column down the river road, and Greene the other on

the road to the left, accompanied by General Washington himself.

About daylight Sullivan reported that his muskets had been rendered useless by the wet. The reply was, "Tell the general to give them the bayonet. The town must be carried." At daylight they struck the enemy's pickets, and went into the town with them. The surprise was complete. Washington's guns commanded the streets of the town before the garrison could be formed; the commanding officer, Rahl, was killed; a small force of Yagers and light dragoons escaped, and the rest were captured; one thousand prisoners, with their arms, equipage, and wagons, were taken. Washington immediately withdrew across the river with his spoils. By noon of the 27th Cadwalader crossed at Burlington, but Donop fell back to Princeton, leaving his sick and wounded and all his heavy arms and baggage. Washington reoccupied Trenton on the 29th. When the news of the catastrophe reached New York, Cornwallis countermanded his luggage from the packet which was about to convey him to England, and rode in a gallop to Princeton, where he found Colonel Donop intrenching.

On January 2, 1777, Cornwallis, with eight thousand men, moved on Trenton, where he found Washington strongly posted behind the Assunpink, a small stream which flows into the Delaware just south of Trenton. Cornwallis's men were worn down by the day's march, but he made several attempts to force the bridge over the creek, and was easily repulsed. He therefore went into camp, and sent back to Princeton for the two thousand men left there with Donop. He proposed, the next morn-

ing, with this re-enforcement to turn the American right flank, roll him back on the river, and capture the whole force—"to bag the old fox," as he said. The position was plain to the American commander. Donop would be up the next day, and then he would have another Long Island retreat over a wide river. Instead of waiting for Donop, it might be best to meet him half way. He summoned a council of war; but a council of war never fights. He proposed to leave his camp-fires burning, and move around Cornwallis so as to strike Princeton by day-break. It had been snowing, sleeting, and raining for several days. The chief of artillery reported that guns could not be moved; the quartermaster general that no horses could pull the wagons. Everybody agreed that the roads had no bottom. Washington held on to his opinion with his usual patience and pertinacity, explaining what immense advantages would accrue from the movement, and persistently urged that it be made. By ten o'clock the change occurred that he expected and was waiting for. He opened the door, looked out into the night starless and moonless, and turned to the council. "Gentlemen," said he, "Providence has decided for us—the wind has shifted; the army will move in two hours." In two hours the roads were frozen as hard as if macadamized, and the troops marched over the firm ground, the wheels muffled and as noiseless as the march of the dead.

At daylight Cornwallis's pickets reported that something unusual had taken place in the American camp, and his scouts soon brought him word that it was empty. He was dazed. "Where had the old fox gone to earth? Where was his hiding-place?"

were the astounding questions he was to solve, when away off to the northeast the opening guns at Princeton sounded his sharp reveille. He had been surprised as Rahl had been, and outwitted as Sir William at Long Island.

About sunrise Washington's advance came in contact with Donop's leading brigade marching on Trenton to help Cornwallis. General Hugh Mercer, the aid to Prince Charlie at Culloden, and the comrade of the commander in chief at the Monongahela, was in command of the right brigade, and he attacked at once. The British resistance was vigorous, and they pressed Mercer firmly. He was killed at the outset, and his lines were going back before the British bayonet, when Washington galloped up, took charge of the field, rallied his troops within forty yards of the British line, brought the whole of his command into action on the double quick, and in twenty minutes had the enemy on the run. The British lost two hundred in killed and wounded, and three hundred prisoners. The firing to the northeast stirred Cornwallis up, and he pushed out to get to Princeton as soon as possible. But a thaw had set in, the bridges were broken, the roads and streams impassable, and by the time he reached Princeton "the old fox" had disappeared with his plunder.

It was Washington's intention to swoop down on New Brunswick, where there was a depot of provisions, arms, and supplies; but by the time the affair at Princeton was over the men were too tired for further exertion. They had had no sleep the night before, and the cold night march and the sharp affair of the morning had taken the spring out of them. They must have refreshment and rest. In-

stead, therefore, of making a dash on New Brunswick, the American general moved off to Morristown, where he occupied a strong position on a range of hills. Cornwallis pressed on to New Brunswick, intent on saving that post. In a few days Putnam moved from Philadelphia to Princeton.

By the middle of January, 1777, this then was the position: the American right wing under Putnam, at Princeton; the center under Washington, at Morristown; the left under Heath, on the Hudson. The British retained only New Brunswick, Amboy, and Paulus Hook (Jersey City). The occupation of Jersey had failed, the attempt on the "rebel Capital" had been frustrated, and, after two years of struggle "to retake, reoccupy, and repossess," and to reduce to loyalty the rebellious colonies, the three posts in New Jersey above named were all that remained to show for results.

This campaign was the most brilliant one of the War of the Revolution. Stonewall Jackson's valley campaign, in 1862, reminds the military student of it. Cornwallis—the ablest soldier that Britain furnished—gentleman and knight as he was, generously expressed his admiration for it. Stedman, his historian and comrade, considers that Washington's most remarkable and strongest marked characteristic was his supreme and unfaltering courage. To cross a wide and rapid river in winter, by night, with an inferior, half-clad and half-fed force, surprise and capture a veteran command of regulars, to make off with his booty, and then reoccupy his position in front of Cornwallis with thrice his numbers, fight him, hold him back, elude him and strike his rear, and make him give up all the territory won by the

preceding campaign, was an achievement of tactics and of strategy, of endurance and of courage, which nothing but supreme audacity, pugnacity, and courage could accomplish.

The same characteristics were afterward observed in Robert E. Lee, son of "Light Horse Harry" Lee, of the Legion, no kin to the vain braggart, coward, and traitor who tried to lose the Battle of Monmouth and to sell the American army. Robert Lee's friends were wont to criticise his pugnacity and daring. They said he would run any risk for a fight. The courage displayed by Washington in this short campaign, not the physical courage of the fighter but the intellectual intrepidity of the thinker, at once won him the respect of military men and military nations all over the world, and, what was of equal importance, the confidence of the people at home. There is no doubt that there was a widespread dissatisfaction with his caution and his slowness. The gentlemen who sit at a safe distance studying the map, unshaken by responsibility, always know more about war than the generals who are fighting it, and are liberal with their advice—*after* the event. The debaters are the most impatient for action *by others*.

The dispersion of the debating society at Philadelphia had silenced them for a time, and panic had made them shift all responsibility from themselves, by conferring on Washington the powers of dictatorship. But this was no proof of confidence. On the contrary, it was intended by very many as a trap, to prove the utter incompetence of the commander in chief, and make way for superseding him in command. Charles Lee and Gates were both intriguing,

and undermining and depreciating the ability of their chief. But the New Jersey campaign settled all that, and public confidence arose to support Washington to such an extent that, when subsequently a wretched cabal in the army was formed to depose him, publicity was the only punishment required to overwhelm the parties to it with shame, confusion, and ignominy. Confidence at home and reputation abroad were the consequences to Washington and the cause. But reputation and confidence did not furnish meat, rations, breeches, or shoes.

The Christmas gift by Washington to the Congress saved the Revolution. The terms of enlistment of a majority of his troops expired on the 1st of January; but with provisions abundant, the plunder of the Hessian quarters and knapsacks in hand, and the glorious enthusiasm of victory thrilling every nerve, the soldiers were induced to stay a few weeks longer. Washington made himself personally liable for their pay, and pledged his entire estate to secure it. John Stark and others followed his example, and the army was held together on a halt before final dissolution.

Washington was untiring in his petitions to Congress and to the States. He appealed to Governor Johnson, of Maryland, his associate in the Ohio and in the Potomac companies, who had nominated him in Congress to be commander in chief, for immediate and prompt re-enforcements. "I have no army," he said. "The men with me are too few to fight, and not enough to run away with." He urged Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, and Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, in the same terms. On March 6th he wrote to Gov-

ernor Trumbull from Morristown: "I tell you in confidence that after the 15th of this month, when the time of General Lincoln's militia expires, I shall be left with the remains of five Virginia regiments, not amounting to more than as many hundred men, and parts of two or three other Continental battalions, all very weak. The remainder of the army will be composed of small parties of militia from this State (New Jersey) and Pennsylvania, on which little dependence can be put, as they come and go when they please."

On March 14th, also from Morristown, Washington wrote to the President of Congress: "From the most accurate estimate I can now form, the whole of our numbers in Jersey fit for duty at this time is under three thousand. These, nine hundred and eighty-one excepted, are militia, and stand engaged only until the last of this month." Thus he had, as the sole remnant of the Continental military strength, about five hundred Virginians and four hundred and eighty-one Marylanders. That was almost all that remained of the rebellion. New England was quiet, New York and New Jersey nearly hostile, and Pennsylvania utterly indifferent.

When Captain Morris's troop of Philadelphia Light Horse tour of duty as escort at headquarters had expired, they were relieved with a complimentary order they and their descendants may well be proud of. "I take this opportunity," said the order of the commander in chief, "of returning my most sincere thanks to the captain and to the gentlemen who compose the troop for the many essential services which they have rendered to their country, and to me personally, during the course of this

severe campaign. Though composed of gentlemen of fortune, they have shown a noble example of discipline and subordination, and in several actions have displayed a spirit of bravery which will ever do honor to them, and will ever be gratefully remembered by me."

And with the Light Horse went the brightest spark of chivalry from Pennsylvania in the army. The philosophy of Penn had taught that thrift, energy, and the accumulation of material means, with peace, order, and prosperity, are the main objects of life and the chief end of man; and the consequence was the commonwealth could not understand why such imaginary, remote, iridescent, impalpable things as justice, right, and liberty could be worth the sacrifice of present comfort, of fat beeves, of well-fed swine, and even risk of bodily hurt. The idea did not penetrate the bucolic mind during the whole war, and the Philadelphia troop is the most picturesque, chivalric exhibition of sentiment, devotion, and courage made from that State during all those trying times. That troop proved time and again, as Lee's and Washington's Legion subsequently proved in the Carolinas, that there *is* room in society for the order of gentlemen, and that in time of stress it is well for the State to have a class to call on who will die as gayly as they dance, and will pour out their blood, as they were wont to do their fortunes, for faith and honor, for sentiment and ideals. Three battalions of Associators were raised in Philadelphia, officered by Colonels John Bayard, John Cadwalader, and Jacob Morgan, knightly gentlemen, and did gallant service. They and the Light Horse are the most brilliant contributions of Pennsylvania to the cause.

To Washington, with his nine hundred, Johnson brought seventeen hundred from Maryland. They were not very effective, but they were courage and sympathy, hearts as well as hands, like a torch to the lost traveler in the desert. They upheld the spirit of resistance until the country along the Chesapeake could rally; for it had come to be that the chief resistance was henceforth to be made by the English on the Chesapeake. New England stood ready, prepared to repel invasion and expel intruders. John Stark did the first at Bennington, Benedict Arnold the last for a British raid on Danbury, Connecticut.

Washington remained in winter quarters at Morristown, watching his enemy at New York. The junction of Howe with Burgoyne in upper New York was of prime importance, but the occupation of the "rebel capital" at Philadelphia, the permanent dispersion of the rebel Congress, and the separation of the Eastern and Middle States from the Southern, was of equal value. New England paralyzed, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania indifferent, Georgia "restored" to loyalty; the Tories of North and South Carolina gave full occupation to the Whigs of those States, so that they were unable to re-enforce the nucleus of opposition, the Continental Army. Sir William Howe may well have argued that a division of the rebellion on the line of the Delaware was infinitely more pregnant of results than that on the Hudson.

The Southern States subdued, the Eastern and Middle States cut off and neutralized, the rebellion on the Chesapeake and the gallant three counties on the Delaware would have been easily crushed under the guns of the British fleet. The great bays, the

wide and deep rivers, gave the command of the water entire control over the land. So Washington watched and waited. Howe might move up the North River, or up the Delaware, or up the Chesapeake. Either move might be disastrous to the American cause. Each must be met and defeated.

The county committees in lower New Jersey, in lower Delaware, on the eastern shore of Maryland and Virginia, were notified to keep a sharp lookout night and day for the fleet, and to report its appearance and progress as soon as it was identified. Lines of couriers were provided from county to county to transmit the news to headquarters.

On April 15th, Washington wrote from Morristown to Landon Carter: "The designs of the enemy are not yet clearly unfolded, but Philadelphia is the object in view; however, this may or may not be the case, as the North River must also be the object of very great importance to them, while they have an army in Canada and are desirous of a junction with it." On May 28th, he moved from Morristown to Middlebrook, fifteen miles south, on the Raritan River. The army then consisted of forty-three regiments in ten brigades and five divisions, under Major Generals Nathanael Greene, Adam Stephen, John Sullivan, Benjamin Lincoln, and Lord Stirling. The artillery was under Henry Knox. They mustered about seven thousand men, mostly militia, from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The New York and Eastern troops were guarding the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain chiefly at Peekskill and Ticonderoga.

On July 1st, Washington wrote to Putnam from Middlebrook, and on the 4th to Governor Trumbull,

that Howe was in motion, and "that, upon the whole, there is the strongest reason to conclude that he will push up the river immediately to co-operate with the army from Canada, which it appears certainly has in view an attack on Ticonderoga and the several dependent posts." At the same time he moved back to Morristown, to be in position for "succoring the Eastern States, and to be near enough to oppose any design upon Philadelphia." In a week news arrived from Schuyler, in command on the upper Hudson, of the evacuation of Ticonderoga and its occupation by Burgoyne. Washington moved out of Morristown to Pompton Plains, and then farther on toward the Hudson. It had then, in his opinion, become so plainly the policy of Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne that he prepared to support the force at Peekskill on the Hudson.

Howe had collected a fleet of one hundred and twenty vessels at New York. By the last of July he put to sea. At the same time Putnam captured a dispatch from Howe to Burgoyne, advising him that the fleet was to go eastward to Boston. Putnam sent the captured dispatch to headquarters. Washington understood the *ruse* at once. The dispatch was intended to deceive and to be captured. It said the enemy was to move northeast—that meant was really to move southwest. Without a moment's hesitation he ordered Sullivan's and Heath's divisions to cross the Hudson and march to Philadelphia. Howe appeared at the Capes of the Delaware. Washington moved over to that river, but it was so clearly the interest of Howe to join hands with Burgoyne, that, as he wrote to Gates, he "could not help casting his eyes continually behind him."

Washington pressed on and took position at Chester, fifteen miles below Philadelphia. But on August 1st he received news by express that on the day before the enemy had sailed out of the Capes in an easterly course. After a week's delay, and not hearing of Howe, he started the army back toward the Hudson. He camped for a few days at Schuylkill Falls, five miles north of Philadelphia, and hearing nothing of Howe's fleet, on August 8th the whole army started back for the East, with about eleven thousand men, mostly militia, "badly armed and worse clothed," as Lafayette, who then joined for the first time, recorded in his journal. On August 10th, at night, a dispatch was received from the President of Congress that the fleet had been seen off Sinepuxent, on the ocean side of the eastern shore of Maryland, on the 7th instant.

The army was then at Neshaminy camp, twenty miles north of Philadelphia, on the Old York road, where it halted until further information should be obtained of Howe. From here he sent Morgan and his riflemen to Gates, who had been assigned to the Northern army, then being assembled about Albany, to intercept Burgoyne. Washington was of opinion that Howe's object was Charleston, "though for what *sufficient* reason, unless he expected to drag this army after him, by appearing at different places, and thereby leave the country open for General Clinton to march out and endeavor to form a junction with General Burgoyne, I am at a loss to determine," as he wrote to Gates on August 20th.



The next day a council of war decided that, as the enemy's fleet had most probably sailed for Charleston, it was not expedient for the army to



march southward, and that it should move immediately toward the North River. The next day the fleet was reported sailing up the Chesapeake. Sullivan was ordered to rejoin with his division as promptly as possible, and the next morning everything was put on the march for Philadelphia and onward. He informed the troops, in a general order, of Stark's brilliant victory at Bennington on the 16th of August.

On Sunday, August 24th, part of the army, amounting to ten thousand men, with Washington at its head, marched through Philadelphia, down Front Street to Chestnut to the Common, and crossed the Schuylkill at the Middle Ferry, Market Street. They were followed next day by General Francis Nash's North Carolina Brigade and Colonel Proctor's Brigade of Artillery. They made a fine impression with their solid marching and seasoned appearance and with green leaves in their hats, though they were dirty and ragged, and were a revelation to the faint-hearted Whigs and jubilant Tories, who had no idea that the rebels could muster such a force of fighting men. He pressed on through Wilmington, where he heard that Howe was landing eighteen thousand men at the head of the bay. Washington proceeded with all his cavalry up to the enemy's lines, to reconnoitre his position and his force, and employed the next three days in acquiring personal knowledge of the roads and topography.

Howe landed on August 25th, and by September 7th had moved only seven miles. The American army fell back to Chadd's Ford, over the Brandywine, a small stream thirteen miles north of Wilmington, where it awaited the British attack. The position



on the north side overlooked that on the south, and during the day it became apparent that the skirmish at the ford opposite the American center was a feint to cover some ulterior purpose. The British army numbered eighteen thousand men, the American about eleven thousand. Wayne, with the artillery, held the center, and Greene was in reserve, with Sullivan on the right and Armstrong on the left. During the morning it got to be understood that the body of troops in front of the ford in plain sight was Knyphausen with his Hessians, and after a time reports began to come in from scouts that a heavy column was moving round the right toward the upper forks of the Brandywine. The enemy had therefore divided his force while within striking distance, and Washington promptly gave orders to Greene to cross and attack, supported by Wayne.

The movement was precisely that of McDowell at First Manassas, and of Jackson at Chancellorsville. Beauregard's countermove to his adversary was to cross Bull Run and attack his reserve and trains at Centerville. This would have been successful, but was not made on account of an inexplicable accident. There is no record of Hooker's intention or attempt to countercheck Lee's move with Jackson at Chancellorsville. When troops are in actual contact—when men see each other and are firing at each other—it is difficult to disengage and perform military evolutions. None but disciplined, and veteran troops can "change front under fire."

By the time, then, the formations were being made to cross the creek and attack, news came that there was no British column moving round the right flank, and the order to advance was countermanded. In

an hour another report of the flank march would come in, and preparation be made for an advance, and then another contradiction. There was no American cavalry to scout or to carry information—only a headquarter escort of mounted men.

In some countries—in every country where people are alert, enthusiastic, hot-blooded—tidings of an invading enemy would be spread on the wings of the wind. In Virginia, long afterward, farmers' sons and daughters would ride thirty miles in a dark night to give information to Lee or Jackson or Stuart of some move of the enemy; and no important move was ever made by any Federal general without being promptly and accurately reported to his adversary in ample time to prepare. And McClellan, Hooker, or Meade, in Maryland and Pennsylvania, were always kept thoroughly posted as to the movements of their Southern enemies by the country people through whose farms and along whose lanes and roads they were marching.

But at Brandywine not a syllable was ever uttered to the American commander from the population among whom operations were taking place for the capture of their capital city and the subjugation of their country. Cornwallis marched seventeen miles through the open country by daylight, to get in the rear, surround, and capture the American army, and not a soul in all that thickly settled country raised hand or voice to save it.

The first positive and accurate knowledge the Americans had of the British movement was when, late in the afternoon, Cornwallis appeared in their rear. Sullivan tried to change front and check him, but that was impossible with his green troops, and

they broke, pouring back over the reserve. Washington rode in among them in a tempest of fury, but nothing could stop them. Greene held his command well in hand and moved back in good order and perfect deliberation, and saved the wreck the rout had left. Washington fell back to his old position behind the Schuylkill, and for two weeks was engaged in manœuvring to defend the fords. At last Howe and his army crossed.


Washington wrote to the President of Congress, on September 23d: "The enemy, by a variety of perplexing manœuvers through a country from which I could not derive the least intelligence (being to a man disaffected), contrived to pass the Schuylkill last night at the Fatland (half a mile below Valley Forge), and other fords in the neighborhood of it. . . . At least a thousand men are barefoot, and have performed the marches in that condition."

At 10 A. M. on September 26th, Lord Cornwallis, with two battalions of British and Hessian grenadiers, two squadrons of the Sixteenth Dragoons, and the artillery, with the chief engineer, Captain John Montresor, the commanding officer of artillery, the quartermaster, and the adjutant general, marched in and took possession of the city of Philadelphia, amid the acclamations of some thousands of the inhabitants, mostly women and children. The men would not appear. So, at last, the rebel capital was taken, their Congress dispersed, and their army nearly routed and driven in disorder from the field. Howe camped his army at Germantown, near Philadelphia, occupying the city with a few picked troops and fixing general headquarters there.

The expulsion of Congress, the seizure of the capi-

tal, and the rout at Brandywine, had depressed the *morale* of the country to its lowest point. It seemed utterly impossible that the militia could be braced up to meet, much less to attack, the invincible regulars, who had driven them whenever and wherever they could get at them. A victory over the British would be of inestimable value. A gallant trial of strength would restore confidence, at least, to troops and to the country. The exposed position of Howe invited enterprise similar to that at Trenton, and the American commander promptly took advantage of his opportunity. He divided his army into three columns of attack, and at 7 P. M., October 3d, moved out of his camp to strike the British just before day next morning. The camp was about twelve miles from the enemy. The attacking force was eight thousand Continentals and three thousand militia.

The attack was to be made by the right wing under Sullivan, accompanied by the commander in chief, moving down the road on which the village was built, with his division of Maryland troops supported by the division of Wayne. His reserve was under Lord Stirling, of Nash's North Carolina and Maxwell's Virginia brigades. Sullivan was to attack the left wing, while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was to pass to the left of the enemy and attack in the rear. Greene, with the left wing, was to move to the right of the enemy and march upon the Market House, about the center of the camp; while McDougall, with his division, was to attack in flank, and Smallwood's division of Maryland militia, and Forman's New Jersey brigade, making a circuit by the Old York road, were to attack in the rear.



The plan was fatally defective. It proposed to march green troops twelve miles in the night. None but veterans can make such a movement. The darkness disorganizes the command, and destroys the control of field and company officers over the troops. File-closers become powerless. And after such a march with such troops, four separate attacks in front, both flanks and rear to be made by four separate commands at the same instant of time, were impossible. It was impracticable, as the result showed. But Washington, knowing the value of vigor and enterprise in war, that surprise and the unexpected are wonderful forces in attack, hoped to repeat the exploit of Trenton. And the way in the darkness was long and weary. An unprecedented fog obscured the stars by night and the sun by day. It was after daybreak when Sullivan came in touch with the enemy. He attacked at once, and drove them down the road in rout. Neither the right nor left attacks were up, and Sullivan had to do all the fighting.

Colonel Musgrave, of the Fortieth Regiment of the Line of the British army, with six of his companies, threw himself into a strong stone house belonging to Chew, right in the line of attack, and held on to it, firing on the Americans as they passed. Sullivan stopped to take it, lost half an hour, and then pressed on a mile farther and broke the enemy's left. Everything was now in retreat, and Washington's audacity about to be crowned with magnificent success. The line in front pursuing and pressing the enemy saw the attack on Chew's house in the rear, and faced about to go to the assistance of their comrades. The enemy supposed it was a retreat and immediately advanced, and the whole army broke into rout. They

were within ten minutes of victory, if it had not been for the stone house. Washington rode to the head of the fugitives, rallied fragments, and with them charged the advancing line and was driven back, again and again to rally, charge, and be repulsed. The gallant and warm-hearted Sullivan, knightly gentleman as he was, said: "I saw with great concern our brave commander in chief exposing himself to the hottest fire of the enemy in such a manner that regard for my country obliged me to ride to him and beg him to retire. He, to gratify me and some others, withdrew to a short distance, but his intense anxiety for the fate of the day soon brought him up again, where he remained until our troops had retreated."

. Washington and all the principal officers were deeply mortified at the result. They always believed that the victory was lost by an accident, and that the panic of the troops was unaccountable. It is difficult now to get at the hidden influences which produced results long past, but a cotemporary, who commanded troops at Germantown, has left a recorded statement that "there was too much drinking at Germantown"; and General Stephens, of the Virginia Division, was cashiered for drunkenness at this battle. To the darkness of the night, the complicated detail of movements, the obstacle of Chew's house, and Musgrave's six companies, may have been added the incapacity of superior officers paralyzed by drink. That would account for every misfortune.

Though the daring enterprise failed and he lost the hazard, the moral effect of the movement was enormous at home and abroad. That an army that had been retreating for a year, and been beaten

within thirty days, could have been brought to face and attack regulars and come within an ace of routing them, produced a profound impression on the soldiers and statesmen on the Continent.

Frederick the Great said that the dash on Trenton was worthy of the greatest general; and the Count de Vergennes told the American Commissioner at Paris that nothing struck him so much as General Washington attacking Howe at Germantown; that to bring an army raised within a year to such a pass, promised everything. It reminds us of McClellan's attack on Lee at Sharpsburg or Antietam; not that McClellan got such magnificent fighting out of his troops—for they did fight superbly—but that he got them to fight at all; men who for the preceding year had never fought their enemy but to be beaten, and had never faced him but to retreat. The fighting at Germantown, as at Sharpsburg, was a phenomenon of will and courage in the commander.

When the army was about dissolving, and the Congress itself, paralyzed by inherent imbecility and secret treason, was fleeing from town to town, wherever it could find temporary shelter, it found itself at Christmas time, 1776, in brief security at Baltimore. It met at a hall in the building on the corner of Liberty and Baltimore Streets, then the building farthest west on the road which led from the Western country to tide water.

Then, while Washington was moving back after the surprise at Trenton, and was securing his prisoners and his booty by the retrograde over the Delaware, on the 27th of December, 1776, the Congress passed this resolution: "This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis, having

perfect confidence in the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of General Washington, do hereby resolve, that General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light horse and three regiments of cavalry, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general, and to fill all vacancies in every department in the American army; to take, wherever he may be, whatsoever he may want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine all persons who refuse to take Continental currency or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause, and to return to the State of which they are citizens their names and the nature of their offenses, together with the witnesses to prove them. That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington for and during the term of six months from this date, unless sooner determined by Congress."

On December 30th the Congress sent a circular letter to the Governor of each State, explaining the necessity of this extraordinary action, and urging that "the fullest influence of your State may be exerted to aid such levies as the general shall direct

in consequence of the power now given him." They also appointed a committee, consisting of Robert Morris, George Clymer, and George Walton, to convey to General Washington a copy of their resolutions appointing him dictator, who inclosed it to him on December 31, 1776.

On January 1, 1777, he wrote to the committee from Trenton, where he then was, with Cornwallis moving on him from Princeton with the flower of the British regulars. He said: "Yours of the 31st of last month inclosed to me sundry resolves of Congress, by which I find they have done me the honor to intrust me with powers, in my military capacity, of the highest nature, and almost unlimited in extent. Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil obligations by this mark of their confidence, I shall constantly bear in mind, that as the sword was the last resort for the preservation of our liberties, so it ought to be the first thing laid aside when those liberties are firmly established."

Whether this resolution was passed in the enthusiasm of the receipt of the news of the victory at Trenton on the preceding morning, or whether it was passed in despair at the desperate condition of the Revolution, it was clearly an abandonment by Congress of the struggle, and a confession of its own incapacity to do anything. It meant that, "experience having proved that we have neither the capacity nor the power to direct or conduct the rebellion, we hereby invest you, general, with all the power intrusted to us by our States, or whatever you can obtain from them or from anywhere, by hook or by crook, to do the best you can under the circumstances. If you can conduct the war, conduct it; if

you must make peace, make it ; if you are obliged to disperse, take to the woods. We are at the end of our rope ; we can do nothing further ; we give it up, and turn the whole matter over to you."

To be sure, they pretended to limit the duration of the dictatorship to six months or the pleasure of the Congress ; but the only limit to the power of a dictator is the pleasure of the dictator himself. He ends it when he thinks public necessity—which is another term for his personal opinion—requires that it should terminate. The prestige of the attack at Trenton and Princeton conferred vastly more authority on the commander in chief than the transitory resolves of the ambulatory Congress.

The people felt, and the States knew, that the government of the country was at the headquarters of the army, and that its counsels and debates were conducted under the chapeau of the general in chief. The power of public opinion furnished recruits, sustained the currency, and supplied provisions, as far as anything in that direction was done. The resolution of Congress effected nothing, and, whether intended or not when it was passed, its utter failure to accomplish anything or to strengthen the arm of the general in the field was made the excuse, the reason, and the justification for the intrigue of the following winter, when it was intended by the Board of War to drive him out of the army, and thus accomplish a surrender of the struggle.

Washington's correspondence during this period is the most remarkable display of ability ever made by any soldier or any statesman. His task was, first, to keep an army together so as to furnish a nucleus for armed resistance ; second, and equally

difficult, to hold the Congress and prevent its dispersing to the woods and the mountains to escape the wrath of the victorious officers of the law; third, to hold up the States to the spirit of resistance, so that, whatever happened to the Continental organization, armed or civic, military or congressional, the seeds of rebellion should be preserved and cherished, and the struggle against irresponsible and unlimited power should never be abandoned. He, more than any man, knew the limitless resources of the Western country—West Augusta he once called it—with its plains and its mountains, its forests and its valleys, its great rivers and its grand unsalted seas. He knew that “*montani semper liberi*”; and with the British occupying every port and garrisoning every capital and patrolling every town on tide water, the trackless forest and illimitable desert could never be subdued when held by men of the race he represented.

CHAPTER X.

THE TIMES THAT TRIED MEN'S SOULS.

WHEN Howe, on September 26, 1777, occupied Philadelphia, the fortunes of America were at their lowest ebb. Burgoyne had opened the way from Canada by the capture of Ticonderoga, which St. Clair had abandoned after his assurance to the commander in chief that it could and should be held. After the evacuation he had disappeared in the wilderness with his troops, and for days there were no tidings of him. Sir Henry Clinton had forced the Hudson and was pressing on to Albany with every prospect of a junction with Burgoyne. That union insured the conquest of New England.

Gates, by his own intrigues and the influence of the New England members of Congress, had procured the command of the Northern Department, displacing Schuyler, who, by his family connection, his political influence, his services, the confidence the country reposed in him, and his patriotic devotion, was entitled to and best fitted for the command. Washington at once dispatched Gates to his command, well instructed as to the strategy of his campaign. If New England was to be saved, she must be saved by her own exertions. He proposed to give him a nucleus of veteran Continental troops around which the country could rally. He sent

Morgan and his Virginia riflemen with him, and wrote urgent letters to the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut, pressing them to hurry their militia to the support of Gates and the defense of the New England line, and impressing on them the vital importance of preventing the junction between Burgoyne and Sir Henry Clinton.

The moral effect of his exhortations, aided by the imminent peril, was prodigious. New England rose *en masse*, and its militia, including many soldiers of the last war, of the capture of Louisburg, and of Indian fights, rushed to the camp at Albany, bringing their own arms and rations. No more stalwart and determined re-enforcements ever came up in time of need. Burgoyne, as he wended his tedious and devious way down Lake Champlain, saw the tempest rising. He wrote to the ministry at home that the New Hampshire grants, which had been a wilderness at the time of the last war, were now peopled by the most hardy, daring, and rebellious race in America, "who hang like a gathering storm on my left." He reached the southern end of Lake George and crossed the Hudson, keeping up a casual and uncertain communication with Sir Henry Clinton.

Around him gathered the yeomanry of New England—front, flanks, and rear—as they had enveloped Lord Percy on that retreat from Lexington. They were everywhere. They were untiring. By the middle of October Burgoyne sent word to Sir Henry that he would hold on for five days; that he could not be responsible after that. His position and condition were better understood at the American headquarters than at his own, and no effort was left untried to force the fighting and to terminate the

campaign before Clinton could possibly get up. Arnold was with Gates, with the rank of brigadier general, but had come into collision with his commanding officer, who had deprived him of his command, and in effect had ordered him to the rear by directing him to report to headquarters. To be sent to the rear in the presence of the enemy is an unpardonable affront, an outrage, or an extreme duty, as the case may be, but it is the decision of the commanding officer that that particular soldier is unfit for duty in that battle.

Arnold's fiery, insubordinate temper could never brook such an insult, and on his troops becoming engaged, he dashed off, without rank, command, or orders, and led them. On the field his personality was so great that his directions were obeyed as orders, and the best fighting against Burgoyne was done by Arnold. At last the British general was forced to capitulate, and on the 17th of October, 1777, surrendered five thousand seven hundred and fifty-two men to Gates, who had, regulars and militia, ten thousand five hundred and fifty-four men on duty. Gates was so much elated by his success that his head—a weak, light member—was turned. He had been assigned to his command by Congress, therefore he argued that he held an independent command, ignoring the fact that Congress had appointed a commander in chief of all the armies raised and to be raised for the defense of American liberty. He reported the result to the President of Congress, and Washington was left for weeks with no official information from Gates of the capitulation and of its substantial results.

Gates had captured seven thousand stand of small

arms, with great quantities of artillery, ammunition, clothes, tents, and supplies, which would have been of immense importance to the army before Philadelphia. Washington went straight on in the execution of his grand strategy. He occupied the interior lines, and, by concentrating against isolated attacks of the enemy, could, to an extent, equalize the enormous disparity of force. He had fortified the Delaware; and, could it be held, Sir William Howe, surrounded in Philadelphia by the rising of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, could be destroyed as Burgoyne had been.

The surrender of the British general at Saratoga had released the Continentals in the army of the North. With them to re-enforce him, he could hold the Delaware, and the militia of the three States could close the gap behind Howe to the Chesapeake. He sent a peremptory order to Gates to dispatch all his Continentals to him. Gates did not do it. He sent another order, and then dispatched Colonel Alexander Hamilton, his aid-de-camp, to see that his commands were promptly obeyed. Hamilton started, expecting to meet the troops *en route*; but, riding across the country, it was not until he reached Peekskill, on the Hudson, that he met Morgan laboring on the way to Philadelphia.

Finding Putnam on the east side of the Hudson, he dispatched two Continental brigades from his command to headquarters, and on reaching Gates prevailed on him to send on two other brigades. These re-enforcements reached the Delaware ten days too late—after Howe had captured the forts, opened the Delaware, and made secure his communications with the open sea and his base of supplies

in New York. The probability of repeating in Pennsylvania the achievement of Saratoga was gone, and the only thing left to do was to protract the war, wear out his antagonist, and wait for re-enforcements, which, in the opinion of the American commander in chief, were sure to come. His anticipations of the rising of the country were not met. The militia of Maryland came in from the mountains to the sea. The counties on the Delaware—now the State of Delaware—responded with that chivalry, spirit, and generosity for which those people have always been distinguished.

New Jersey was divided in sentiment, torn by internal broils, harried by continual raids by Hessian, Tory, and regular, and could not rise; she was tied. But Pennsylvania, the invaded State, stood as placid as her own fat oxen. On the 17th of October Washington wrote to Wharton, the President of Pennsylvania, appealing to him to keep up the quota of troops demanded of the State by Congress. "I assure you, sir," he writes, "it is a matter of astonishment on every part of the Continent to hear that Pennsylvania, the most populous and opulent of all the States, has but twelve hundred militia in the field, at a time when the enemy are endeavoring to make themselves completely masters of, and to fix their quarters in, her capital."

Yet, a month afterward, when the American army, "starved, naked, without shoes, clothes, or provisions, three days successively without bread, two days without meat," writes Varnum, of Rhode Island, the Legislature of Pennsylvania addressed a remonstrance to Congress against Washington's going into winter quarters instead of keeping the open field.

This drop overflowed the full cup of his patience, and he broke out in a letter to Congress which did full justice to the subject, to himself, and to them. He told them: "With truth I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have by every department of the army. Since the month of July we have had no assistance from the quartermaster general, and to want of assistance from this department the commissary charges a great part of his deficiency.

"To this I may add, that notwithstanding it is a standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be ready on any sudden call, yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy that it has not been either totally obstructed or greatly impeded on this account. . . . By a field return this day made, besides the men in hospital and farmers' houses for want of shoes, we have two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in camp, unfit for duty because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. . . .

"By the same return it appears that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the Eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty. . . . I can assure gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and

distressed soldiers, I feel abundantly for them, and from my soul I pity those miseries which it is neither in my power to relieve nor prevent."

To keep the field was impossible. The commanding general might have kept the field, but he could not keep the army. It would have died out, starved out, frozen out, straggled out. In thirty days he would not have had enough men for camp guard; so, in the face of the remonstrances of the Congress and of the Pennsylvania Legislature, he went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, twenty miles from Philadelphia, on the west side of the Schuylkill, on the 17th of December 1777. The Congress had become ambulatory, and was steadily deteriorating in material. The best men were in the army or in the State governments. Johnson had been made Governor of Maryland, and was organizing that new State and utilizing her resources to support Washington, for he thoroughly understood that Washington was the Revolution. Patrick Henry was Governor of Virginia, and had declined to accept the position of deputy to Congress, as George Mason also had done from the beginning. George Clinton was Governor of New York, and Schuyler was with the army.

The feeble, incapable body known as the Congress was no longer the body that at risk of life and fortune had shown the way to liberty by the Declaration of Independence, but was composed of obscure men, without force of character or consideration in the communities they represented. This was particularly so among the deputies from New England. The Adamses were there, firm, faithful, brave, and true; they never faltered or hesitated; but the great

mass were attorneys or preachers or traders, without high ideas of duty, with no idea of devotion or self-sacrifice. John Jay, long after the Revolution, said to his son: "No one but John Adams and I know the history of the Continental Congress. It will never be written." Its corruptions, its intrigues, its unscrupulous undermining of Washington and the common cause will never be revealed. The sectional line had appeared at an early day.

The Adamsses had endeavored to obliterate it by cordial support of Virginian influence in the selection of a Virginia colonel for commander in chief. He was nominated by Johnson, of Maryland, but Adams brought New England to his formal support. This left a feeling of soreness in New England. Artemas Ward, their own commander in chief of their own army, which they had raised, was superseded by a Virginian aristocrat, with his liveries, his coat of arms, his coach and four, and his outriders. He was an abomination to the nostrils of the faithful. John Hancock, President of the Congress, was affronted that he had not been selected to command the army. So the feeling grew. Small men, without pedigree, manners, or fortune, hate those who are their antipodes in character, conduct, and general estimation. The dignified deportment of the Virginian gentleman was exaggerated into ponderous pomposity, and his style of dress and of living resented as an assumption of superiority.

Whenever the troops were in cantonments, or camps, the commander in chief expected all general and field officers to dine with him every day at three o'clock. The etiquette at dinner was, that every officer should appear dressed as a gentleman should

be; and the meal, whether of the scantiest or most abundant, was served by the general's own cooks and trained servants he had brought from Virginia. They were not unaccompanied with a glass of good rum or sound Madeira from the cellar of Mount Vernon. This simple social rite served a great and useful purpose. It brought all the officers under the constant supervision, inspection, and examination of their chief, who thus became acquainted with the character, ability, and capacity of each man; while it brought them all into that close contact which so largely creates the comradeship of arms, and makes soldiers the more serviceable, as they have confidence in each other. This form of entertainment had been commenced by the commander in chief as soon as he assumed command at Cambridge, and was continued by him during the entire war. This formal state was offensive to the democratic mind, and was the source of criticism, carping, and ill-will in Congress. How much and how far British gold was used in that body to foment discontent and to create dissension and purchase treason, we do not as yet know. It is certain that John Jay and others believed that such influences were at work.

We now know that Charles Lee had made his terms, and was exchanged and sent back to the army to carry out the scheme agreed on at the British headquarters in New York. At the same time appeared in London a number of letters of Washington to his brother Lund Washington and to Lieutenant Battaille Muse, his manager at Mount Vernon, depreciating the movement for independence, and the motives of the movers for it and the characters of the leaders. These letters contained

many domestic allusions and family details, which seemed to establish their genuineness. If true, they showed that the writer was a traitor to his cause, a hypocrite to his friends, and a maligner of his comrades. They were, in fact, forged by Sir John Randolph, Royal Attorney-General of Virginia, who had taken the Tory side, gone to London, and made this contribution toward the destruction of kin and country, though he never struck a blow in the field in defense of his opinions.

These letters were republished in New York and distributed through the country by the hands of envy and the breath of slander. Everywhere the air was full of suspicions of "our modern Fabius," as the New England members derisively dubbed the Virginian colonel. Even brusque, prompt, positive John Adams wrote his wife, that he was thankful that the capture of Burgoyne had been made by the Northern army. "If it had been accomplished by the Southern army," said the New Englander, "its commander would have been deified. It is bad enough as it is." A deep-laid plan then began to be put in execution, not alone to displace Washington—though that would have been fatal to the cause, for it would not have brought such prompt returns to the operators. It was intended, in Congress, to force Washington out; Lee to take command, as next in rank, and then the latter was to carry out his agreement with Sir Henry Clinton of restoring the Union and peace to a distracted people. The first step was to paralyze the commander in chief. That was done by reorganizing the Board of War, vested with general direction of operations, on which was placed Thomas Mifflin, the discredited quartermaster general, whom

Washington had just reported to Congress for incompetency, Joseph Trumbull, ex-Commissary-General Richard Peters, Colonel Timothy Pickering, and General Horatio Gates. This board organized by making Gates president, and Wilkinson, his chief of staff, secretary. It was thus organized to convict. Its plan was to snub Washington, to ignore his rank, to send orders over his head, and to make it impossible for him to command the army.

When he resigned, Gates assumed that he would succeed to the vacant scepter. We can not believe that Gates was a party to the Lee plot, and there is no evidence now known pointing that way; but it is more probable that Gates was the cat's-paw of the conspirators. If Washington were out of the way, the command, by operation of law, devolved upon Lee; and it would require an entire reorganization of the army to put Gates at the head of it, and that would be impossible.

Gates had been a sergeant in the British army, and the victory of Arnold and Morgan at Saratoga, for which he had received the plaudits of the public, had so addled him, that he failed to see the game that was being played inside of the one in which he had taken a part. He was playing to make Gates commander in chief. The real managers of the movement intended Lee to take charge—play the Monk act over again—and they would all gain rank, honors, and much wealth. Of course the first step was to blind Gates by flattery; and he was plied with that day after day. The conspiracy exploded in the most accidental manner, and hoisted its engineers as other petards have done, before and since.

On Gates's staff, at Saratoga, was a young Mary-

lander as adjutant general—James Wilkinson by name—with the proverbial modesty, diffidence, and self-depreciation of the ichthyophagi—of those nurtured on oysters and fish. Gates dispatched him with his report of Burgoyne's surrender to Congress, at York, in Pennsylvania. It took him eighteen days to make the ride; he ought to have done it in five. But then a bright, handsome, well-dressed young staff officer, carrying the news of victory through the country, was a great man at every village and at every gentleman's country seat where he stopped to bait and rest.

The girls of the house hung over him, and ran over each other in their eagerness to wait on this new Othello—how he marked with the bread the British fortifications, and with the salt the rifle-pits of the Americans; what the general said to him, and what he said to the general; and how by happy coincidence his suggestions—though he would not presume to insinuate that the general accepted and followed them, but the fact was, nevertheless, that when the line of action happened to correspond with the views he had confidentially imparted to the general, success invariably attended the operation.

All this over and over, for days and nights, as the gay gallant galloped from country house to country house. As he approached the army he would from time to time light on some post of soldiers or quarters of officers. Passing through Reading, he spent the evening at the headquarters of Lord Stirling, and of course began sounding his trumpet. The staff sized him up in five minutes, filled his glass again and again, and kept it full and also kept him talking. They chaffed him about his

great influence at headquarters with their tongues in their cheeks, and intimated that in the Southern army the adjutant general did not know and control everything. Knowledge and control were reserved to the general in chief alone.

Wilkinson, eager to impress these incredulous aids-de-camp, told them that they had no idea of what was going on; that the Board of War was about to supersede Washington with Gates, and that then they would have an opportunity to win some of the laurels of which he had secured such a plentiful crop. "In fact," said the garrulous and bibulous chief of staff, "I have read a letter from General Conway, the brilliant and distinguished and experienced French officer, lately joined, to my own chief, General Gates, in which he says: 'Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it.' So you see," said Wilkinson, "that your hero is only a clay hero at last; my hero is the only genuine one, who alone can save the country."

Wilkinson proceeded to York, where he delivered his dispatches with a flourish and a bow, like a rustic beau, and waited until Congress should reward, with some signal recognition, his distinguished services in taking eighteen days to carry a message which any ordinary rider would have delivered in five. He demanded a major general's commission, a vote of thanks, a horse, and a sword—any one, either or all—until Dr. Witherspoon, of Princeton, said, "I think ye'd better give the lad a pair of spurs." They did give him a brevet brigadiership, and he went off swelling and happy. Stirling's adjutant, McWilliams, of course immediately reported Wilkin-

son's statement to his chief, who informed General Washington of it.

He had been well informed of the intrigues of Congress. He knew the efforts that were being made to undermine him in public opinion. Anonymous letters had been sent to Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, to Laurens, President of Congress, and to General Putnam, on the Hudson, carefully depreciating Washington's abilities and services, and urging the necessity for an immediate change in the command of the army. Henry and Laurens sent their letters to Washington, who identified them as in the handwriting of Dr. Benjamin Rush, of Philadelphia. That to Putnam, still preserved among his papers, has since been identified as in the handwriting of James Lovell, deputy in Congress from Massachusetts. Such a swarm of buzzing insects, hiving in darkness, only required the light to be let in on it to disperse it, and Washington did this in the simplest, most direct way. On November 9, 1777, he wrote Conway this note:

"SIR: A letter which I received last night contained the following paragraph: 'In a letter from General Conway to General Gates, he says: "Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it."' "

"I am, sir, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE WASHINGTON."

Conway was overwhelmed. He was inspector general, with the rank of major general. He promptly resigned, but the Board of War very properly would not accept his resignation.

Mifflin and Gates were as confounded as Conway, but they all agreed to stand together as far as possible. The first thing to be done was to find out how much Washington knew. Hamilton had been some time at Gates's headquarters, and mean-minded men suspect mean tricks, so the idea floated through what Gates took for his mind, that Hamilton had stolen his correspondence—in the name of Heaven, how much and what part! Gates therefore wrote to Washington, complaining of this theft from his letter book, and beseeching that the general would aid him in discovering the thief. Washington wrote him, explaining how the information had come to him through the babbling of Wilkinson, thus upsetting the theory of theft, but relieving the cabal with the knowledge that no written evidence of the statement was in the possession of the general. Gates therefore denied that there was any such expression in Conway's letter to him, and at the same time returned the letter to Conway, so that he (Gates) could not be called upon to produce it. Conway denied that any such expression was in the letter, and refrained from exhibiting it. Washington coldly persisted in holding them both to the point, that the simplest, plainest, most perfect settlement of the existence or nonexistence of the obnoxious paragraph was the production of the paper itself, and without it the question would be left absolutely uncertain.

Stirling wrote Wilkinson that he had heard that the latter now asserted that there were no such words in the letter, and asked Wilkinson also for a copy of the letter. Wilkinson indignantly refused, repudiating the idea of such a betrayal of confidence as showing a private letter. But Wilkinson's time

was not a happy one—Stirling prodding him for a copy, Gates denouncing him for treachery, Conway damning him for a fool. He undertook, as many a man has, to brazen through it. He rode over to York, sent his friend Colonel Ball, of Virginia, to Gates with a letter demanding satisfaction. The terms of the duel were arranged, when Gates came around at night to Wilkinson's quarters, made up, and they became friends. He went after Stirling, but Stirling was too ready with his right hand, and Wilkinson accepted in satisfaction a statement from Stirling that Wilkinson had said what he did about the letter in a convivial moment, but not in confidence. Wilkinson resigned his commission as inspector general and major general, retaining that of colonel, and retired to obscurity. After the war he was restored to the army, was in command at New Orleans on the cession of Louisiana to the United States, and was charged with complicity with Colonel Aaron Burr in his treasonable schemes.

Conway resigned, fought a duel with General John Cadwalader about this business, who shot him through the body, thought he was going to die, and wrote a contrite letter to General Washington, expressing the highest respect and admiration, and the deepest love for him. Gates was sent after a time to command the Southern army, and there his "Northern laurels turned to Southern willows," as Charles Lee warned him they might. After defeat and disaster he was relieved, and retired to an obscure plantation in Virginia, where he died unnoticed and unknown. Every conspicuous, exposed member of the cabal came to an ignominious end. Not one survived Washington's letter to Conway. The

parties to it in and out of Congress have escaped, sheltered by their obscurity, but not a single member of that Congress ever won public confidence or achieved reputation, unless he had been at that time an avowed supporter of Washington. The exposure of this intrigue paralyzed the conspirators. The dictator ruled the Board of War, instead of the Board of War managing him. He made Nathanael Greene, of Rhode Island, quartermaster general, and Jeremiah Wadsworth, of Connecticut, commissary general; and very soon military matters began to improve.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

FROM the day of the Declaration of Independence Washington perfectly appreciated the situation, that independence could not be achieved by the colonies alone. With the command of the water, the British would occupy all the ports and control all foreign commerce and intercourse with the world. The colonists could retire to the mountains, and could not be subjugated, but they never could be an independent people as long as they were cut off from the world and blockaded from the ocean. When he presided at the Fairfax meeting, and voted to memorialize the King—that from the King in council there was but one appeal—he understood that to mean an appeal to the God of battles, and that appeal the Virginians were ready and willing to make, unaided by any other arm and unsupported from any quarter. They had done so under the lead of Nathaniel Bacon against Sir William Berkley—unsuccessfully, indeed, so far as the overthrow of his government was concerned, but with entire success so far as demanded reforms were obtained. Resistance to the King might be made unaided ; independence of the kingdom could only be fully attained by foreign assistance.

Washington was brought to favor independence

as a war necessity to carry on successful war; he was forced to favor the French alliance as the only means of securing independence. But independence and the French alliance were both entirely distasteful steps to many earnest and determined patriots. To resist the Government with arms was an inherited right; to dissolve the Union was an offense against the law of Nature; to fight our kin, our own blood and our brothers, was the natural order; but to join the "bloody Frenchman" in fighting them was entirely inconceivable. The great struggle their ancestors had made was to expel New France from, and establish New England on, the American continent; and it was contrary to the traditions, the sentiments, and the convictions of the English in America to aid in re-establishing the French in the position from which they had dislodged and expelled them twenty years before.

These objections weighed heavily on the mind and heart of Washington. He had spent a score of the years of his life in fighting the French; he was not willing to purchase independence from his blood and kin at home for the purpose of restoring their hereditary and natural enemy to the position in America from which they had been expelled. But Washington's mind worked with mathematical and inexorable logic. If we were subjugated, we would lose every right that freemen cherish and every muniment of liberty on which they rely, and with which alone it can be perpetuated. We would become serfs of an insolent, brutal, overbearing set of masters, who, arrogating to themselves Norman blood, would introduce Norman customs of confiscation, conviction, and forfeitures into America. We could

achieve independence and escape subjugation solely by means of a French alliance. The alliance might restore Canada to France, but it were better to achieve independence first, and then control as best we could the consequences of the alliance.

Therefore, when the news came that the treaty, offensive and defensive, had been signed on the 6th of February, 1778, at Paris, between His Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, it was considered the beginning of the end. It was certain that Spain must soon join France in this attack on their hereditary enemy. Great Britain promptly declared war on France, on March 13, 1778. Lord George Germaine shifted the responsibility for the disasters of the American campaign from his own shoulders to that of the generals in the field. Burgoyne, who had gone home on parole at once, took his seat in the House of Commons and defended himself with vigor.

As soon as Sir William Howe heard of it he insisted upon his right to face his accusers and meet the charges against his conduct in person. He resigned, turned over the command to Sir Henry Clinton, and sailed for home. The war with France had put a new complexion on the occupation of Philadelphia. Instead of perfectly secure communications by sea, with his base at New York and England, the approach of a great French fleet rendered them exceedingly hazardous. Consequently, on June 18, 1778, the British army marched out of Philadelphia, with a trail of wagons and Tory refugees twelve miles long. Before sundown the American advance took possession of the city.

The American army was now about numerically

equal to the British. It was better than it ever had been in drill, equipment, and *morale*. During the winter it had been under the instruction of Von Steuben, inspector general, and the troops were anxious to put in practice some of the movements of the great Frederick—which their drill master, the Baron, had told them a thousand times were the means by which he achieved victory. Sir Henry Clinton was pushing for deep water and an open port. He apprehended being cooped up in Philadelphia, the Delaware blockaded, and the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey rising like a storm in his rear, both flanks and front, as the Green Mountain Boys and the Massachusetts and Connecticut militia had swept around Burgoyne.

Washington intended and hoped to accomplish this, but the treason of Lee and the vanity of Gates lost the chance. As soon, however, as Sir Henry set his face toward the sea the American commander's drums beat the assembly, and he pushed out to cut him off. The news of the evacuation reached the American headquarters at ten A. M. By two P. M. six brigades were on the march pushing out into Jersey, followed by the whole army next morning at daylight. This prompt action was extraordinary. The troops had been in huts for exactly six months. In that time an army accumulates an incredible amount of trash—clocks, feather beds, large iron ovens, bedsteads, boxes, trunks, etc. It is impossible to shake them off in a few hours. Soldiers will load themselves with every conceivable inconvenience rather than throw it away. When the army of northern Virginia evacuated Manassas, in March, 1862, its wagons were broken down with Saratoga

trunks—unwieldy, cumbrous affairs, the contribution of devoted sisters and mothers—and it took three days' stalling of wagons and breaking down of four and six mule teams to clear out the "things" piled in and on them.

When the Germans, in 1871, invested Paris, the Teutonic mind seemed to run by a law of Nature to horology, and the files of the marching columns were picturesque and ridiculous with every variety of clock—big clocks, little clocks, square clocks, round clocks, long clocks, short clocks—on their backs, in their arms, stuffed in their haversacks, and protruding from their knapsacks; and after a day or two the route was strewn with every variety of product of French skill and of German vexation. Cæsar called this "impedimenta."

That Washington should have got in motion in four hours after receiving notice proves, first, that he had been preparing for the move; second, that his troops, officers and men, were well in hand; and third, that the general in chief had a prompt, quick, positive mind. He knew that Sir Henry must evacuate; that he must move by land to New York; that his column must be long and attenuated, choked with the *débris* of winter quarters, and stretched out with the plunder of officers and the impedimenta of refugees. With such an army guarding such a train, there must occur opportunity to strike some point weaker than the other, and to cut it off. If the amputated portion should be the artillery and the reserve ammunition, so much the better; but the opportunity *must* occur; it was a certainty that it would occur. It was his duty to be prepared to take advantage of it; for the great difference between sol-

diers is, that one knows an opportunity when he sees it, and embraces it on sight, while the other never understands that an opportunity has been within his reach until after it has passed irreclaimably beyond.

The American appreciated the conditions, and knew what would happen. He had his troops stripped ready for the race, and the moment Sir Henry started he gave the word, and six brigades moved out promptly and took the route, Charles Lee in command. He crossed the Delaware at Coryell's Ferry, now Lambertville, N. J., on the 20th, the army following over the same crossing, and pressed on toward Princeton. Washington had the interior and shorter line to New York. By the 27th of June his advance interposed between the British and Amboy, and Sir Henry turned off to the right and marched for Sandy Hook.

The most incomprehensible line of Washington's policy during the whole war was his constant appeal to councils of war. He had councils to determine whether he should attack General Gage at Boston or Sir William Howe at New York or in Philadelphia, or whether he should make the dash on Princeton; and, what is still more impossible to understand, he always permitted his council to decide.

It may have been that, appreciating his own inexperience, he really desired advice; or it may have been that, having made up his mind, he took this means of impressing his views on his subordinates; or he may have taken this means to bring his officers in close and confidential relations to each other, just as he always expected all his general officers to dine with him every day. Whatever may have been the reason for the councils of war, they are not discern-


ible now. But this council decided to attack. The commander in chief had intended and had been preparing for this move for the preceding four weeks. Lee, therefore, was directed to push on with his five thousand men and cut off the British rear guard at Monmouth Court-House, and hold it while Washington brought up the main body of the army.

The movement was too assured of success to suit Lee's plans. It would certainly be accomplished if pressed, and, if accomplished, disastrous consequences to Sir Henry Clinton might ensue. He might be surrounded and captured, as Burgoyne had been, and then "good-by" to Lee's dukedom and pension. He therefore asked to be relieved from the command of the advance, on the ground of his disapproval of the military movement. Lafayette was thus left in charge, and his fidelity, energy, and courage insured a vigorous execution of the plan of the commander in chief. During the night Lee concluded that there was too much chance of success with Lafayette, and that he alone could insure disaster.

With a rout of the army and a probable capture of its commander, the Board of War would be revived, the command would devolve on him, and, in conjunction with the mercenary traitors in Congress, the *débris* of resistance could be surrendered, the terms of the British commissioners accepted, the Union restored, and he secure his dukedom, with vast possessions from the confiscated estates of the rebels. Of his own personal knowledge he knew what a princely estate Mount Vernon was, for he had been entertained there; and it would furnish a delightful haven for an old soldier battered by many wars and buffeted by various fortunes.

Lafayette was pressing on to make the movement which would bring on a general engagement. Lee thereupon represented to the general that a movement of such moment and responsibility ought to be intrusted to the second in command, and that it was his duty to execute it. Washington agreed with him; said that that had been his intention, and that Lee himself had frustrated it by declining the command, and that now no change could be made which would appear to reflect on Lafayette by sending a senior officer to rank him and take his command away from him in the presence of the enemy. But Washington, with a consideration for Lee's feelings which does no credit to his judgment of men, at length sent Lee forward with Scott's and Varnum's brigades to re-enforce Lafayette. Upon reporting his arrival to the latter, his rank gave him command of the whole, and the opportunity to produce disaster, which he sought. He was within five miles of the British left wing, which was separated from its right, convoying the trains, by an interval of several miles.

The next day (June 28th) was one of the hottest of the season. Lee did not get into action until after eight o'clock—he ought to have struck his blow at daylight—and as soon as he appeared, Cornwallis, who commanded the British left, turned sharply on him and pressed him with vigor. Washington, with his main body, was three miles back, comfortably enjoying the sound of the firing which assured him of substantial results. All at once a countryman rode up with an exclamation that the Americans were retreating. The general, with emphasis, said that the man was a fool; but before half a dozen phrases could have been uttered the road,



the woods, the fields, the air became full of indications of rout and panic. A drummer boy ran up with his tongue hanging out, who was promptly cuffed into decency and quiet. Soldiers could be seen dodging about in the woods, flanking the group in the road, which they understood at once consisted of generals, who were not good company at that time for a skulking private.

The general up to that time had been standing in the road with his arm on his horse's neck, taking in everything that transpired, cool and quiet, only opening his mouth to damn the countryman and to scold the drummer boy, when at once he mounted and struck off in a gallop to the front, with the staff straggling on as best they could behind him. Some distance toward the fighting he met Grayson's and Patton's regiments running as fast as fatigue, the hot weather, and the crowd would let them. The Virginians on the run! No living man had ever seen that sight before, and the general demanded of them whether the whole advance corps was retreating. They said it was. Soon Shreeve, at the head of his regiment, came along in good order. "What's the reason of all this?" "I do not know," said Colonel Shreeve; "I retreated by order." He directed Shreeve to halt, form a line, and rally what he could on it. Meeting Colonel Nathaniel Ramsay, of the Maryland Line, struggling and straggling back, he said, "Colonel Ramsay, if you can stop this advance for fifteen minutes you will save this army." "I will do it," said Ramsay, "or die;" and he did it, and did not die either. Every officer who came by was dissatisfied with the retreat. No one could explain it. They were driving the enemy

when they were called off. That was the universal feeling. General Lafayette sent word that the presence of the commander in chief was imperatively needed on the field.

This message overflowed the cup of patience and broke the back of self-control. Just then Lee came along with his staff, cool and complacent. Washington rode at him as if he meant to ride him down. He was like a raging lion. "What is the meaning of all this?" he fiercely demanded of Lee. His manner was more nerve-shattering than his words, his voice than his actions, and Lee was utterly abashed. He stammered that misconception of orders made confusion, and confusion necessitated withdrawal, "for our troops can't face the British infantry; they are the best troops in the world." "Will you command here, sir, and hold this hill while I bring up the rest?" "It is perfectly indifferent to me where and what I command," said Lee. "I expect you to take proper means for checking the enemy!" "Your orders shall be obeyed, and I shall not be the first to leave the ground."

Washington galloped back and formed his line, with Lord Stirling on his left and Greene on his right. Cornwallis first attempted to turn the left flank, but was driven back by Stirling, and then tried the right with equal bad fortune, for he was checked by Greene. The British then fell back beyond Monmouth Court-House, and took a strong position with flanks well covered by woods and morass. The American general pressed his troops on to attack, but before the proper disposition could be made night fell, and the movement was abandoned on account of the darkness. During the night

Washington and Lafayette occupied the same cloak on the ground, and passed the entire time discussing Lee. What passed has not been recorded, but Lafayette had seen the thing with his own eyes. It certainly was not cowardice, for Lee was beyond peradventure a brave man. But he had refused to fight, had declined to inflict a mortal blow on his enemy, and had thrown away victory when it was within his grasp. His mysterious capture outside of his lines, the talk about trying him by British court-martial as a deserter, his effort to have a committee of Congress visit him in his quarters while a prisoner of war, that he might make an important communication to them—all this, it may well be supposed, was brought up for review and criticism.

There is no evidence that either Washington or Lafayette had the faintest idea of the length and breadth and height and depth of Lee's turpitude. They could not conceive that he was at that very moment in the pay of the British commander in chief, and that the British commander was acting on Lee's well-matured plan to destroy his commander, his comrades, his country, his friends.

The army was halted the next day, and soon after was moved to a salubrious camping ground at New Brunswick for rest and refreshment. Sir Henry, on the 30th of June, crossed over to Sandy Hook, and thus again New Jersey was clear, and the enemy, after three years' campaign, only held what his picket lines covered. Lee wrote to his chief, demanding an apology for his language and manner in the battle. He was at once ordered under arrest, and charges preferred, first, for disobedience of orders; second, misbehavior in the presence of the enemy—

i. e., cowardice; third, disrespect to his commanding officer. A court-martial, with Lord Stirling as president, four brigadiers and eight colonels, was convened on July 4th, at New Brunswick. The trial lasted until August 12th, and resulted in the conviction of Lee on all three charges. He was sentenced to be suspended from all command for one year, subject to the approval of Congress. On December 5th the sentence was approved by that body—fifteen ayes and seven nays. If he was guilty as charged, he ought to have been shot, and his escape can only be attributed to the provincialism of the court that tried and sentenced him.

The respect for the British character, the British morals, statesmen, and soldier, was still the dominating and directing influence in the colonial breast; and the militia generals and colonels who sat on Lee's trial would not have dreamed of shooting a real lieutenant colonel of the British army—a genuine soldier, who had seen war against the Infidel and been decorated with crosses by live kings and emperors. It required another generation and another war to eliminate that sentiment as one of the forces, and a strong force, of American society. But it has been eliminated, and the dregs of it, still exhibited on occasion, only prove the fad of weak-minded women and no-minded men.

Lee retired to a small plantation in Jefferson County, Va., not far from Charlestown, long afterward the scene of John Brown's execution. Toward the end of his term of exclusion, hearing the Congress was going to drop him from the army, he wrote a very impertinent letter to the President of the Congress, which, without more ado, struck his

name from the list of American soldiers. He fought with Colonel John Laurens, aid-de-camp of Washington, on account of some reflections on Laurens's chief, and passed the rest of his life snarling and cynical, discreditable and discredited; and only the discovery of the Howe papers in this generation has resurrected the skeleton of the almost last survivor of the free lance and the soldier of fortune.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE AGAIN.

WHEN Washington took command of the New England army, in July, 1775, no man living understood the conditions, political and military, as well, and no man enlarged his view as environment developed and changed the relations of people, of communities, and of States; and he rose higher and higher to understand what surrounded him and what was necessary. The Fairfax resolutions accurately represented his views: First, protest against illegal acts of government, because government had no right to levy taxes or take any portion of the property of any Englishman without his consent; this had been done by John Hampden. Protest proving unavailing, then to resist with arms every trespass on common right—the right of Englishmen to have, hold, and enjoy the products of their own labor, free from interference by any one, from King to constable, except under laws to which he had consented.

Such armed resistance, which the common law called the right of self-defense, was the reform element of the British Constitution, and since the Norman Conquest had been the power by which the English had kept their rulers in check and preserved rights of person and of property to home and family. Self-defense against trespass on rights—the right to

use precisely that amount of force which was necessary to protect and preserve person and home—was the logical premise of armed resistance against void laws attempted to be enforced by officers of government, whether civil or military. The colonists comprised about three million white people, mainly English, scattered along the Atlantic seaboard for two thousand miles, which was indented at every point with sounds, bays, and rivers, affording easy access to the interior. Great Britain had three hundred thousand troops in the field, seasoned by campaigns in every climate in every part of the world, and braced by victory over every foe they ever met. For a thousand years the Cross of St. George had been the signal for victory and the emblem of glory, and for nearly a hundred and fifty years it had swept the oceans from continent to continent, the controller of commerce and the mistress of the sea.

The strategy of the Revolution was the largest, wisest, best, that could have been adopted. It was evolved from the broad brain and great heart of Washington, and was the result of his capacity and experience. He understood continental conditions. He knew the value of the Western lands, and how the outlet to the highway of commerce, of civilizations, of nations and races, was necessary to the future dwellers on the great rivers and lakes of the inland continental basin; but he also understood that the continent itself was necessary to support the progress of the seaboard. The thirteen separate, distinct corporations—colonies—were as entirely apart as if they were on different continents. Charleston was as far from Boston as from London, and the people of New England differed as widely from those

on the Chesapeake as those on opposite sides of the British Channel. In race, in religion, in ideas of life, and ideals of right and duty, they differed widely—in many respects were antagonistic.

The Marylanders despised the Connecticut "Yankees" as bumpkins without manners; the Yankees derided the Marylanders as "Macaronis" without manliness. Virginia and Pennsylvania were on the point of war about the possession of the upper Ohio. New York and New Hampshire had a similar bitter quarrel about the Green Mountains. So, when Washington assumed command of the Continental army, it was in substance a New England army, and the continental feeling was not yet born to brace it. During the whole time of the investment of Boston his great effort was to bring his people together so as to know each other, for he knew that association would produce sympathy and respect, and, when the Virginia troops under Morgan and the Maryland Riflemen under Cresap reported, he was enabled to carry out his policy of mixing them. While seeking to crystallize his command by association, and thus consolidate the colonies by the friendly relations of their representatives, his mind was occupied with the grand conceptions which embraced the continent and eventually directed the war.

He sent Montgomery and Arnold to Canada to secure the support of that people, which would have been done but for the accident of the fall of Montgomery at Quebec, and the impenetrable stupidity and incorrigible bigotry of the Continental Congress, which alleged as one of the grievances the colonies had taken arms to redress, the act of Parliament securing liberty of conscience, freedom of worship,

and protection of property to Roman Catholics and to their Church in Canada. Such a statement of the principles and feelings of the colonies in arms against the Government effectually crushed out any sentiment of sympathy that may have existed among the French in Canada. The Congress attempted to repair its blunder by sending a commission with John Carroll, Provincial of the Society of Jesus in America, at its head, to explain away to the Canadians the protest and petition to the King.

The Congress did not mean what they said, but only desired to enlist on their side the bigotry which lay dormant in every Englishman's heart. The Roman Catholics of Maryland would testify that among the Protestants in the English colonies there was the fullest religious liberty and toleration for Catholics. But the Canadians very reasonably refused their confidence to a policy which consisted of falsehood and deception. They could have no guarantee that they were not to be the victims of the fraud, and not the English people. The other move against Canada was more successful. The Quebec Act of 1763 had extended the boundaries of Canada to the Ohio River, thus asserting, ratifying, and executing the pretensions of the French as to that boundary. The great colonies on the ocean shore were thus cut off from the Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes.

Washington understood and appreciated the continental conditions flowing from the control of the inland waters and lands—i. e., development and commerce. When, therefore, a young Virginian frontiersman, scout, hunter, surveyor, prospector—George Rogers Clark—came forward with a proposition for

the conquest of the Western country, to Governor Patrick Henry, during the winter of 1777-'78, Washington supported the movement with all his influence; and early in 1778 all the country northwest of the Ohio was conquered by Clark and annexed to Virginia as the "County of Illinois." The strategy of the resistance was to create cohesion and fraternity among the people of the different colonies, to evade the British in the open field and on the high sea, to expand the power of the colonies by territorial extension, to confine the enemy to the ports, and protect the interior from them. Washington believed in waging a waiting war, in exhausting his enemy—so far from his source of supplies—by delay, in the firm conviction that the finances must break down and war cease from very exhaustion. War of invasion requires greater efforts and greater sacrifices than war of defense. Invasion is voluntary, and may cease at any moment the invader wills it. It therefore requires energy and determination, as well as enormous expenditure of material resources of men and money.

But defense is a matter of pure necessity; it is the protection of home and property, as well as of life and liberty. Invasion is at a distance from the base. Defense is on the base itself. Every pound of food and forage used by the British troops in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia was brought from England or Halifax, while the Continental army was fed by the neighborhood. It was impossible to drive the British out of the seaports without sea force. It was equally impossible for the British to penetrate the interior. Sir John Burgoyne and Sir William Howe had both tried it with disastrous conse-

quences. The strategy of the war, therefore, was to be defense and delay, as long as the dominion of the sea was wielded by the British.

But Washington argued that the maritime nations could not and would not let slip such an opportunity to emancipate commerce and to create a rival to the maritime control of Great Britain. Strategy, the direction and control of military force toward great objects, is the product of great genius, great will, great intelligence. The strategy of the Revolution, elaborated and created by Washington, was the result of all these, and therefore it was grand, wise, and all-embracing. Skillful tactics, the management of troops in actual contact with the enemy, is the result of experience. This, of course, the Virginia colonel did not have, and therefore his tactics were defective, weak, and inefficient.

The campaign of Schuyler and Gates against Burgoyne; of Gates and Lafayette and Greene against Cornwallis; the defense of the line of the Hudson and the Delaware; the concentration by interior lines on Yorktown, were all parts of the same wise, strong strategy, and exhibit the highest qualities of generalship. But the dispositions at Long Island and at Brandywine, at both of which places he was flanked, and the attempted movement of converging columns at Germantown and Trenton, both of which failed to be carried out as projected, all show the inexperienced soldier. He had seen Braddock's two thousand men in battle destroyed by bad handling, and had absolutely no experience in tactical movement of troops on the field of battle except that once, and his tactics were bad. Just as, in the beginning of the war between the States, in 1861 there was no soldier below Gen-

eral Scott who had ever commanded a regiment in battle, and none of them had ever seen a brigade movement under fire. At the first battle of Manassas, July 21, 1861, McDowell's plan of battle was faultless, if he had had veteran officers and troops to execute it. He moved round his adversary's flank, and there, marching down the right bank of Bull Run, extended and re-enforced his line as each ford or bridge was uncovered. His movement had been executed with the accuracy of a game of chess, until Johnston's unexpected attack on his flank gave him checkmate. Beauregard's reply move was to cross Bull Run and capture McDowell's reserve and supplies, and cut off his army; and this failed from the inexperience of *his* officers.

Washington attempted Beauregard's move at Brandywine, and failed from precisely the same cause. His apparent recklessness in battle was prompted by the same reason. He knew what he wanted done. He could not get it done by orders or agents, so he undertook to do it himself. It was a matter of cold, calculating necessity. He was too large a man—had too firm a hold on a fiery, tempestuous nature—knew his own limitations too well to ever permit himself the enjoyment of letting himself loose in battle. His business was to see, to think, and to direct. The mere fighting could well be left to people whose business it was to attend to that department. The exhilaration of combat is an excitement that a great man—leader of men—never permits himself. The stimulant rouses the heart to quicker pulsations, drives the blood with faster throbs, charges the batteries of the brain, until the great general in battle becomes one ganglion of

nerves, with twenty senses, each acting with electrical force and precision.

He sees everything, hears everything, understands everything above sight, and hearing, and judgment. The present is photographed on his brain as the future is displayed to his heart, and he acts on inspiration, not logic. Washington did not have this genius. Battle roused him physically, but not so much intellectually, and when he could not get done what he saw was necessary and which he wanted done, he attempted to do it himself. Hence his attempt to rally the rout at Brandywine; hence his throwing himself before his retreating line at Germantown, until Sullivan led his horse out; hence his establishing himself within forty yards of the charging line of British bayonets at Princeton, until his leading regiments could be brought up to him and take the place from which Mercer's troops had just been driven. These incidents were not exhibitions of the *gaudium certaminis*, or the fury of fighting, at all; they were the struggles of the inexperienced soldier to repair disaster caused by his inexperienced officers and men. But he was master of the strategy of the struggle. That was to protract resistance, keep an army in the field, pen up the enemy in the ports, until a foreign alliance gave him a chance on the sea.

France was the historical, logical, necessary ally of rebellion in the British Empire. Every attack on the hereditary enemy within her own dominions, for ten generations, had come from France, and it was mathematically certain from the first that, as soon as France was convinced that rebellion promised revolution, she would aid it with all her force. The

news of the treaty of alliance, then, which had been concluded February 6, 1778, was precisely what he expected; and when war was declared by Great Britain, Washington well knew that it must be followed by war with Spain.

Sir Henry Clinton crossed over to Staten Island on June 30th, where he was securely bottled up by Washington, who promptly took position on the Hudson. On July 8th—a week afterward—the French fleet appeared off the Capes of the Delaware, under command of Lieutenant General the Count D'Estaing. After communicating with the shore it sailed for Sandy Hook. The British fleet in the harbor was far inferior to the French outside, and Washington sent his aids—Laurens and Hamilton—promptly to the French general admiral to propose a joint attack on New York. No men accept kindly the command of men of different professions, and sailors no more like command of soldiers than soldiers would that of sailors; and the French admiral did not enjoy the command of the American general. The bar of New York was found to impose an insuperable obstacle to the great French line of battle ships; and Washington's dream of the two previous years—of the capture of a British army by aid of a co-operating naval force—was abandoned at that point.

Another place, however, offered opportunity. After the expulsion of the British from Boston, New England had been free from the enemy, except that Lord Percy had made a lodgment at Newport, in Rhode Island, where the British commanders had ever since maintained a considerable force. Instead of concentrating and forcing the line of the Hudson,

and thus isolating New England, British strategy consisted of threats, occupation of seaports, raids on exposed rural districts, and harrying defenseless towns and villages. War on women and children sometimes, though rarely, unnerves the arms of men in the field; it more generally braces them. But for two years this outlying post of New York was kept up. Sir Henry Clinton used it to worry Washington and to make him loose his grip on the Hudson to defend Connecticut. After Lord Percy's departure for home, the command devolved eventually on Sir Robert Pigott, an accomplished soldier and a gentleman, under whom the garrison was increased to six thousand men.

Newport and New York were the only places in the United States pressed by British feet, and, as the latter could not be attacked by the allies, the former was considered the next point to move on. John Sullivan, of New Hampshire, had been in command at Providence since the spring, and Washington now sent him fifteen hundred picked men, under Greene, a native of the country, and whose Rhode Island brigade had been the smartest, best equipped, best drilled, and best disciplined corps at Boston.

D'Estaing arrived off the harbor of Newport, July 29th, and it was agreed between him and Sullivan that a joint landing should be made and a concerted attack pressed. Sullivan moved promptly, as he always did, and seized Butts Hill, an outlying prominence where there was a British battery; which exploit hurt the feelings of the French, to whom "the doing" was not as important as the "manner of doing it"; and this "manner" not being exactly according to the agreement, they became affronted.

Just then, however, Lord Howe appeared in the offing with a British fleet. Such a challenge no French gentleman could possibly refuse, no matter how momentous the consequences of accepting it, and D'Estaing re-embarked his troops and sailed out to attack the British. But a storm fiercer than the heaviest ordnance drove both enemies over the face of the deep, and gave them full occupation to save themselves instead of destroying each other. It was not until August 20th that D'Estaing brought his shattered fleet into harbor, and then decided to take his troops and his ships to Boston and refit.

Sullivan remonstrated and Lafayette pleaded with no avail, and the Frenchman sailed away from the point of contact with the enemy. This was the second failure to secure cordial co-operation between French and English, between Saxon and Gaul. Many a man in General Sullivan's command bore a fire-lock which his father had carried at Louisburg against the French, and a sword which his grandfather had worn in fights against French and Indians. It was a sore test of human nature to ask these men to give their hearts to the French, who on the first trial of friendship had failed them—as they felt, and as Sullivan said in a public proclamation. Not the least of the difficulties with which Washington struggled from this time until Yorktown, in October, 1781, was the constant effort to smooth the sensibilities of the susceptible French, and to appease their insatiable demand for honor, glory, and consideration.

As soon as the fleet appeared on the coast he had opened communications with them with a tact, a delicacy, and a finesse which nothing could surpass. He

sent Laurens—French in blood, in manners, in language—and Hamilton—West Indian by birth—two youths as perfect specimens of cultured chivalry as ever won spurs or bore sword. Personal appearance, deportment, air, produce a profound and lasting impression on human nature, and these brilliant young staff officers only prepared the minds of the Frenchmen for the appearance of their chief. The natural gravity and grace of Washington's carriage, the grand proportions of the man, the vigor of his intellect and the clearness of his views, at once subdued the respect and conquered the allegiance of all, from general and admiral to the line and the ranks.

In letters which are absolutely unparalleled for delicacy, for elegance, for convincing logic, for appeals to chivalric sentiment, he persuaded, he convinced, he led his allies to follow his directions. His difficulty was enormously increased by the character of the French force. It was a mixed army and navy, under command of a soldier. So, to the jealousies of race and religion were added those of the States on the one side and those of the army and navy on the other. Washington's problem was to keep in touch, on friendly terms, the Puritan and the Cavalier, the soldier and the sailor, the Saxon and the Gaul, and so imbue them with a common sentiment that they could be got to act in a common enterprise.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARNOLD AND ANDRÉ—THE FRENCH AGAIN.

DURING this period occurred an incident which tested Washington's character as much as any incident of his illustrious career—the episode of the treason of Arnold and the execution of André. If in the summer of 1775, before Boston, during the ensuing winter before Quebec, or after the campaign of Saratoga, any officer of rank in the Continental army had been requested to name the soldier who would most distinguish himself for gallant achievement, and who would win the largest, most enduring reputation among all his comrades, he would beyond doubt have selected Benedict Arnold, of Connecticut. Of a superb figure, generous feelings, chivalric carriage, strikingly handsome features, he was "the bravest of the brave," and at once attracted the attention of the commander in chief, and so deeply impressed him that he intrusted him with the important command of the expedition through the snows and rocks and forests and torrents of Maine to the capture of Quebec.

The intelligence, the fortitude, the perseverance with which Arnold prosecuted this expedition entirely justified the confidence and judgment of Washington. He would have taken Quebec had he not been wounded and Montgomery killed at the same

moment of their assault of this fortress. Arnold was taken prisoner, and, after the loss of more than a year of his military career, exchanged, and returned to duty while the army was before New York. At the investment of and attack on and capitulation by Burgoyne, Arnold had acted the most brilliant part; and *his* leadership, *his* gallantry, *his* spirit, more than that of any one man, had held the American lines to their work and showed them the way to victory. He was wounded there again, and, instead of being thanked or promoted, was snubbed by the Congress and ignored by the Board of War. His juniors were jumped over his head, and his feelings mortified by constant slights.

Washington had a warm feeling for the brilliant, handsome soldier, and sympathized deeply with his mortification. To soothe his feelings and mark his appreciation of him, while his wound disqualified him from service in the field he ordered him to the command of Philadelphia. He ought to have known that Arnold was not the man for such duty. To be the military governor of a city in time of war, when it was necessary to enforce the civil law with military force and control the troops by martial law, requires a mixture of coolness, patience, tact, sagacity, and firmness that Arnold did not possess. And when the civil population to be governed is divided into fierce factions by race, religion, or politics, the difficulties are ten thousand times multiplied.

The selection of Arnold for such duty was probably the most injudicious possible. Arnold had been born and bred in a social sphere entirely different from that to which his rank as brigadier general introduced him. He had been a druggist and bookseller

in Hartford, Conn. Social position and attentions are over-valued by those who have never possessed or enjoyed them, and when Arnold assumed command in Philadelphia, he was immediately inordinately influenced by the consideration of a rich, luxurious, highly refined society. Probably a soldier is controlled by no force as completely, as suddenly, and as temporarily as that of beautiful, cultivated, and rich women. To a man from Arnold's sphere of life the habit of command, the assertion of authority, the consummate ability to direct and control men and affairs displayed by them, is a revelation. He had never seen such women in the sphere from which he came, and he had never imagined that such women could exist. His mother, sisters, cousins were good, industrious, faithful housewives; but women who could talk intelligently with the most intelligent men on the topics of which the latter were masters; whose information was as large as that of men; whose business it was to know; whose judgment of character and of motives was instinctive and unerring, were creatures of a world of which Benedict Arnold had no conception.

Forces which overwhelmed Arnold would have passed unfelt over Charles Lee, Laurens, or Hamilton. The highly organized, subtle, irresistible influence of the social machine known as "society" enveloped, permeated, absolutely controlled the plain Connecticut farmer's son. As commanding officer of the principal city of America, which in wealth, luxury, fashion, and style far surpassed all others; which during the preceding year had been entertaining the gentlemen and nobility who were with the army under Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clin-

ton, Arnold occupied a conspicuous place. His rank drew to him social attention that required handsome quarters, uniforms, coaches, liveries, horses, balls, and dinners. He took the Penn palace, the handsomest residence in the city, on the pay of a brigadier general. Women always attack the commander of the invading force, and when the American brigadier assumed command of the Continental capital the court circle measured him at once, and captured him without a struggle on his part or theirs. He was handsome, he was vain, he was brave, he was generous; what easier prey would a beautiful woman want, and who could be quicker made captive?

The belles of Sir William's staff, the dames of the ridiculous mock tournament with which belles and beaux had complimented his departure, overwhelmed the new commander with attentions and flattery. "At Arnold's balls were not only 'common Tory women' (notoriously loyal ladies), but the wives and daughters of Tories who were even then in arms against their country in the invader's camp in New York," wrote Joseph Reed, President of the Council of Pennsylvania. But, worse than that, Miss Margaret Shippen, one of the Tory beauties who had been one of the ladies "of the blended rose" at the Howe *Mischianza*, had captured Arnold on sight. She agreed to marry him for then, as before and since it has been deemed wise and prudent for people on debatable ground to have hostages to fortune on either side, and in the doubt between rebellion or victory, revolution or glory, it was good for the Shippens, a solid Tory family, to have a daughter, wife of one of the most distinguished rebel generals. The proposed alliance still further en-

raged the Philadelphia Whigs, and through Joseph Reed, and his council, they were not long in making their fangs felt, besides their hiss.

The Congress had made five major generals over Arnold's head, on the excuse that Connecticut already had two. Not one of them compared in service, in talents, in ability, or in achievement with Arnold, and he naturally and properly resigned. Washington induced him to withhold his resignation for the present, and he then proceeded to organize a settlement of old soldiers in western New York in co-operation with George Clinton, his comrade of Stillwater and Saratoga, on lands granted him by the Legislature of New York. While thus engaged in preparing to withdraw from the military service, the President and Council of Pennsylvania preferred charges against him to the Congress, for peculation, extortion, and misbehavior in his office of Military Governor of Philadelphia, and directed copies of the charges to be forwarded to the Governor of each State.

Arnold promptly returned to Philadelphia and demanded an investigation, which was given him by a committee of Congress. The committee reported him not guilty, on all the specifications except the improper use of some army wagons to haul private property out of danger, and irregularity in granting a pass. This was a triumph for Arnold, but Reed and the council preferred new charges on the allegation of newly discovered evidence. The Congress referred the charges to the Council and Assembly of Pennsylvania, and they were eventually brought before a court-martial, April 3, 1779. Reed secured delay to gather evidence, and the charges

and court hung over his head until December of that year. Miss Shippen, like a high-spirited and warm-hearted woman, promptly took place by her lover's side and married him, in the face of the charges, the court, and the Congress, thus testifying her faith in him and her contempt for them. During all this harassing delay General Arnold was in Philadelphia, with nothing to do but wait on his mistress and wife.

The French alliance was genuinely distasteful to him, as it was to very many ardent patriots. Nothing but absolute, dire, pressing, extreme necessity, and the conduct of the English Administration at home and their Hessian allies here, reconciled the English in America to an alliance with their hereditary foes to fight against their own flesh and blood. The change of the issue of the war, from a resistance for reform to a war for disunion, also had alienated some and cooled many patriots. This was particularly so in Philadelphia. Arnold had no Whig associates. The members of Congress from the Southern States were all gentlemen, as were many of them from the Middle States and some from New England. Arnold was a vulgarian, a snob *cutis et in cute*. He believed that fine clothes, fine style, luxurious living made the highest type of men and women, and he imitated them. The gentlemen of the Congress—plain men like Madison, of Virginia; simple-minded, frank men like Carroll, of Maryland, or Laurens, of South Carolina—were not congenial to this swelling roysterer, nor they to him. He was thrown more and more under the influence of the Tory society of his wife's family. It is beyond a doubt that neither she nor they ever imagined, stimulated, or participated

in the turpitude which was being conceived and transacted by Arnold under cover of their hospitality.

The Tories of the Revolution for these three generations have been held up to universal execration in America, but surely it is time now to see something of their side of the quarrel. They embraced the clergy of the Church of England almost without exception, the great landholders of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and the devoted Jacobite population of the Carolinas. The education, the wealth, the culture of the Middle States was largely on the side of the Crown. For five years the revolutionary government of New York dared not call a General Assembly, for fear that it would make terms with Colonel William Tryon, the Royal Governor; and members of Congress from Pennsylvania were open in their expressions of desire for peace.

Loyalty in its highest form—devotion to duty, absolutely regardless of consequences—exhibited itself; and to this day, in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, people may be found, descendants of American Tories, who look back with longing eyes to the lovely homes their ancestors gave up for their duty and their faith. With Arnold in the state of mind produced by the unjust, malignant Whig attack of General Reed and his associates, he irresistibly turned to the other side—the side where honor was cherished, valor rewarded, and great achievement recognized.

Between Philadelphia and New York there were a thousand underground channels of communication. During the war between the States the fashion papers were received as regularly in Richmond,

though not as promptly, as in Washington; and in 1779 there was no difficulty, and little danger, in having letters delivered in either place from the other. Here Arnold began to write letters to Sir Henry Clinton, inquiring what terms could be made by an American officer of rank, who was disgusted at the Declaration of Independence and the French alliance. The intrigue was turned over by Clinton to Major John André, his adjutant general and general manager. André was the adroit man about headquarters. He knew everything, and was appealed to by everybody, on every subject. His mind turned instinctively to intrigue, and he was an adept in its arts, trained by natural tendency and personal experience.

At the siege of Charleston, Clinton sent him into the beleaguered city as a spy, and he remained there undetected until its surrender and the capitulation of Lincoln's army. He represented himself as a Virginian officer of the Virginian line. He resided at the house of Edward Shrewsbury, a respectable citizen suspected of disloyalty to the patriot side, and after the capitulation was introduced by Shrewsbury to his friends as Major André. The proof of this is set forth in detail in William Johnson's *Life of Greene*, and was derived by the author, a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and son of a patriot, from contemporary authority and personal testimony. Therefore when the anonymous letters, signed "Gustavus," came to headquarters, Major André was the party qualified to answer them. As "John Anderson," he conducted the correspondence during the summer of 1779, until he accompanied Clinton on his Southern expedition, when he made

his little excursion into the domain of the secret service and lived in Charleston as a spy. Returning from Charleston, he resumed the correspondence between "Gustavus" and "John Anderson." On January 26, 1780, the court-martial had found Arnold guilty of the same specifications as the former committee of Congress had determined against him, and sentenced him to be reprimanded in general orders. Washington's reprimand was conveyed as mildly as it was possible for language to express it. Of course it only further inflamed Arnold.

All history showed that in a civil war parties to it, high and low, generals and privates, constantly changed sides. It was not desertion. It was only a change of opinion, necessarily required by a change of condition. Monk had done it, Marlborough had done it; why not Arnold? The event justified the act, if success crowned the move. This was the line of reflection forced on Arnold by circumstances. But, bold, blatant, and bankrupt as he was in fortune and in fame, a simple desertion was not enough. He aspired to the highest rewards, and he proposed to earn them by the most superlative infamy. He applied to Washington for the command of West Point, on the ground that it was due to soothe his wounded honor, lacerated by the court-martial, its decision, and the reprimand; and he did this with the distinctly formed purpose in his mind of selling his post for *money*! No such idea was conceivable by the high-bred and high-minded Tories of the Shippen family or the Philadelphia society of which it was the leader. Such an idea could only have been conceived in the base mind of the Connecticut village apothecary and bookseller, ad-

mitted solely on account of his rank into the association of ladies and gentlemen.

Washington ought to have known better. He was a good judge of men, as his appreciation of Greene and Lafayette, of Gates and Conway showed. But he was imposed upon by the showy qualities of the conqueror of Ticonderoga and the leader of the forlorn hope against Quebec. At the bottom of it all lay the feeling of sympathy for the wronged, the ardent desire to heal a soldier's wounded honor. He assigned Arnold to the command of West Point, with the distinct understanding with him that it was the key of the Revolution. This key Arnold promptly arranged to sell to Sir Henry Clinton.

"John Anderson" (André) and "Gustavus" (Arnold) met at Haverstraw below West Point to agree upon the details of what was to be sold and what was to be paid. An American battery on the right bank of the Hudson soon drove down stream the sloop of war which had brought André up from New York for the conference. Thus left in the American lines by his escort, in disguise, he was supplied with a suit of citizens' clothes and rode for the British lines all night. About daylight his guide left him, and shortly after he fell into the hands of a patrol from Arnold's command, who carried him to their superior officer. The papers found on André fully disclosed the proposed betrayal. They were sent by express to Washington that morning returning from an interview with De Rochambeau at Newport, and, by curious but honest stupidity, the American officer forwarded to Arnold a letter from André.

The express to Washington missed him on the road. The letter to Arnold found him and the staff of

Washington at breakfast at the Beverley House. The latter had stopped to examine the fortifications on the other side of the river. Arnold rose from the table, passed out, mounted a horse standing saddled and bridled by chance at the door, and rode for his life to the British vessel below. He succeeded in reaching it just about the time Washington reached West Point. Arnold in a word had disclosed his project and his danger to his wife. The captured dispatches sent to Washington followed him and were delivered to Hamilton before Washington's arrival. He met his chief coming from the river to the house and informed him of the treachery and escape of Arnold. Washington dispatched Hamilton to intercept Arnold at Verplanck's Point, but he was too late. Prompt orders were sent out to collect the troops and put the post on the *qui vive*.

Arnold's treachery was the severest blow that Washington received during the whole war. His relation toward Charles Lee was not one of trust and confidence. It was controlled by his supreme sense of justice, for Lee was next in rank to himself, and it was proper that he should be treated with the greatest consideration. But he did trust Arnold. He admired and loved him. He was a brilliant, dashing soldier and an able general, and he sympathized deeply with him at the injustice inflicted on him by the Congress. The jealousies and bickerings of Reed and the Pennsylvania Whigs, and their attacks on Arnold, jarred on his feelings. They had sympathized too much with the Board of War and the Conway intrigue, in impatience at the strategy of "our modern Fabius," for him to appreciate their distrust of the "bravest of the brave." It was now clear to

him that the instincts of the Congress and the Pennsylvanians about Arnold's character were wise, just, and correct, and that he had been utterly mistaken.

His confidence in his own judgment was shaken to the core. Whom could he trust? Who was true? By what intrigues was he surrounded? Gates was an Englishman, and had been an enlisted soldier; Steuben, De Kalb—all held important commands, and may have been shaken by the failing fortunes of the Colonial Confederacy. Members of Congress were, he knew, dissatisfied with him. How far had that feeling extended, and how many were in British pay? All these questions rose darkly for answer, but his indomitable soul never quailed.

Major John André was Sir Henry Clinton's chief of staff. He had been caught as a spy, and was ordered before a court-martial composed of the ranking officers of the American army, Lafayette being one. A spy is not entitled to a trial. He may, by the law of war, be shot or hung *in flagrante delicto*. He can not surrender. He may not make himself a prisoner of war. Now, the service of a spy may be patriotic; it may be valuable; it requires courage; but it is never the honorable service of a soldier. No commanding officer can order his subordinate, commissioned or enlisted, to doff his uniform and penetrate the enemies' lines, pretending to be a friend and betray them. The dangers from spies are so great that everywhere, in all wars, in all ages, the penalty of detection has been death. One single spy may destroy a movement, neutralize a combination of one hundred thousand men, paralyze an army, and defeat a campaign. He may cost tens of thousands of lives and many millions of money. Therefore the doom

of the spy discovered is death—swift, sure, sudden death. Major André was found guilty and condemned to death. He had played a great game and had lost it, paying the penalty; and no just man, British or American, can ever blame the American commander in chief for directing the execution of the judgment of the court-martial. André was a bright, handsome, accomplished young gentleman. He had been a toast with the loyal belles of Philadelphia during the occupation. Every effort, appeal, threat was made by the British general to save his staff officer. But the South Carolina members of Congress knew of André's spy exploits in Charleston, and they alone would have prevented pardon or commutation of his sentence, even if his crime had not been such as to preclude all possibility of mercy.

André had gone into his enemy's lines under the sacred protection of a flag of truce. He had used his inviolability to arrange a perfidy which might have wrecked the cause of a whole people. It would have cost confiscations, prosecutions, hangings innumerable if it had succeeded, as he and his colleague in crime hoped and intended. It failed, and he died for it. As Washington said, he was captured as a spy, he was tried as a spy, he was convicted as a spy, and he was executed as a spy. He might, under the law, have been hanged five minutes after he was delivered by the patrol to their officer on post. But he was fairly tried and justly convicted and executed. Washington never afterward, in conversation, mentioned Arnold's name. In a letter to Greene he expressed the opinion that Benedict Arnold was of so low and base a nature that he did not think he suffered from his dishonor.

After the failure at Newport other feelings had to be appeased as well as the French, for New Englanders had susceptibilities as sensitive as those of the Gaul. Sullivan—ardent, high-spirited, generous, chivalric—felt the refusal of D'Estaing at Newport like misbehavior in the presence of the enemy, and he said so in private and in public, in conversation and in orders to the troops. And on the drop of a glove he would have justified his language and his opinions with his own sword against D'Estaing or any French officer of proper rank on any turf about Newport or around Boston. For gentlemen—Puritan and Cavalier, French and English—in that generation believed it the duty of every one to back his opinion with his arm, and to defend his honor with his life.

Lafayette was the kinsman of D'Estaing, and he would have challenged Sullivan, but Lafayette belonged to the family of Washington, and Sullivan had saved Washington's life at Germantown. Kinsmen fought for kinsmen, friends for friends, staff officers for their chiefs. General John Cadwalader challenged and fought General Thomas Conway because the latter had written disrespectfully of the commander in chief. Colonel John Laurens challenged and fought Charles Lee for a similar offense against his chief. But the influence of Washington composed the quarrel, held Lafayette in check, and made him an active peacemaker between the discordant elements. He prevented hostilities, if he could not restore cordial feelings. Besides these jars between subordinates, there was a chill in the highest quarters. It had been much discussed in Paris as one of the conditions of the alliance and the auxiliary force, that the whole should be under

French command. It was not conceivable, much less permissible, that a marshal of France, a lieutenant general in the army of his most Christian Majesty, should be subordinate to a militiaman, a rough backwoods hunter, scout, and bushwhacker. But Franklin, with intuitive sagacity, insisted that if the French went, they should go as assistants and not as leaders. He did not possess the feelings or the experience of Washington on this subject.

Washington's whole life, as also that of his father and grandfather, had been spent in a struggle against the French for the Ohio, and he never divested himself of the fear or the suspicion that if the French power was too prominent or too predominant in securing independence from Great Britain, the Canadians would gladly rush to their old allegiance, to which they were bound by ties of blood and religion, and who had been separated from *their* mother country only fifteen years before by the Treaty of Paris. The sagacity of Franklin and the firmness of Washington saved the continent from the re-establishment of French influence here, and many woes. It so happened that the French never accomplished anything substantial, by land or by water, from their appearance in the summer of 1778 until the campaign of Yorktown, in October, 1781, where French assistance was decisive. The large force of five thousand men was landed, and co-operated with the Continental army, but the fleets were cruising up and down in quest of "glory," and undertaking enterprises independent of the strategy of the commander in chief. D'Estaing made an attack on Savannah and failed, the second French attempt thus proving disastrous, and then he sailed away for the West Indies.

Sir Henry Clinton withdrew his detachment from Rhode Island and concentrated everything at New York. The British strategy of the war abandoned New England, and with it further effort to seize the line of the Hudson and thus cut off the head of the rebellion. It was believed that something might be done in the South, where population was sparse, where slavery partly paralyzed military resistance, and where loyalty, not more extensive than in the Middle States of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, was more belligerent and aggressive; where the friends of the old order backed their opinion with their blood, their lives, and their fortunes. There was not as large a percentage of Tories in the Carolinas as in Pennsylvania or New York, but the former believed in standing up for their principles, regardless of cost; the latter were opposed to disorder, disturbance, or trouble of any kind for any cause. Therefore, Lord George Germaine and the ministry at home determined to try the plan of cutting off around the edges, that of dividing through the center and across vital parts having utterly failed.

Washington, during the winter of 1778-'79, had become persuaded that the war in the North was over. After four years campaigning the British occupied their camp on Staten Island, less than when Gage had evacuated Boston. The year 1779 was one without hope, without energy, without fortune to the Americans. The French auxiliaries had paralyzed the State governments. The people at home supposed that the coming of the army and navy of the grand monarch settled the business; for, with true provincial training and ideas, they exaggerated

the high qualities of the great people on the other side of the ocean, whose generals were marquises and earls, counts and barons.

The French alliance was of real detriment for a time, and exertion by the States, and by the people who constituted the States, almost ceased and died out. The finances flickered out as public credit burned lower and lower, until the currency issued by Congress, being paper *promises to pay* bearer, stipulated amounts in money, became absolutely worthless. The idea of declaring that a piece of paper was *money*, and of fixing its value by act of Congress, had not then been born. The pay of the troops amounted to nothing, but even that was not given to them. In the winter of 1778-'79 the New Jersey regiments refused to march until they received their pay—five months in arrears. They got it.

In the spring the Connecticut line mutinied for their pay, followed by the Pennsylvania line. Washington reduced these troops to discipline by prompt firmness; but when a newly enlisted Pennsylvania regiment had the audacity to follow the example of its elders, on tap of drum he put it down, and hung two of the mutineers. He sympathized with the old soldiers, whose patience had been worn out by starvation, nakedness, disease, and marches; they were brought to their senses by reason and vigorous force firmly applied. But for a set of green recruits, who had never smelled powder, or marched barefoot, or lain out in the snow and mud, or been without meat for three days, or without meat or bread for two—for such fellows to complain was pure impudence. He hung some to satisfy the others. It did satisfy them! The whole year was taken up with

appeals to the States to strengthen the Congress, and to the Congress to brace up the army.

Washington saw how the Congress was deteriorating year by year. He entreated Henry to re-enforce Richard Henry Lee, who was bearing on his shoulders the support of Washington and the army in Congress. It has been suggested that for some unknown reason Lee became estranged from him, and it has been intimated that he sympathized with, if he did not actually participate in, the conspiracy of "the cabal." This is an error that in justice to a great soul should be corrected. Richard Henry Lee and Washington had been comrades from boyhood. Their mothers were friends before them, and to the day that death separated them their mutual respect, affection, and devotion knew no check nor chill.

During the summer Sir Henry Clinton occupied Stony Point, on the left bank of the Hudson below West Point, and Paulus Hook, where Jersey city now is, to give him control of a reach of the river and secure his communications with his friends in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the South.

Washington was dissatisfied with the operation of the French alliance. It accomplished nothing, and rather weakened the Continentals than aided them. He sent Lafayette—whom he appreciated as a gentleman, a soldier, a man of ability, and a true friend—to France to secure more troops and closer co-operation. He made Lafayette understand that the war was over in the North, and must be decided in the South. Unless that section was redeemed, the probabilities were that with acknowledgment of the independence of the Northern States would come the re-establishment of the Spaniards in possession of

Florida and all the great territory from the mouth of the Cape Fear to the Mississippi. She already possessed the continent from the Mississippi to the Pacific, and such an end of the struggle would put her astride, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, of the continent from which France had been expelled only fifteen years before. If France wished to avert such a result, she must join Washington in saving the South by a campaign in which he must have the earnest, loyal co-operation of a French fleet on the sea and a French army on the land.

Washington sent General Lincoln to South Carolina to take command, with distinct and emphatic instructions that at every cost he was to save his army; under no circumstances was he to lose it. The possession of posts, positions, or lines he was too great a soldier to value. The army was the vital force; it was the right arm, the sword, to be wielded by intelligent courage; and the absolute ultimate, final necessity to the cause was to keep an army in the field at all times. In June, 1780, Lincoln lost Charleston and surrendered his army, directly contrary to the mature views and distinct orders of the commander in chief. The conquest of the South seemed secure. Georgia was already reconstructed, and South Carolina must soon be. General "Mad" Anthony Wayne surprised and captured Stony Point, as Lee did Paulus Hook, and Sir Henry was again pushed back to Manhattan Island.

In July, 1780, a French fleet arrived, with an army of six thousand men under command of General Count De Rochambeau, who was to report, and did report, to the headquarters of the American army, as distinctly subordinate to it and within its command.

This was of enormous service, as it removed at once all the paralyzing influence of disputes and jealousy about rank and command. The French contingent were no longer allies. They were part of the American army and navy, and, like it, subject solely to the control of the American commander in chief.

The Southern campaign had become the turning point of the war. Washington dared not leave New York nor the Congress. If Sir Henry escaped from his control he might do serious damage along the Hudson and up the Mohawk Valley; but if the Congress once got away from him, it was certain to bring on disaster, so he could not go South. The best man he had was Greene, the Rhode Island blacksmith, who during the four years of experience, observation, and meditation had matured into a great soldier. Greene, disgusted with Congress, had, in July, 1780, resigned his place as quartermaster general, and had gone home. Washington recalled him into the service. He was thoroughly imbued with Washington's ideas of the strategy of the war—that he must never hold on to a place so as to risk his army; he must avoid pitched battles, but wear his enemy out by marching, by alarms, and by disease. He was to entice Cornwallis, who was in Charleston, to leave his base, and draw him into the interior. The Briton breathed the sea air; he lived on the salt breeze; the fresh blasts from the mountains would wither his energy and paralyze his vigor.

Cornwallis was to be drawn far enough into the interior to cut his communications, then to be surrounded by a blazing circle of militia, and, thus isolated, destroyed. Or, if that failed, and he stuck to tide water, he was to be fastened there until the

French fleet could blockade him from his base and the open sea, and the allied armies could be concentrated on him to force a capitulation and end the war. This strategy was thought out and discussed thoroughly with Greene. Cornwallis must be drawn North, so as to enable the concentration of the Northern army from New York with the Southern army from Carolina. General Greene went South, took charge of the *débris* of Gates, reorganized and reconstructed an army—the basis of it being the veterans of the Maryland line—and assumed command at Charlotte.

Morgan, affronted at the slights of the Board of War—who constantly promoted his juniors over his head—had also resigned and gone home to the valley of Virginia, but Camden brought him to life at once. “It was no time to think of rank,” he said; “the country was in danger, and every man must help to save it.” The Virginians rallied around him. The remnant of the Maryland line, consolidated into three regiments of about one hundred each, was as bright and as highly tempered as a Toledo blade, in charge of Colonel John Eager Howard. The militia of the two Carolinas formed a body of mounted gunmen well adapted for rapid movement and bush fighting, entirely unequal to closed ranks and leveled bayonets in the open field. With these commanders—Greene, Morgan, Howard, Lee—and such troops, Washington commenced the first moves in the last stage of his great game.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH.

THE failure of the combined land and naval operations against New York and Newport did not discourage Washington, or impair his determination to use the French power on the sea, with that of the States on the land, to strike a decisive blow. He had succeeded in the strategic move against Burgoyne in the North, owing to the active and zealous support of New England. He had failed in his plan to capture Sir William Howe and his army in Philadelphia, owing to the treachery of Charles Lee, who withheld re-enforcements in time to hold the Delaware, and the failure of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to rise in the enemy's rear and on his flanks, as New England had done at Bennington, at Stillwater, and at Saratoga.

But thenceforward his main effort was first to get his enemy in the South into such a position that he could isolate him, by the use of the French fleet, from his base of supplies, for the open sea was the British base; and, second, raise the country on him, surround him, capture him, end the war, and achieve liberty and independence. He impressed on Lincoln, commanding in South Carolina, that the defense of posts, positions, and lines was impracticable. The Americans held the interior line of defense. The

British must move on exterior lines of attack, and by keeping the American defense foot free it could be moved from point to point as necessity required, and always confront its adversary, extended on the circumference of a circle, with superior force moving on the interior. The attempt to hold positions and lines would give the enemy the initiative, and he would thus select his own time and place of attack. Lincoln, in any and every event, was to save his army. Posts and ports, towns and cities, might all be surrendered and retaken. An army taken captive was an army destroyed. Its *esprit*, its *morale* could never be resurrected, even if its men and material could be completely replaced.

Washington was forced by necessity to hold the line of the Hudson. That and the Chesapeake were the only two absolutely requisite strategic conditions to be maintained; all others might be given up, as he had abandoned Boston and New York and Philadelphia. But local populations have an intense horror of the enemy. The feeling is somewhat a sentimental one, for the rules of war in modern times forbid the outrages of earlier states of society. Therefore, when Sir Henry Clinton and Cornwallis approached Charleston, S. C., in February, 1780, there was a unanimous and vociferous outcry among the South Carolinians that Charleston should not be abandoned, and Lincoln allowed himself to be cooped up there.

Sir Henry Clinton, finding he could not loosen Washington's hold on the North River by forays along the Sound and raids up the Hudson, determined to force his hand by a move in another quarter. He embarked eight thousand men at New

York, and after Christmas, 1779, sailed for Savannah, with Cornwallis second in command. He was soon followed by Lord Rawdon, afterward Earl of Moira and Marquis of Hastings, with three thousand more. This move forced Washington to dispatch all his Carolina and Virginia troops to the assistance of Lincoln, together with Pulaski and his legion of the odds and ends of nations and races.

Clinton landed in South Carolina, moved to the rear of Charleston, cut the city off from the country, and on May 12, 1780, Lincoln surrendered three thousand Continentals, with a large supply of munitions of war. The strategic points in the interior were at once occupied, and in June, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis with five thousand regulars to consolidate the conquest and restore the unhappy country to its allegiance.

Georgia, before then, had been subdued, and Pulaski lost his life in a futile attempt, by French and Americans, to retake Savannah. Marion and Sumter alone kept the flag of rebellion flying among the palmettoes. It seemed as if the rebellion was to be destroyed from the edges, and not by cutting it into pieces. Georgia and South Carolina quiet, it only remained to advance into North Carolina and Virginia to arouse, rally, and protect the Union sentiment there, just as, eighty years after, Sherman marched by the same routes to extinguish the rebellion and revive the Union sentiment among the grandsons of the people who had known Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Banastre Tarleton.

The anti-Washington feeling in Congress, the sectional sentiment, sought this occasion to mortify him and to make another move toward displacing him.

Gates, with the Army of the North, had captured one British army; with an army in the South he would capture another, and then there would be no doubt that he was the general for the war, the destined saviour of the liberties of the continent, and all would agree that he was the Moses selected by Providence to lead us through the Red Sea of rebellion, and to command the army on its march to the promised land.

As in the assignment of Gates to the command at Albany, Washington did not agree to this estimate by the Board of War and the New England influence, nor assent to his being intrusted with great responsible command. But his opinion was disregarded, and General Gates was sent South to redeem the Carolinas. Charles Lee, who knew him well—knew his ignorance, his self-conceit, his weakness of will, his intellectual incapacity—sent him word, by a mutual friend, to “take heed lest his Northern laurels turn to Southern willows.”

Gates arrived at Hillsborough, N. C., July 19, 1780, where he found the Maryland and Delaware lines, of about two thousand men, under Major General the Baron de Kalb, who while on the march from the North had reached that point on June 20th, when the news of Lincoln's surrender reached them. De Kalb halted until he could secure some co-operation from Richard Caswell, Governor of North Carolina. The arrival of Gates, with orders to assume command of the army and of the States, relieved De Kalb of responsibility, and he calmly awaited orders. The British held no positions in North Carolina except a depot on the Cape Fear, the present city of Wilmington. They held Camden, under command of

Lord Rawdon, in the center of South Carolina, where roads from east, west, north, and south converged, and the possession of Camden would cut the communications of all posts, east, west, and north, with headquarters at Charleston. Therefore General Gates proposed the brilliant strategic feat of the capture of Camden before Lord Cornwallis could reach it from Charleston.

He moved by the shortest line, and arrived at Camden before Cornwallis, but by indecision and delay lost his advantage and opportunity, for Cornwallis came before he could make up his mind to attack Rawdon. He did so at last on August 16, 1780, with three thousand men, of whom fourteen hundred were veterans of the Maryland line, against two thousand regulars under Cornwallis, and in a few hours was utterly routed, dispersed, destroyed. The only ray of light on that black field is the chivalry of the First Regiment of the Maryland line, which by repeated and reiterated bayonet charges stayed the onward sweep of the British line, and the heroic death of their commander, De Kalb, who died on the field from many wounds. Gates fled ignominiously, and never drew rein until he reached Hillsborough, two hundred miles off, in four days. Cornwallis halted a month at Camden before he moved north into North Carolina.

The destruction of the army of the South, the submission of Georgia, the conquest of South Carolina, and the impending subjugation of North Carolina, threatened the most tremendous consequences. War had been waged for five years; independence had been declared four years; the alliance with France had been accomplished two years, and there

was still no apparent end to the struggle. Florida Blanca, the Spanish Prime Minister, urged Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to make peace between the revolted colonies and their home Government on the basis of the retention of New York and Rhode Island by the latter, and the acknowledgment of the independence of the rest. The wily Spaniard argued that such a settlement would leave the English Protestants in America so divided that they would exhaust themselves and the mother country in internecine fraternal struggle, and leave the dominion of the sea again to Spain, as it had been before the failure of the Grand Armada.

The Frenchman, with a wider view and farther sight, believed that the way to break Great Britain's supremacy was by force, not diplomacy, and that a great, prosperous, energetic, aggressive, Anglo-Norman, Scandinavian, Celtic, Gothic, Saxon race in America would more certainly overcome Great Britain by the arts of peace, than the trite device of undermining the adversary by encouraging internal broils and intestine struggles. Quarrels may be composed and strife may be stilled, but power produced and supported by industrial development will overcome and outlast conditions created by and resting on cunning, adroitness, and the manifestations of passions, religious, racial, or national.

Therefore the French statesman elected to create a great power on the Western continent, instead of trying to involve it in ruin. The French alliance had amounted to nothing in the field. It supplied some money and arms and munitions, and a superabundance of military adventurers and soldiers of fortune like Conway, but it was really disadvantageous,

in that it weakened the self-reliance of the States, and tended to turn their eyes toward France for success, instead of relying on their own hearts and arms alone. The finances of the confederacy were absolutely *nil*. There was no courage, no brains, no experience in their management.

The Articles of Confederation still hung on between the States unratified. There was no authority in the Congress. It could not enlist a man or raise a dollar by taxation. It could and did issue promises to pay, and flooded the country with currency which was estimated at the value of the expectation it represented. Virginia maintained a post at Fort Pitt, the former Fort Duquesne, and constructed a chain of forts from the head waters of the Ohio along the Alleghany range to the North Carolina line, while she claimed the county of Kentucky from the mouth of the Kanawha to the Mississippi, and the county of Illinois, comprising all the territory west of the Ohio, to the same river.

The other States refused to accede to the confederation until Virginia agreed that these territories should be considered the common property of all the States. She, on the other hand, insisted that, as they had been conquered by Virginian arms and paid for by Virginian blood and money, they belonged to her; and that the objections to her title were based not on the common interest, but on selfish considerations to save the speculative rights of men prominent in the States, and who had been conspicuous in the colonial governments—among them Lord Dunmore, of Virginia, and Governor Tryon, of North Carolina and New York. With this wrangle of jarring interests, the general depreciation of public

morals, always accompanying war, with a fluctuating, uncertain medium of exchange, steadily debauched the public virtue.

Washington was more concerned with the social degeneration than even the gloomy military outlook. Speculators, engrossers, blockade runners overshadowed society, and easy and rapid gains produced easier and more rapid expenditure, until the luxury of a few only accentuated the sufferings of the many, and the aspirations of all were rapidly tending toward the accumulation of money more than to the acquisition of liberty. He wrote, he urged, he entreated leading men of the States to apply their whole energies toward correcting this fast-growing corruption, demonstrating to them the fact that, if it could not be cured, there would be nothing left worth contending for.

Looking to Virginia, as ever, for support and example, he impressed George Mason with the sense of the immense danger, and urged him to rouse the General Assembly to action. He knew nothing of the intrigue of the Spaniards for peace with a divided continent, but his phenomenal political sagacity warned him of the danger; and while Florida Blanca was writing to Vergennes to secure peace, he was writing to Mason that the highest duty and most pressing necessity was the continuance of the war. To the General Assembly he set forth at length, through a letter to Mason, the actual conditions, and demonstrated that peace now could only result in untold disaster, and that their only safety lay in vigorous preparation for, and defense against, Cornwallis's invasion, now impending.

Thomas Jefferson had become Governor, and the

State, aroused, proceeded to put herself in position for what fortune might send. One difficulty about the French alliance had been that the troops and fleets sent were allies, and not part of the military and naval force of the confederacy. The French commanders *co-operated* in good faith, it is true, in the strategy of the American commander in chief, but they took no orders from him. In February, 1779, Washington sent Lafayette to France, ostensibly to see his family, but really to secure from the ministry the detachment of a substantial body of trained troops to report to Washington, and to form part of his command. In April he returned, and informed Washington that France would soon send the desired re-enforcement.

On July 10th the French fleet arrived at Newport with five thousand veteran soldiers, the *élite* of the armies of his Most Christian Majesty, under command of General the Count de Rochambeau. The fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bombs. As soon as Sir Henry heard of this arrival he moved an army against it. Embarking a large force on his fleet and transports in New York harbor, on July 31st he sailed up the Sound eastward. Without a moment's hesitation Washington headed everything he had on foot, on horse, and on wheels for Kingsbridge, intending to "swap queens" with the British general and capture New York while he was struggling with Rochambeau at Newport. This countermove promptly recalled the expedition eastward, and by August 4th it was safely back in New York.

On September 21st Washington had an interview with De Rochambeau, at Hartford, Conn. The com-

mander in chief was attended with more state and ceremony than the French marquis general. M. de Rochambeau was accompanied by six officers—the admiral, his chief of engineers, his son the Viscomte de Rochambeau, and two aids-de-camp, of whom Count de Fersen was one. Washington had with him Major General the Marquis de Lafayette, General Knox, Chief of Artillery, M. de Gouvion, Chief of Engineers, and six aids-de-camp, and an escort of twenty-two dragoons.

Says the Count de Fersen, in his diary written that very day: “M. de Rochambeau sent me in advance to announce his arrival, and I had time to see this man, illustrious if not unique in this century. He is handsome and majestic, while at the same time his mild and open countenance perfectly reflects his moral qualities; he looks the hero; he is very cold; speaks little, but is courteous and frank. A shade of sadness overshadows his countenance, which is not unbecoming, and gives him an interesting air.”

This pen picture by the bright young Frenchman accurately portrays the appearance and describes the manners of a Virginian gentleman of the epoch, of estate, reputation, and weight in his province. Gravity, decorum, stately deportment, were characteristic of that society, and the description would have done as well for George Mason, of Gunston Hall, or Colonel Thomas Ludwell Lee, of Berry Hill, or Daniel Carroll Brent, of Richlands, or Thomas Fitzhugh, of Boscobel, or William Fitzhugh, of Ravensworth, or Colonel McCarty, of Marmion, or many more of his kinsmen and friends on both sides of the Potomac. Washington was no phenomenon of deportment, but was the type of his class—the

very highest and best type of the Virginian country gentleman of his period.

The conference established perfectly cordial relations between the two commanders, but nothing was determined except the general strategy of their operations: to keep Sir Henry Clinton from re-enforcing Cornwallis by constant threats against him in New York, and to isolate Cornwallis within reach of the Northern Army, cut him off from the sea by the French fleet, and capture his whole force. To this end it was agreed to re-enforce the naval power by an addition to the fleet from that of the Count de Guichen in the West Indies. Washington sent to him a request for ships of the line, and De Ternay sent him an order to re-enforce the fleet in Newport harbor; but De Guichen sailed for France. A second division of French war ships and troops was prepared for America, but they were blockaded in the harbor of Brest, as Admiral de Ternay was in that of Newport by a superior British force, and never succeeded in getting out.

De Rochambeau marched his army across Connecticut and joined Washington, and then they threatened Sir Henry Clinton. In the meantime the steady insults by Congress had forced Morgan and Greene out of the service, as it was hoped would be the case with Washington. But Gates's disaster at Camden required a new arrangement, and in great trouble the Congress appealed to the commander in chief for a commander for the Southern army. He selected Greene. The rank of major general was conferred on him, and he took command at Charlotte, N. C., of the fragments of Continentals that Gates had left and the militia that Caswell was able

to embody. With General Greene he sent his *corps d'élite*, the legion of Henry Lee, made lieutenant colonel for his brilliant surprise of Paulus Hook, and Kosciusko as engineer.

He appealed to Morgan, who promptly reported to Greene, and Congress tardily righted the wrong by conferring on him the appropriate rank. With Greene in the saddle in North Carolina, Washington knew that that part of the movement would be properly executed. He was to draw Cornwallis North. Steuben was sent to Virginia to keep Greene's communications open with the army, and Lafayette was directed to take command of such Virginia militia as Governor Jefferson could raise for him, and to hang around Cornwallis as soon as he entered the State, keep him employed by constant threats, and worry him out of the open country back to tide water. Greene fell back through North Carolina with Cornwallis hot on his track, until at last he gave him battle at Guilford Court-House, for the purpose of crippling him and keeping him near the water. After the battle of Guilford, Cornwallis fell back to his base on the Cape Fear, and then marched on Sherman's projected route of eighty years after, through the eastern part of the State to Petersburg, Va. There he was confronted with Lafayette, the major general of twenty-three years, who refused to fight, and who constantly eluded him. He crossed the James River to Malvern Hill, where McClellan fought in 1862, turned up the Pamunkey, following the Frenchman; by Hanover Town, where Grant crossed in 1864, and forced Lafayette across the North Anna, where Grant fought in 1864, back to Ely's Ford on the Rappahannock, by a road which

ROUTE OF THE ALLIES,
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1781,
FROM THE HUDSON TO YORKTOWN.



he cut through the country, known as "Marcus Road," or the Marquis's Road, to this day.

Thence Cornwallis dispatched Tarleton on a raid to Charlottesville where Governor Jefferson and the Virginia Legislature were assembled, and Lafayette moved up the river, and about Warrenton joined Wayne, who with one thousand Continentals was moving South to support him. With Wayne's reinforcement he cut Tarleton off from his command, and drove him to the Point of Fork, in Fluvanna County, on the upper James, sixty miles above Richmond. From the North Anna Cornwallis was obliged to march sixty or seventy miles west, three days' march, to rescue his dashing raider, who had become enveloped in the toils set for him by the French general and his Virginians. As soon as his troops were reunited the British general marched down the north or left bank of the James by Richmond, across the Chickahominy, to York River. He was closely followed up by Lafayette.


In the meantime Washington had been pressing De Grasse, who commanded a great French fleet in the West Indies for the conquest of Jamaica, to unite with De Rochambeau and himself in a combined land and water attack on Sir Henry Clinton in New York, or on Cornwallis in Virginia. It was not until the summer that he had a definite reply from De Grasse that he elected to take the Chesapeake as the scene of his operations. The area was large and the water deep, and the bay suited the great vessels of his command better than the bar and contracted waters of New York harbor.

Sending Lafayette orders to hold Cornwallis until he got up, he set to work to persuade his own army

and Sir Henry Clinton that he intended to attack the latter in New York. De Grasse's fleet consisted of twenty-eight ships of the line and six frigates, carrying seventeen hundred guns and twenty thousand men. The presence of such a force would deprive the English of the command of the sea, cut them off from their base, and isolate Clinton or Cornwallis, whichever it was directed against. De Grasse decided against whom the operation should be directed by selecting the Chesapeake.

On August 19, 1781, five days after receiving De Grasse's dispatch, Washington's army crossed the Hudson. He left Lord Stirling with a small force to watch the gate from Canada at Saratoga, and General Heath with four thousand Continentals to hold West Point. His army consisted of two thousand Continentals, composed of two regiments of New Jersey, the First Regiment of New York, Colonel Hazen's Canadian regiment, Colonel Olney's regiment of Rhode Island, Colonel Lamb's regiment of artillery and the light troops under command of Colonel Scammel, and four thousand French troops under General de Rochambeau. "The Rhode Island regiment, among others, is extremely fine," writes a French officer, the Baron Cromot du Bourg, at the time.

The French contingent contained the Regiments Bourbonnais, Deux Ponts and Saintonge, Soissonnois, and other *corps d'élite* of the army of France. It was the only time that Continentals ever marched with French. They were afterward to be brought close together in the comradeship of arms and the noble rivalry of battle in the trenches and before the redoubts at Yorktown. The route was through New



MAP
OF THE COUNTRY FROM
RARITAN RIVER IN EAST JERSEY
TO
ELK HEAD IN MARYLAND
SHOWING THE SEVERAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
AMERICAN AND BRITISH ARMIES
IN 1776 AND 1777.

SCALE OF MILES
5 10 15 20 25

Jersey, and not until New Brunswick was passed did even the general officers dream that any other enterprise was in execution than the attack on New York. So closely had the secret been kept between Washington and De Rochambeau, that not until the army passed through Philadelphia, September 3d to 5th, did Sir Henry Clinton divine the object of the movement—that it was not against him, but was a concentration on the interior lines on the army in Virginia. Just below Philadelphia Washington received a dispatch by courier that De Grasse had arrived in the bay, and the news was communicated to the column. The tidings strung them up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and they swung along with the free stride and square-set shoulders that marches and bivouac and battle for six years had given them. Their uniforms were ragged, but their bayonets were bright; their shoes were tattered, but their hearts were light; and no hunger, no fatigue, no labor could depress the men marching to the fulfillment of their dream of six years—liberty and independence, glory and peace! The French, natty, clean, precise, followed, much pondering at the power which could give such looking men such spirits. They were reviewed by the Congress and the French minister as they passed down Chestnut Street by the State House.

On September 7th the head of the allied army reached the "Head of Elk," and was pushed on board the bay craft there collected for its transportation to the James. Washington, with his staff, rode rapidly through the country, passing through Baltimore on the 8th, to Mount Vernon on the 9th, where he was joined by De Rochambeau on the 10th, and where he stayed until the 12th. Thence they rode by Fred-

ericksburg and New Castle to Williamsburg, which place they reached on the 14th, to Lafayette's infinite relief. They rode fifty miles a day.

As soon as De Grasse opened communications with the latter, he gave him three thousand French infantry, which made his position before Cornwallis perfectly secure. The transports with the troops proceeded down the bay, past York River and Old Point Comfort and turned up the James to Williamsburg, where the army debarked. Admiral de Barras, having escaped Graves's blockade at Newport, joined the Count de Grasse with his ships and transports, and the latter having been sent to Baltimore for the remainder of the French army, which had marched there from the Head of Elk, arrived at Williamsburg on the 28th, and the whole army was assembled.

The investment of Cornwallis was begun at once, and completed by the 30th—the Americans on the right, the French on the left, under the Marquis St. Simon and the Viscount de Vioménil. Cornwallis having seized and fortified Gloucester Point, on the opposite side of York River, the Americans and French under Generals de Choisé and Weedon and the Duke de Lauzun blockaded him there. Admiral Graves followed De Barras from Newport and attempted to force the entry to the Chesapeake, but the overwhelming force of De Grasse met him at the Capes, and after a severe engagement drove him off.

Thus the grand movement which Washington had prepared for the last year was accomplished. He had left Sir Henry Clinton in New York. He had precipitated on Cornwallis, in Virginia, an overwhelming military force, while the enormous naval preponderance of his allies gave him absolute con-


trol of the sea. Clinton might evacuate New York and come with Graves to Cornwallis's deliverance. But then Heath would occupy the strategic center of the war, and De Grasse would prevent the junction of the two British armies. Even if he succeeded in getting into York and uniting with Cornwallis, he would have abandoned the struggle, given up all the territory won by six years of war, and risk all in a final trial with the allies when their combinations rendered his destruction more than probable. The move was a perfect checkmate.

CHAPTER XV.

YORKTOWN—CARRYING THE NEWS TO CONGRESS.

THE army of Cornwallis consisted of seven thousand British regulars. That of the allies was composed of fifty-five hundred Continentals, good troops, seasoned by marches, battles, and campaigns; thirty-five hundred Virginia militia, who for the preceding year had been thwarting Cornwallis up and down the James, the Pamunkey, and the Rappahannock, under Lafayette, and were now under command of Thomas Nelson, Governor of Virginia; and seven thousand French, as fine troops as ever fought under the lilies. Washington began his investment in the regular way. He drove in Cornwallis's outposts, forced the evacuation of his advanced works, and opened parallels against his heavy fortifications around his position on deep water. The first parallel was opened October 6th, at six hundred yards from the British works; the second, on the 11th, at three hundred yards. Two redoubts, advanced from the British line, seriously incommoded the working parties of the attacking force, and it became necessary to silence them.

Hamilton, on the general staff, was commanding a light battalion under Lafayette. The reduction of the left redoubt (the American right) was intrusted to Lafayette and the Americans; of the right, to the



French. The regiment Gatinais was to lead the French storming party. It had been formed from that of D'Auvergne, of which De Rochambeau had been colonel, and was known as "*D'Auvergne sans tache*." In the detail for the attack Lafayette gave the right to Major Gimat, of his staff, with the Rhode Islanders.

Hamilton promptly claimed the command of the storming party, as it was his tour of duty on the lines as officer of the day; and Lafayette declining to change the arrangement, Hamilton appealed to the commander in chief. It appearing that Hamilton was on duty at the time, he was within his right in his claim to lead the advance, and it was awarded him. Gimat's regiment was given the right of the line, with Hamilton's battalion of light infantry in support, Hamilton in command of the whole. The Baron de Vioménil was to lead the French column of assault against the enemy.

These preparations—the riding of staff officers hither and thither, the relieving of pickets and the calling off of sentries, and that tense excitement in bodies of men which is felt, not seen—had been going on all the afternoon of the 14th. De Rochambeau had ridden over to the grenadiers of D'Auvergne and had inspected them. Washington had ridden down to the Rhode Islanders and complimented their trig uniforms and the polish of their bayonets, and the general staff had collected itself toward the right of the American lines, on the earthworks of a battery, in plain view of the enemy. All these movements going on for hours, in sight, only meant one thing to old soldiers—an assault would be made that night somewhere, almost certainly on the two

commanding and advanced redoubts. After sunset the American and French works became lined with soldiers without arms. The unusual spectacle brought out the British, and thus both armies were drawn to witness the stirring spectacle of an assault on fortifications. Washington dismounted, sent his horse to the rear, and took his place on a parapet with Knox and Lincoln and their staffs.

They could see Hamilton moving along his line as they lay flat on the ground, and could feel in his alert, vigorous air, that he was saying, "Look out, boys! this is an affair of cold steel. Not a gun is to be fired, and I want to see the man who will beat me into that work." On the French side there was not so much life. De Vioménil was standing, in faultless uniform and perfect gloves, a little to the right of his regiment, formed in a column of companies, with a section of pioneers armed with axes on the right. Hamilton, never having seen an assault, supposed that axes were the proper thing, so he scraped together a dozen and gave them to some of his men, with instructions to rush ahead and cut those fallen trees out of the way, and so make room for him.

The sun set, and the shades of that October evening spread over the panorama until, about eight o'clock, one single rocket sprang into the air, and at the moment Hamilton could be seen with his sword flashing round his head as he gave the order, "Up, and forward!" Forward they went with a rush to the abattis, and the axemen started to cut their way through; but Hamilton, jumping from tree-trunk to tree-trunk, was ten yards ahead. The regiment broke forward and followed their leader. At the bastion the slope was too steep, and he slipped back;

but one of the men stooped, so that he put his foot on his shoulder, and he was thus "boosted" into the work—the first man there; but Gimat and the Rhode Islanders and the light infantry came piling in, one over the other, and the thing was done in a breath. He did it with empty guns and by the bayonet alone. Not a shot was fired. Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, another aid to the commander in chief, with eighty men, at the same time took the redoubt in reverse, so as to prevent the escape of any of the detachment defending it.

It was too dark to see all this from the point where the generals were standing. They could hear the British fire and see the flash of their guns, but could not tell on which side victory was until an ear-piercing yell went up from the inside of the work. "That's Hamilton!" said one of the generals to the other. But the firing about the French party continued. They were halted, being regular soldiers and well drilled, until their pioneers had cut away the obstructions; and while the pioneers were cutting abattis the British were shooting Frenchmen.

The instant Hamilton was comfortably fixed and had his prisoners disarmed, he started a young lieutenant to the Baron de Vioménil: "Colonel Hamilton's compliments to the Baron de Vioménil, and begs to inform him that he is inside, and to inquire if he can be of any assistance to the baron." To which the Frenchman sent back word in the same gay spirit: "The Baron de Vioménil's compliments to Colonel Hamilton, and he begs to say that, though he is not in yet, he will be in two minutes, and will stay when he gets in. He thanks the colonel for his courtesy, but does not require help." In a moment the French

win the parapet; there are a few musket flashes in the gloom, and then there is silence that tells the story of the bayonet, and then a cheer. The thing was done. The last move of the last piece in the great game that had been begun at Newport, Hartford, and Dobb's Ferry in the North, and at Charlotte and Camden in the South, more than a year before, was made, and the game was won.

Washington, impassible, grave, stern, with no sign of the tremendous pressure under which he was laboring, except a flash of the eye, turned to the attendant generals, and said: "Gentlemen, the work is done, and well done! Let us ride! William, bring me my horse!" and they all rode off into the black night, deeply impressed with the immense importance of the events that had just taken place.

As long as De Grasse held York River the result was mathematically certain. The only doubt resulted from the Gallic temperament, and the possibility of another attack on him by Rodney from the West Indies and Graves from the Atlantic station. Washington knew that in such a contingency it would be impossible to control the French appetite for glory, and he was reasonably anxious on that score. This doubt solved, the capture of the redoubts meant the speedy, prompt capitulation of Lord Cornwallis. The next day Cornwallis attempted to re-establish himself in the position from which he had been expelled, but was easily repulsed. The redoubts were included on the second American parallel, and howitzers securely mounted on them.

Sir Henry Clinton made no sign. Cornwallis proposed to cross the river to Gloucester Point and force his way north to rejoin Clinton. It was an utterly

impracticable, foolhardy scheme, and not even desperation could justify it. But a sudden storm frustrated even that; and on the 17th he hoisted a white flag, his drums beat a parley, and he sent out an officer with a proposition for an armistice of twenty-four hours, while commissioners from each army could settle the terms of the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. Not knowing what might happen on the bay in that time, Washington gave him but two hours' time in which to send in his proposition.

Those sent by Lord Cornwallis were not satisfactory, so the Viscount de Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, commissioners for the allies, met Colonel Dundas and Major Ross, on the part of the British, to arrange terms. The whole of the 18th was spent in discussion, and on the 19th a draft of terms of capitulation was submitted to the British officers. "Are not those terms somewhat harsh, colonel?" said Dundas to Laurens. "They are copies of those granted to General Lincoln by the marquis at Charleston," said Laurens. They were transmitted to Lord Cornwallis with a note from General Washington, informing him that he expected them to be signed by eleven o'clock that day, and that the garrison would march out and ground arms at 2 P. M. They were signed, and the posts of York and Gloucester, with their garrisons, arms, ordnance, and supplies, were surrendered to General Washington, and, the ships, transports, and naval supplies to the Count de Grasse, as commander of the French fleet.

At two o'clock the British army marched out along a road on which the Americans were formed on the right and the French on the left, facing in-

ward—Washington and staff on the right of his own line, De Rochambeau and staff on the right of his, facing Washington. They marched with shouldered arms, colors cased, and their drums beating a march. The terms of surrender required that they should beat a British march, so they selected as the one for the occasion one called "The world turned upside down." Cornwallis, unworthy of his character and unfortunately for his fame, was unable to face the inevitable, and sent General O'Hara to represent him in the mortifying ceremony. Superbly mounted and perfectly equipped, O'Hara, when he reached the end of the line, turned his horse out to General Washington, to whom he tendered his sword, with "Lord Cornwallis's excuses and regrets that indisposition compelled his absence on so interesting an occasion." Cornwallis had received Lincoln's sword at Charleston on precisely the same terms he was now being forced to comply with; and General Washington, bowing to General O'Hara, directed him to General Lincoln, to whom he was to deliver his sword and to surrender, and whose directions he was to obey. So Lincoln, marched the British column out into the open field, where they grounded their arms in sulks and temper.

The surrender was over by four o'clock, and the news must at once be sent to the Congress. Who should have that honor? On the brilliant staff of the commander in chief, besides Hamilton and Laurens, was Tench Tilghman, of Maryland. He was of that family which in England had made its mark by intellectual vigor, and in the provinces of Pennsylvania and Maryland filled the first place in the revolt against the mother country. He was from the east-

ern shore of Maryland, and from the County of Talbot, which for eight generations has been the center of a noble culture and a generous chivalry. His uncle had been President of the Revolutionary Convention of Maryland, and every man of the breed able to ride a horse was in arms for his country.

Hamilton and Laurens had had their chance in the assault on the redoubt and the negotiations for the surrender; so fairness required that Tilghman should have the honor of bearing the news of victory to Congress. By six o'clock on the evening of the 19th, with his dispatches in his breast pocket, he had his horse on an open sailboat, flying down the York River. Out in the open bay he turned his bows north, but lost a whole night aground on Tangier shoals, on account of the ignorance of his boatmen. Reaching Annapolis, he found that a dispatch, dated the 18th, from De Grasse to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, had preceded him by a day, so he turned at once with his horse and boat across the bay toward Philadelphia. He lost a day in a calm between Annapolis and Rock Hall, in the County of Kent. From there to Philadelphia is about eighty miles as the crow flies. De Grasse's courier had passed through the country the day before. The people were on tiptoe to hear the news from York. Their hearts stopped as they imagined they heard the great guns of the English and the French booming over the waters in the still night. Mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, and sweethearts all looked with wistful eyes to the South for some sign of the issue of the weary struggle.

It was the supreme effort of American liberty. It was the very crisis of freedom. But the flower of

Maryland was in that fight, and the lower counties on the Delaware had sent their bravest and best to back their brethren of the eastern shore. One of the miracles of history, attested time and again by indisputable evidence, is that when the minds and hearts of a whole people are at a white heat of excitement and expectation, knowledge comes to them independent of the senses. The Greeks believed that the great god Pan spread the knowledge of victory or defeat at the time of their occurrence, hundreds of miles away. The result of the battle of Platæa was known the day it was fought, and the news of Thermopylæ spread over Greece through the silent chambers of the air carried by the arrows of light. The victory of Pharsalia was known in Rome at the time it occurred, and the events of Waterloo were discussed on the London Stock Exchange before it adjourned on the afternoon of June 18th.

So when Tench Tilghman landed at Rock Hall, for his hundred miles' ride through the country, he found the hearts and minds of men and women aglow with a divine frenzy. They felt what had occurred without knowing it, and were wild for confirmation by knowledge. Up through Kent, without drawing rein, this solitary horseman sped his way. When his horse began to fail, he turned to his nearest kinsman—for they were mostly of the same blood—and riding up to the lonely farmhouse would shout, "Cornwallis is taken!—a fresh horse for the Congress!" and in a minute he would be remounted and pushing on in a free gallop. All the night he rode up the peninsula, not a sound disturbing the silence of the darkness except the beat of his horse's hoofs. Every three or four hours he would

ride up to some homestead, still and quiet and dark in the first slumber of the night, and thunder on the door with his sword-hilt, "Cornwallis is taken!—a fresh horse for the Congress!" Like an electric shock the house would flash with an instant light and echo with the pattering feet of women, and before a dozen greetings could be exchanged, and but a word given of the fate of the loved ones at York, Tilghman would vanish in the gloom, leaving a trail of glory and of joy behind him. So he sped through Kent, across the head of Sassafras, through Christiana, by Wilmington, straight on to Philadelphia. The tocsin and the slogan of his news spread like the fire in the dry grass, and left behind him a broad blaze of delirium and of joy.

"Cornwallis is taken!" passed from mouth to mouth, flew through the air, was wafted on the autumn breeze, shone with the sunlight. "Cornwallis is taken! Liberty is won! Peace is come! Once more husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, lovers, shall return to the hearts that gave them to the cause! Once more shall joy sit on every hearth, and happiness shine over every roof-tree." When or where in all the tide of time has such a message been carried to such a people? Liberty with justice! Peace with honor! Victory with glory! Liberty, peace, justice, victory, honor, and glory now and forever, one and inseparable! These were the tidings that Tench Tilghman bore when he rode into Philadelphia at midnight of the 23d, four days from the army of York. The dispatch from De Grasse had been received, but the Congress and the people waited for Washington. Nothing was true but tidings from him. Rousing the President of the Congress—McKean

—Tilghman delivered his dispatch to him, and the news was instantly made public. The watchmen, as they went their rounds, cried, "Twelve o'clock, all is well, and Cornwallis is taken!" In a minute the whole city was wild; lights flashed in every window; men, women, and children poured into the streets. The State House bell rang out its peal, "Liberty throughout the land, to all the inhabitants thereof!" And thirteen sovereign and independent States were proclaimed to all the world.

CHAPTER XVI.

PEACE, AND SURRENDER OF HIS COMMISSION.

WASHINGTON had no doubt but that the capitulation of Cornwallis's army was conclusive of the struggle, and that the administration of Lord North would not be able to put another army in the field for the reduction of the rebellious colonies. But it was quite uncertain how far Washington would be able to stimulate the States to renewed resistance. Georgia was subdued; South Carolina pinioned, though fiercely struggling by Marion and Sumter, to get loose, greatly aided and encouraged by the genius, the daring, and the intelligence of Greene.

The Congress was tired of the war; the States were worn out; the people, behind all, had nearly given up. If it had not been for the French, Congress would have dispersed, the State governments dissolved, and Lord Dunmore and Tryon would have been re-established in enlarged proconsulships, and confiscation and hanging would have been the order of the day. The suppression of the rising of 1745 in England had given the rebels of America warning of what was to be expected by them if they failed. Public credit did not exist, and, as a matter of fact, gold and silver coin was almost entirely absent. A little of it was hoarded, but most of it had permeated, evaporated, percolated through the lines, as

money always does from places of danger to places of safety. All the gold and silver had gone into British hands for British security.

When Washington proposed to move his eastern regiments South, to complete the operations on Cornwallis, it was absolutely necessary to get *some* money to give them a portion of pay, for the families they were to leave behind. His private fortune and estate of Mount Vernon had been mortgaged before to keep troops in the field, in the terrible stress of 1777-'78. He had not money enough to pay an express to take a letter from his camp on the Hudson to the French minister in Philadelphia, but was obliged to trust it to the ordinary post. So, when he prepared to move, he called on Robert Morris, his unfailing and unfaltering support, for cash, and Morris started to hunt it among the Quakers. They had none; and he actually went to the Count de Rochambeau, without Washington's knowledge, and borrowed from him twenty thousand hard dollars, which Morris promised to return by October 1st.

Relying on luck—which never deserts those who rely on themselves—Morris, who when he obtained the money had not the faintest idea of where he could find it to return it according to promise, was supplied by Henry Laurens, who arrived in Boston on August 25th, with two and a half million livres in cash, part of the six million granted, given, or loaned by the King of France. So French gold actually paid the American troops to go to Yorktown. There were seven thousand French there, and fifty-five hundred American Continentals. The French fleet held the water, and without it there would have been no Yorktown, as there would also

have been none without De Rochambeau. The country in October, 1781, wanted peace. It wanted to stop fighting, and peace was the very worst thing it could have.

The danger was that the French might agree to a general peace on the basis of the *uti possidetis*, and this would leave all Georgia, Charleston, and the low country of South Carolina, Wilmington on the Cape Fear, New York city, and, substantially, Rhode Island, in the possession of the English—the Tories, the loyalists—perpetual exasperating wounds, like broken spearheads thrust into the side of the Union, to irritate and harass and destroy forever until removed by heroic surgery. Amid the universal delirium of self-congratulation and exaggeration of achievement—the necessary and natural consequence of success—the great labor was to keep somebody's head straight and cool. “*We* are great men, great statesmen, great soldiers! See *our* magnificent strategy! *We* have swept the British flag from the seas and penned it into three or four posts on land!” Such was the feeling in the Congress, in the States, among the people. But Washington knew that there was not a word of truth in it; that if it had not been for De Rochambeau's arrival, the Congress would have made terms with the British commissioners, and have swiftly taken Lord North's pardon on their knees; and he knew that now, unless the French were firm, the Congress would make peace on the basis of the *uti possidetis* without the slightest hesitation.

As soon, therefore, as he had marched his paroled prisoners from Yorktown, he sent Greene everything he could spare to support him in South Carolina,

and started Wayne for Georgia. To the Congress and to the leading men in the States he wrote, as was his custom, at great length, explaining the situation, and making clear the very great danger by which the cause of American independence and liberty was threatened. Peace now, he said, would be disaster, second only to absolute subjugation. It would inevitably lead to future incessant war, intestine struggle, and subjugation by some foreign power, even if the mother country abandoned us.

These admonitions, exhortations, and explanations were begun at Yorktown, and he never ceased them until the definitive treaty of peace recognized by name the thirteen free, sovereign, and independent States, who had declared their independence on July 4, 1776, and for whom he had struggled and fought. On his return to the army of the North he found great dissatisfaction and deep-seated discontent. The war was over. Everybody had got rich, and what they wanted, except the soldiers; nothing was done for them, and they were to be turned out on the roadside to beg, or starve, or rob. What justice was there in that? What right had Congress to put honest men in such a dilemma, or to present to them such an alternative? These were hard questions to answer. Washington rode from Yorktown through Fredericksburg, Alexandria, and Annapolis to Philadelphia. Everywhere he was received with the most intense enthusiasm and warmest devotion.

No event has occurred in American history which has ever elicited so much feeling as the surrender at Yorktown, and the subsequent triumphant march of Washington through the country. He was absolutely in control of everything. He was omnip-

otent as far as mortal power could be, for he could do whatever Congress or the States could do; but he could not revive dead credit or reinvigorate paralyzed currency. At the raising of a finger he would have been intrusted with all authority on just such terms as he chose to mark out, and could have been Protector, President, Dictator, or King, as he pleased. It is certain that no such wish ever sullied his soul. The question was discussed in many circles, and of necessity the discussion must more or less have reached his ears. He spent the winter of 1781-'82 with the Congress at Philadelphia, and did not join the army at Newburg until April of the latter year. There he found the discontent of the army, officers and men, rank and file, worse than ever.

Colonel Lewis Nicola, a fussy character who had commanded an invalid battalion about Philadelphia, wrote him a letter, explaining at great length that the cause of the lack of provision for the soldiers was the form of government, or no-government, under which every one was suffering; that the only relief that could be secured by the country was in the setting up a king, and that he was the man selected by Providence for the place. He did not say, but the inference was unavoidable, that Providence had also sagaciously chosen him, Nicola, to announce the choice, and to superintend the arrangements for carrying that choice into effect. The proposition was absurd. Notwithstanding the gush of the Middle and Northern States, the climate of the Chesapeake was exceedingly unpropitious for a new growth of kings. They might have tolerated James III, or one of the heirs of the Charleses, but they certainly would never have submitted to any upstart, pinch-

beck royalty. The house of Hanover was too parvenu for them. Notwithstanding Washington must have understood the feather-headed and irresponsible character of Nicola, he embraced the opportunity to put himself on record on a subject which he knew was the topic of grave discussion among responsible people. He wrote: "With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment I have read with attention the sentiments you have submitted for my approval. . . . I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs that can befall my country. If I am not deceived in knowledge of myself, you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable." It may be unjust to suspect that this letter was more the result of careful deliberation than an indignant outburst of outraged civic virtue, but it certainly will bear that interpretation. Washington knew Nicola, and was aware that nothing from him merited serious attention; but he also knew that loose talk of the kind was floating about, and he considered it wise to stop it at once. The Northern States might have tolerated a king, the Southern never would. The French army rejoined him at Verplanck's Point, on the Hudson, and his task was thenceforward to bring the war to a conclusion. Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry Clinton in command at New York, and Admiral Digby, in charge of the fleet, officially informed him of the movements in Parliament looking to a recognition of the States and a cessation of hostilities. But Washington insisted to his correspondents, the Governors of States, and to the Congress, that the

only sure reliance for independence was preparation for war—active, aggressive war. He found a paper circulating in the army, signed by general and field officers, setting forth the grievances of the soldiers, and calling for a general meeting of officers. He issued a general order censuring the temper of the call, and appointing the time and place for a meeting to be held on Saturday, March 15, 1783.

The meeting was held, and General Gates called to the chair, when the commander in chief appeared. He apologized for being present, which he had not intended, he said, when he issued the order directing the meeting. The diligence, however, which had been exhibited in circulating anonymous writings rendered it necessary that he should give his sentiments to the army on the nature and tendency of them. He then read a carefully considered address, in which he showed the great danger of exasperating the feelings of the army, which, he admitted, had great cause for complaint, and he said: "For myself, a recollection of the cheerful assistance and prompt obedience I have experienced from you under every vicissitude of fortune, and the sincere affection I feel for an army I have so long had the honor to command, will oblige me to declare, in this public and solemn manner, that for the attainment of complete justice for all your toils and dangers, and the gratification of every wish, so far as may be done consistently with the great duty I owe my country and those powers we are bound to respect, you may fully command my services to the utmost extent of my abilities.

"While I give you these assurances, and pledge myself in the most unequivocal manner to exert

whatever abilities I am possessed of in your favor, let me entreat you, gentlemen, on your part, not to take any measures which, viewed in the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained. Let me request you to rely on the plighted faith of your country, and place full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress; that previous to your dissolution as an army they will cause all your accounts to be fairly liquidated, as directed in the resolutions which were published to you two days ago; and that they will adopt the most effectual measures in their power to render ample justice to you for your faithful and meritorious services.

“And let me conjure you, in the name of our common country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, and as you regard the military and national character of America, to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man who wishes, under any specious pretenses, to overturn the liberties of our country, and who wickedly attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising empire in blood.

“By thus determining and thus acting, you will pursue the plain and direct road to the attainment of your wishes; you will defeat the insidious designs of our enemies, who are compelled to resort from open force to secret artifice; you will give one more distinguished proof of unexampled patriotism and patient virtue rising superior to the pressure of the most complicated sufferings; and you will, by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for posterity to say, when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind, ‘Had this day been

wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.' ”

Washington then bowed and withdrew, and Knox at once offered resolutions, seconded by Putnam, reciprocating his expressions of confidence and affection, and asserting that no circumstances of distress would ever induce the army to sully the glory acquired by so much blood and eight years' faithful services. They reiterated their confidence in Congress and their country, and requested the commander in chief to write the President of Congress, earnestly requesting a speedy decision on the late address forwarded by a committee of the army. He did so, and Congress speedily passed a resolution providing for five years' full pay to be given officers and men on their discharge.

The general treaty of peace acknowledging the independence of the States by name was signed at Paris, January 20, 1783. On March 23d, a French vessel of D'Estaing's fleet arrived at Philadelphia, bringing a letter from Lafayette, and the official announcement of the execution of the treaty. In a few days Sir Guy Carleton informed Washington of the fact, and that he was ordered to proclaim a general cessation of hostilities by land and sea, which he did. A similar proclamation was issued by Congress on the 17th of April. Peace was announced in general orders on the 19th day of April, on the eighth anniversary of the battle of Lexington. The men were freely furloughed, and allowed to take with them their arms and accoutrements.

While the main army thus dissolved without disorder, some incidents occurred not equally credit-

able. About eighty new recruits of the Pennsylvania line, stationed at Lancaster, suddenly mutinied, and marched to Philadelphia, where they were joined by about two hundred soldiers from the barracks, surrounded Congress and the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, and demanded justice, with threats of violence if their demands were not complied with in twenty minutes. Congress adjourned to Princeton, and Washington dispatched General Howe with fifteen hundred veterans to quell the mutiny. Several of the mutineers were tried by court-martial, two condemned to death, but pardoned, and four received corporal punishment. By a proclamation of Congress of October 18th, all furloughed officers and men were discharged, and all others were to be discharged on November 3d. Sir Guy Carleton evacuated New York on the 25th of November, and American troops took possession of the city.

On December 4th, Washington took leave of his officers at Fraunce's tavern, in the city of New York, and started on his long ride to Annapolis, where Congress was then in session, to resign his commission and thence to Mount Vernon and home to Virginia. He stopped at Philadelphia to adjust with the Controller of the Treasury the accounts of his personal expenditures from the day he left Philadelphia in 1775 down to December 13, 1783. These accounts were kept in his own handwriting with the utmost exactness, and included money expended for secret service and various incidental charges, with vouchers for all payments. The gross amount was fourteen thousand five hundred pounds sterling, for money actually expended; no pay was charged or received. His account was paid.

He arrived at Annapolis on December 20th, where elaborate and ceremonious preparations were made for his reception. On his arrival he addressed a letter to the President of Congress, requesting to know in what manner it would be most proper to offer his resignation—whether in writing or at an audience. The latter mode was adopted, and the Hall of Congress—the Senate Chamber of the General Assembly of Maryland—appointed for the ceremonial; the day, Tuesday, December 23, 1783. A committee was appointed by Congress to arrange the ceremonial for this proceeding, for it was felt to be an important historical event, which must be celebrated with due order and proper solemnity.

During the war the Congress was constantly struggling with the apprehension of a dictatorship, and among them the fear of Washington grew, as his reputation and influence enlarged. They always claimed and asserted the superiority of the civil over the military power, and even in the very crisis of their fate bore themselves as ambassadors of sovereign States, to whom the army and its commander in chief were subordinate. "On Monday and Tuesday, September 3 and 4, 1781," says the contemporary record, "the French army, under command of his Excellency Count de Rochambeau, passed in review before his Excellency the President, and the Honorable the Congress of the United States, at the State House in this city (Philadelphia). The President was covered; his Excellency General Washington, commander in chief, the Count de Rochambeau, etc., stood on his left hand, uncovered." The army was on the march for Virginia, York, and Cornwallis. The committee of Congress on the reception reported

the details of the ceremony with great minuteness. General Mifflin, Washington's old quartermaster general, was president. Nine States were present. The reception was by the ambassadors of sovereign States to their victorious general and the country's most distinguished citizen; illustrious, but citizen only—nothing more.

When General Washington, escorted by his staff, entered the Chamber, the members of the Congress remained seated and covered; the general was shown by the Secretary of Congress to his seat specially provided for him; his staff remained standing. The President informed him that the Congress is ready to receive his communication. The general then arose and read his address: "Mr. President: The great events on which my resignation depended having at length taken place, I now have the honor of offering my sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before them to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country.

"Happy in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and pleased with the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a respectable nation, I resign, with satisfaction, the appointment I accepted with diffidence—a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so arduous a task, which, however, was superseded by a confidence in the rectitude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union and the patronage of Heaven. The successful termination of the war has verified the most sanguine expectations; and my gratitude for the interposition of Providence, and the assistance I have

received from my countrymen, increases with every review of the momentous contest.

“While I repeat my obligations to the army in general, I should do injustice to my own feelings not to acknowledge in this place the peculiar services and distinguished merits of the gentlemen who have been attached to my person during the war. It was impossible that the choice of confidential officers to compose my family should have been more fortunate. Permit me, sir, to recommend in particular those who have continued in the service to the present moment as worthy of the favorable notice and patronage of Congress.

“I consider it as an indispensable duty to close this last act of my official life by commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty God, and those who have the superintendence of them to his holy keeping.

“Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theater of action, and, bidding an affectionate farewell to this august body, under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life.”

After advancing to the chair and delivering his commission and a copy of his address to the President, he returned to his place and received, standing, the answer of Congress delivered by the President, sitting:

“SIR: The United States in Congress assembled receive with emotions too affecting for utterance the solemn resignation of the authorities under which you have led their troops with success through a perilous and doubtful war. Called upon by your

country to defend its invaded rights, you accepted the sacred charge before it had formed alliances, and while it was without funds or a government to support you.

“ You have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through all disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your fellow-citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius, and transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered until these United States, aided by a magnanimous King and nation, have been enabled, under a just Providence, to close the war in freedom, safety, and independence; on which happy event we sincerely join you in congratulations.

“ Having defended the standard of liberty in this New World, having taught a lesson useful to those who inflict and to those who feel oppression, you retire from the great theater of action with the blessings of your fellow-citizens. But the glory of your virtues will not terminate with your military command; it will continue to animate remotest ages. We feel, with you, our obligations to the army in general, and will particularly charge ourselves with the interests of those confidential officers who have attended your person to this affecting moment.

“ We join you in commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty God, beseeching him to dispose the hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded them of becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address to him our earnest prayers, that a life so beloved may be fostered with all his care; that your days may be happy as they have been illus-

trious; and that he will finally give you the reward which this world can not give."

The Secretary then delivered a copy of the President's address to the general, who then took his leave. When he rose to deliver his address, and also when he retired, he bowed to the Congress, which they returned by *uncovering without bowing*. He left Annapolis at sunrise the next morning, and reached Mount Vernon the same night—Christmas eve. As he wrote George Clinton: "The scene is at last closed. I feel myself eased of a load of public care. I hope to spend the remainder of my days in cultivating the affections of good men, and in the practice of the domestic virtues." This is the last scene in the life of George Washington, soldier, by his own fireside, with his wife and friends, at home at Mount Vernon, in Virginia.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE UNION AND THE CONSTITUTION.

WHEN George Washington rose at Mount Vernon on Christmas day, 1783, it is not an exaggeration to say that he was the most illustrious man then living in the world. His prudence, persistence, courage, wisdom, and patriotism had carried an infant state through a long war with the greatest nation of modern history to a successful and glorious conclusion. His dominating influence in the result was thoroughly understood and appreciated in Great Britain; his wisdom and self-denying patriotism were intensely admired in France, where the ideas of the universal brotherhood of man were just germinating; and the breadth of his military combinations, and the force and vigor with which they had been executed, were admired in the new military nation of Prussia more than those of any modern soldier except their own great founder. So that, in Great Britain, France, and Germany, George Washington occupied the most conspicuous place before all men, and was first in honor, first in reverence, and first in love of all living men.

The action, unparalleled in ancient or modern times, of the successful leader of a revolt against constituted authority, in which organized government had been overthrown and a new order estab-

lished—who had voluntarily laid down his authority, severed his connection with public affairs, and retired to private life—this conduct produced a more profound impression on the world than even the military genius which had directed the war, and the wisdom which had controlled the people through the long ordeal. No one anywhere expected any such event except the men who had known Washington closely—his friends, kinsmen, and neighbors in Virginia, some intimate correspondents, like Jonathan Trumbull, of Connecticut and Thomas Johnson, of Maryland, and his comrades in arms, Nathaniel Greene, Henry Knox, Anthony Wayne, James McHenry, John Laurens, Daniel Morgan, and true men like these whose view was never distorted by envy, ambition, or malice.

The Continental Congress passed an unhappy time from the capitulation of Cornwallis to the definitive treaty of peace. It was plain what position Washington and the army were to occupy. They were to stand first in the respect and the affections of the people and of posterity. But what was the place to be assigned to the statesmen? Like all weak people, they had suffered from a constant terror of the man on horseback. They listened for the knock of the dictator every day at Carpenters' Hall, and when the Pennsylvania militia surrounded them and gave them thirty minutes to gratify their demands, the Congress thought the hour had struck.

The disbandment of the army during the year was an immense relief, and when the general attended at Annapolis as their servant, and in the position of subordinate had surrendered his commission, and all authority of every kind derived from office,

to those who had conferred it on him, he removed the weight of apprehension which covered and threatened them. When, therefore, he arrived at Mount Vernon he was the most illustrious man in the world—the best-beloved citizen, and the idolized hero of a generous, a chivalric, and a sentimental people. Not one human being lived who could or would say, think, or feel any evil of him—not one anywhere in the wide world.

Washington actually persuaded himself that he wanted to end his career in the life of a private gentleman with his family and friends, and, like all men who have long carried a great burden of official responsibility, believed that he could relieve himself of the responsibility by divesting himself of office. But office may be laid aside—conscience, the sense of duty, never can be; and as soon as Washington had leisure to look around him and appreciate the situation of things, it was clear to him that duty called him as imperiously now as when he left Mount Vernon to go to the Congress in 1774-'75, and to the army near Boston in June, 1775.

Washington was fifty-one years of age, in superb health, happy in fortune, friends, and family as few men have ever been. Thirty-three years of his life had been passed in the public service, and it was utterly impossible for him to step aside and let events take their course or other men control them. No living man knew as well what was necessary to be done. Not one could show as well how to do it, nor conduce to the doing of it, as he could. He had struggled through eight years, bearing on his shoulders the responsibility of the revolt, with absolutely no assistance from the confederated colonies. They

had no government, no vigor, no life, no credit; they could do nothing, and did nothing.

They had united upon terms of an alliance they called the "Articles of Confederation," by which they agreed to assist each other in the war, as required by a vote of the Congress, each colony casting an equal vote. This Confederation was only an agreement to agree. It bound no one to action; it never collected a dollar of taxes, nor raised a soldier, except two battalions of volunteers from Canada, who were mustered into the American service as "Congress's Own."

The States were divided from each other by social, religious, political, and race differences. From the first settlement, grave disputes had existed between the adventurers and proprietors who were staking their lives and fortunes on English colonization in America. The Virginia companies, prior in time, were prior in right, and acquired by grant from the Crown the larger part of the North American continent subsequently planted by the English. The vacation of their charters subsequently threw all their territory into the control of the Crown which granted it, to Calvert, to Culepeper, to Penn, to Jersey, and various other royal favorites. But though the courts could vacate charters, and abolish grants, they could not extinguish claims or ideas of rights, created in various individuals by ambition or aspiration.

Gentlemen and merchants had subscribed to the Virginia Company, and had adventured lives and fortunes to subdue the empire which it controlled, and of which they were part owners; and when the fiat of the Court of King's Bench extinguished all

charter rights, the original partners in the enterprise to settle the Dominion of Virginia felt grossly wronged by seeing their property divided out among others. They never abandoned their claim to the original boundaries of the Dominion until the Dominion became a republican State, and in so doing recognized the existence of other free and equal States erected in her territory north and south of her. But in recognizing the existence and the right to exist of Maryland and North Carolina, Virginia still held on to her claim to the Western territory.

The County of Illinois, in Virginia, included the whole country west of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and south of the lakes. The County of Kentucky comprised the country south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. The Dominion during the Revolution consisted of the present States of Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota; and when the States were asked to come into the Confederation, the coming in was a tacit acknowledgment of the claim of Virginia to this whole territory. Maryland refused to concede this, and held on with curious tenacity to her claim of the whole Potomac as her southern boundary, and her right to share in the great territory beyond the Mississippi, and she went through the Revolution, represented in Congress, and contributing her full quota to the armed contest, without ever having been a member of the Confederation.

It was not until March, 1781, after Virginia had executed in due form a deed of release to the United States of all her claims to the Western lands, to be held for the common benefit of all the States, that

Maryland authorized her representatives in Congress to commit the State to the fortunes of the confederacy by signing the Articles of Confederation. New York claimed Vermont, and a bitter controversy existed between New Jersey, with Pennsylvania on the one side and New York on the other, about rights of navigation and of fishery. Virginia and Maryland were in a constant wrangle as to jurisdiction over the Chesapeake and the Potomac.

The first problem to be solved was the construction of a more perfect Union. Washington, with a political sagacity that was pure intuition, saw at once the point on which the power was to rest. He had read as little history as most gentlemen of his station and generation, and was as little informed as any one of the struggles that races, peoples, and nations have made at various epochs in different climates and environments to acquire, to preserve, and to transmit liberty to their posterities.

If the States were to remain discordant and unsympathetic, they would become the prey of demagogues at home, who would without delay transfer them to some foreign power. Spain would have no difficulty in extending her power along the Gulf of Mexico, until that would become a Spanish sea; and France would as easily extend herself up the Mississippi and Ohio and along the lakes, until she would have been re-established in that position from which George Washington and the Virginians had spent their youth to expel her.

Washington had gone into the war with a bitter feeling toward the French and the Papists, and a sentiment of regretful affection for the mother country; he had come out of it with a warm affection for the

French and the Catholics—for the French had proved friends in need, and the Catholics, native and foreign born, had been ardent patriots—and with an intense hostility to the English Government and its adherents, the Tories in America. He loved and respected the Fairfaxes—loyal gentlemen, who grieved over his fall and prayed for his restoration to the ways of duty, of honor, and of patriotism. He conceded to them the right of private judgment, but to them alone. The many distinguished Virginian families who adhered to their oaths of allegiance and refused to rebel against “the best government the world ever saw,” he never, to his dying day, forgave or forgot; and after the war was over, while Mount Vernon was open to all the world who came to pay their respects to the master, no Tory, or son of a Tory, ever broke bread there. Every man who had stood by the flag on land or sea was welcome; any man who had fought it in open, manly, honorable war was welcome; but no one who had deserted friends, and joined with negroes and Indians in servile and savage war, ever again touched the hand of George Washington.

Something has been said—more may be—from the side of those who, faithful to their hereditary allegiance, staked and lost all save honor in the defense of the union with the old mother; but the generation which fought the rebellion, which accomplished disunion, and which established independence, never made allowances for their unsuccessful neighbors, but regarded them with unmitigated contempt and undying hate to the end of their lives. And Washington was a man of his time.

To bring the Western lands in connection with the

East was the first step in the problem of the Union. He never saw the Great Lakes, but he saw the future, and he marked out a way by which a free highway by water might be constructed from the Chesapeake to Detroit. And by Detroit now passes annually a tonnage greater than the entire transoceanic trade of the United States. He had originated this enterprise long before, and in 1762 had held a conference at Fredericktown, in Maryland, with Thomas Johnson, George Mason, and other associates in the Ohio Company, for the purpose of devising means to open the Western lands. In a letter to Johnson, in 1772, he presses the subject; and he secured a charter, in 1774, from the Virginia Legislature for a transportation company on the Potomac. Washington failed to secure the co-operation of Maryland, and the war stopped the undertaking.

Before he retired from the army, in the summer of 1783, he rode with Governor Clinton, of New York, up the valley of the Mohawk and reconnoitered the line of water way to the lakes, which Clinton's son afterward made the route for the Erie Canal. In the autumn of 1784, accompanied by one servant, he rode from Mount Vernon to Winchester, to Wills' Creek, to the Monongahela, to Fort Pitt, and down the Ohio to the Kanawha, to the New River and across the Blue Mountains to the head waters of the James at Clifton Forge; thence along the Piedmont road to Mount Vernon. This extraordinary expedition was made primarily for the purpose of acquiring personal knowledge of the country, in which he had large investments in land, but also for the purpose of ascertaining the best way of connecting the East and the West. With the wonderful political sagacity which he

at times exhibited like inspiration, he was not in favor of acquiring control of the Mississippi "at that time." Free navigation of the Mississippi could draw the trade of its great watershed to the Gulf of Mexico and so establish the Spaniards there forever. Washington *felt* the impulse of "manifest destiny." He knew that the great country of the West would be filled by an energetic, intellectual, courageous, liberty-loving people; their appearance might be delayed; the British, by holding on to the Western posts, in violation of the treaty and their plighted faith, might for a few years keep the Indian tribes in a condition of suppressed excitement, ready at any moment to break out into flagrant war, and thus hinder and delay immigration and settlement; but civilization was bound, by the inevitable law of progress of the human race, to occupy and develop the immense resources which might be made to contribute so immensely to the comfort and happiness of man. It is not probable that Washington ever heard of Evolution or Progress; but he knew that hickory and walnut timber indicated rich land—land that would produce corn, wheat, rye, and oats in profusion; and he knew that wherever there was rich land the pioneer would find it and take it and possess it and cultivate it. He would make "home" there, and wherever the Norman-Anglo-Saxon had established his household altars, from that place he never receded. The rich bottoms and heavy timber of the Ohio and the Kanawha all pointed to future empire, and the soul of the politician-statesman was filled with visions and hopes of the future of such a country bound to the Atlantic and dominated by the liberty-loving, freeborn race that for a thousand

years had been engaged in one constant struggle for liberty and justice and right. As soon as Washington arrived at Mount Vernon he set to work with that patient pertinacity which above all others was his distinguishing characteristic.

He wrote to Madison, then attending the Congress at Annapolis, urging him to bring up in the Maryland Legislature, in session at the same place, the question of some arrangement between Maryland and Virginia about jurisdiction over and the navigation of the Chesapeake. Under the public law, as it then stood, the nation controlling the mouth of a river had the right to regulate and tax the access to the high sea of all the inhabitants of its upper waters. It was not until the Treaty of Vienna that the commercial navigation of rivers which separate States was declared to be entirely free in their whole course. This made the Rhine and its confluent free. Similar regulations as to the Elbe were made by the Treaty of Dresden in 1821, and of the Vistula and Po in 1815, and of the Danube by the Treaty of Paris in 1850. The English secured the right of navigation of the Mississippi by the Treaty of 1763 with France, and the right was secured to the English and Americans by the Treaty of 1783.

Therefore, when the Treaty of 1783 acknowledged and recognized thirteen sovereign and independent States, each State had absolute control of all navigable waters within its limits. Connecticut controlled the Connecticut River; New Jersey and Delaware, the Delaware; Virginia, the lower Chesapeake; and thus Maryland and Pennsylvania might both be cut off from the *mare liberum*, the free highway of commerce of the nations of the world. An agreement

between the States was thus absolutely necessary to secure proper commercial facilities to them, and Washington proposed to use the necessities of the situation to promote the grand object he had in view—to wit, the foundation of a solid Union, by binding the East and boundless West by the ties of mutual interest.

While the Maryland Legislature, at his instance, was initiating negotiations with Virginia as to the jurisdiction over and navigation of the Potomac and the Chesapeake, he pressed the Virginia Legislature to grant a charter to the Potomac Company—the enterprise which he had started in 1762, and only gave up when he went to Congress in 1774. He was made president of the company, which was to construct a slack water navigation from Rock Creek, the head of tide, to Wills' Creek, and then a series of smaller canals and dams across the mountain to the Monongahela, and so bind the East and West, by the ties of interest, into a Union which should last forever. But the fundamental idea in the undertaking was that the navigable line proposed to be created should be a free highway forever to all the people of the United States.

While the Legislature of Virginia was thus providing for making the Potomac a free highway, that of Maryland appointed commissioners to meet those from Virginia, to settle the jurisdiction and navigation of the Potomac and the Chesapeake. Annapolis is within visiting distance of Mount Vernon. It was then within a good day's ride. The general would send a servant on a horse to Governor Johnson or Colonel Tilghman or Colonel Howard, requesting the pleasure of their company to dinner the next

day, to meet some comrade of Germantown or Yorktown, or some foreign officers visiting Mount Vernon, and by sunrise the following morning the cavalcade would be *en route* to Mount Vernon for a three o'clock dinner. Such intimate relations increased his influence among the Marylanders, who were already devoted to him. He pressed the Potomac Company and the question of navigation of the Chesapeake first on the Virginians who were farther off, and then on the Marylanders right at his hand. The Virginians chartered the Potomac Company. The Marylanders appointed Thomas Johnson, Thomas Stone, Samuel Chase, and Daniel, of St. Thomas, Jenifer, to meet commissioners from Virginia to settle the navigation and jurisdiction question. Virginia then appointed Edmund Randolph, George Mason, James Madison, Jr., and Alexander Henderson, to meet the Maryland Commissioners, and Maryland then reenacted the charter of the Potomac Company.

Washington's first move was successful. He had secured the consent and guarantee of Virginia and Maryland that the navigation of the upper Potomac should be free forever, and that the great West should have a free access to tide. But that gave them no access to the ocean. So, when the commissioners of the two States met at Alexandria, in January, 1785, the general met them, and adjourned the whole matter and meeting and negotiations to Mount Vernon. The agreement then made was thoroughly imbued with the ideas of Washington. It gave Marylanders and Virginians equal rights in the Pocomoke, the Potomac, and the Chesapeake, and made these waters free highways to the open sea. The Compact of 1785, as it is called, was the germ of the

Constitution of 1789, and it came from the brain and heart of Washington. It forbade Maryland or Virginia making any regulations of commerce as between their respective ports or over their respective waters which would interfere with the equal rights of citizens of the two States. It declared that the flag covered the cargo, and that the citizens of each State should have the right to be tried for all crimes and offenses committed on the waters of the Pocomoke, the Potomac, and the Chesapeake, by the courts of the State of which he was a citizen. It made the records of judicial proceedings in one State evidence in the other, and it provided for the accession of Pennsylvania and Delaware to it. The Articles of Confederation distinctly prohibited the States from "entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." The negotiations of the Compact of 1785 distinguished between treaty, alliance, or confederation, and the agreement between the two States, and they not only made the agreement between those two, but invited two others to unite with them in the agreement. The compact was promptly ratified by each State, and forms the law of each State to-day.

The consultations at Mount Vernon disclosed the identity of opinions between those present as to the evil and the remedy and the crying necessity for prompt action. The Articles of Confederation were worse than useless. The very compact they were arranging was a nullification of its plain provisions, while the one which they proposed, if accepted, would result in the subversion of the entire confederation. It was plain that if Delaware and Pennsylvania came into the compact of 1785 and thus secured free trade among themselves, then the other

States would hasten to clamor for admission to its benefits. Madison caused to be passed by the Virginia Legislature a resolution, calling on the States to meet in convention in Annapolis in 1786 to revise the Articles of Confederation. That convention was only attended by four of the States, and it issued another call for them all to send delegates to another convention of revision to meet at Philadelphia during the next year.

Virginia promptly selected Washington to head her delegation to that meeting, and associated with him Randolph, Madison, and Mason—three of the Mount Vernon negotiators—and the consultations for Union were transferred from Mount Vernon to Philadelphia, and the negotiations for it from two States to thirteen. On the meeting of the convention Washington was made president, and, although there is no record of his active participation in its debates, there is no doubt that his influence was potent in directing its action.

From the day he assumed command of the army at Cambridge he had suffered from the impotence of the Confederation. His practical mind understood that leagues and alliances between States can never withstand concentrated powers moving against them from the outside, and that dissension and difference in interest and sentiment will always produce feebleness in council and inefficiency in execution among themselves. From the beginning of the movement at Mount Vernon he was not anxious for any action at all as to the Articles of Confederation. The time had not come and opinion was not ripe for their total abrogation, and he wished no half-way measures. He wanted a *government*, not *influence*; for, as he said

about the Shay rebellion in Massachusetts, "*influence is not government.*"

The Confederation was an advisory body, where each party did as they pleased, and were constrained by no authority save their own sense of right. Washington knew that the Union, which he considered the great guarantee of public liberty and individual happiness and prosperity, required a concrete government, a law-making power to make laws, a judicial power to construe them, and an executive to administer them. He and Randolph arrived at the conclusion, early in the discussion, that the laws must be made by the people, for the people, and be applied to the people. No scheme would operate or last which looked to coercing States; that would lead to war, and the idea of coercion of States was fatal to Union and destructive to liberty.

But they believed that a government might be constructed that, passing by the State governments, would directly represent the citizens, and would operate on the citizens. They had no conception of the idea of a citizenship of the United States apart from the citizenship of the State, but they believed that, securing and preserving the autonomy of States, they would thereby secure the highest guarantee for the perpetuation of the Union, the Union being constructed of a number of States whose citizens became citizens of the Union and on whom the Union operated directly.

With infinite labor, patience, perseverance, and courage, Washington labored in support of the "Virginia plan" introduced in the convention by Mr. Randolph for the new government, and all his influence was exerted toward the creation of a government to

operate on individuals and not on States. George Mason separated from his associate negotiators of the Compact of 1785, and resolutely opposed any plan to create a government with centralized power. The idea of a government that governs prevailed over that of one that advises, and the Constitution of the United States was adopted by the convention, and sent to the States for ratification. Then began the greatest, most pregnant labor of Washington's life. If it can be said "he was the Revolution," it is beyond doubt equally true that "he was the Constitution and the Union."

From the day the convention adjourned at Philadelphia until the ratification by the ninth State fulfilled the terms upon which the Constitution was to be put into operation, his correspondence was incessant, copious, all-pervading. He wrote to gentlemen in different States that they must become members of their State conventions to which the Constitution was to be submitted for ratification. He substantially appointed the Convention of Maryland, for he selected the leading members of it. He wrote Johnson that the Constitution ought to be ratified at once, without conditions or amendments. He was not satisfied with it, and some features of it he probably never would assent to, but it was the best that could be done, and the only present means of preserving peace and the Union. The action of New York and Massachusetts was very uncertain. Rhode Island and North Carolina had promptly rejected it. New Hampshire was hanging back, and if the vote of Virginia was to be permitted to be the casting vote, the vanity of that State, he wrote, would be so much inflamed that her action would be very doubtful. If,

however, Maryland promptly accepted the new form of government, this would place its ratification by nine States beyond doubt, and render the position of Virginia of little consequence. The situation would ultimately decide her to join the Union. It would be a necessity. The Maryland Convention, accepting the orders from Mount Vernon, ratified the Constitution, and adjourned while a committee to consider amendments, raised on motion of William Paca, was out, and that committee of the last century has not reported to this day.

When the Constitution was accepted by eleven States, its author and creator of necessity became its director, and was selected, by the unanimous vote of all the States and the unanimous wish of all the people, to put it in operation. He secured the election in the different States of men selected by him, known to him, and esteemed by him, to constitute the first Congress. He had great doubts about the success of the experiment, but he was determined that he would give every energy of mind, heart, and body to insure it. He was convinced that the paramount, overreaching, all-pervading duty of patriotism was to secure a perpetual union of all the States. He was convinced that the first step toward that, beyond government or administration, above mere constitutional arrangements, was to secure the valley of the Ohio to the seaboard by proper commercial connections. Hence the Potomac and the James River Companies and the Compact of 1785.

With this territory, bound together by social and material ties, he believed a State would be founded which would eventually include the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, and the islands of the West Indies, and

he foresaw the time when the Gulf of Mexico would become an American sea, dominated by the arts and the arms, the intelligence and the valor of the Union. The key of Washington's whole conduct for the rest of his life will be found in this deep faith of his in the manifest destiny of the Union.

There was a great deal of human nature in him, and he resented the conduct of the British Government toward the Americans during the war. Theories about taxation without representation, and trials without juries, did not affect his mind so much; but he felt bitterly to the day of his death—as did all the men of that time—the hiring of the Hessians to ravage and destroy, and the inciting of the Indians to all the horrors of savage warfare. He insisted on his Americanism—that the American, in courage, in intellect, in force and vigor, in regard for justice and right and reverence for truth, was the equal of any race that ever lived, and he repudiated for himself, his compatriots, and his country, that provincialism which looks to other social conditions for standards for morals or other political systems for ideas and models. He believed that the American was to develop a new race and a new civilization, which for power, for energy, for virtue, and for valor has never been equaled in this world. For this reason he laid down the broad principle, ever since received by the Republic, that America never would enter into the politics of Europe nor be bound by entangling alliances with it. This doctrine was afterward applied by Mr. Monroe to mean that, as America took no part in the disputes of Europe, Europe should not acquire interests in America, so as to embroil herself in American interests.

And it seems as if the doctrine of nonintervention was to apply not only to the two American continents and the Atlantic islands on the American coast, but as well to the archipelagoes of the Pacific. By the Treaty of Peace the British were to deliver possession of the posts in the Northwest to the Americans. They did not do so, and during President Washington's first term he was constantly harassed by the apprehension that they would stir up the savages against the outlying settlements in the vast counties of Illinois and Kentucky.

As the French Revolution developed he never was sanguine that any great good would result from the destruction of institutions which were the growth of centuries. He saw the suffering that would surely ensue; the benefits that were to grow out of it he failed to appreciate. He organized his government with Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State; Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Henry Knox, Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph, Attorney General. Hamilton and Randolph had served on his staff, and Knox had been known and trusted since the camp at Cambridge. Jefferson was the only one who had not been a soldier and a comrade. He had been American minister to France, where he had fraternized with that Revolution, and adopted some of the most extreme ideas of the French philosophy of human rights.

On the breaking out of the war in Europe the sympathies of the Americans naturally crystallized around France, and the French Revolutionary Government claimed the assistance of the United States against Great Britain as guaranteed by the Treaty of Alliance. Washington loved Lafayette, he liked

De Rochambeau and De Grasse, and many French comrades of the war, but he never did admire French ways; their demonstrativeness, their effusion, were offensive to him; and while he was anxious to fulfill all the obligations of public faith, he was equally anxious to afford the Americans opportunity to build up their enormous country and develop their great destiny by the arts of peace.

The Union was his highest aspiration, and peace and neutrality had become necessary to the Union. Hamilton gave as his opinion that the other party to the Treaty of Alliance having ceased to exist, its successor—the Revolutionary Government—could not claim the benefit of its treaties. Jefferson claimed that the treaty was made with the French nation, which lives forever, and therefore the treaty bound the American succession to the Confederation, as well as the French Republic succeeding the monarchy. Washington decided with Hamilton—properly decided, but on the wrong ground. Treaties are not modified by changes in the form of government of the contracting parties, but continue in force as long as the contractors choose to perform their obligations. But for that very reason there can be no perpetual treaty. No Government can bind the future forever, and the same right to change forms of government, of which each nation must, of course, be the sole judge for itself, must reserve to each party the right to release itself from the obligations of any treaty upon fair notice.

The United States preserved their neutrality. The first duty presented to the new Government was that of creating public credit and public revenue. Hamilton, in a report unequalled in any language in

any age of the world for grasp of conditions, for appreciation of principles, for vigor of intellect, proposed as the first step toward rehabilitation of credit, that the Union should assume all the debts of all the States created in the course of the war in the common enterprise. Washington understood that such a measure would draw large and powerful interests to the support of a government on maintenance of which their property depended, and he urged the measure with all his influence. It was adopted as part of a compromise by which the site of the Federal city was finally fixed on the Potomac River, at the mouth of Rock Creek.

The revenue measure was unfortunately conceived. It levied a tax on distilled spirits in the hands of the manufacturer. Hamilton was neither an Englishman nor an American. He was West Indian by birth, and he knew nothing by observation of the deep-seated aversion people have for tax-gatherers spying about their houses. But theoretically a tax on spirits was an ideal tax. It taxed a luxury; no one need pay it unless he chose to use spirits, and it would be cheaply and easily collected. These theoretical views did not turn out to be practical. The mountaineers from Fort Pitt to King's Mountain flew to arms and drove the Federal tax-gatherers from their borders.

In 1785 there had been an insurrection against the State authorities of Massachusetts, led by one Shay, and Washington had been urgent upon the Governor that it was of the greatest importance that the power of Government should be promptly exhibited, and the rising suppressed without a moment's delay and by the strong hand. "We must

show to the world," said he, "that we have a *government* which will *govern*, and not *advise*." As soon as he was assured that rebellion against the Union had arisen in Pennsylvania, he made Congress pass a law authorizing him to call out the militia to suppress any insurrection anywhere; and he issued his proclamation calling out the militia of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and appointed Light Horse Harry, Governor Lee, of Virginia, to command them.

The States furnished fifteen thousand troops, and Washington accompanied them as far as Bedford, in Pennsylvania. Lee moved farther west, but the insurrection dispersed. Some of the leaders were arrested and tried by the Federal Court at Philadelphia and convicted of treason, and were pardoned by the President. The necessary lesson that there was a government which could and would govern had been taught.

By one of the curious antitheses of history, the only other time the power of the President to call out the militia to suppress rebellion was exercised, was when it was invoked to suppress rebellion led by the Governor of Virginia and the son of Light Horse Harry Lee. Washington assumed control of the Government impressed with the idea that better government could be obtained by ignoring those differences of opinion that must exist in free societies, and the organizations that of necessity arise to enforce policies. The great difference that had arisen before the Constitutional Convention was whether or not the Articles of Confederation should be revised or a new government formed; and in the convention itself, whether the new government to be or-

ganized should be founded on States or on the people. Hamilton and Edmund Randolph favored a consolidated government, with great powers to operate directly on the people; William Patterson, of New Jersey, and Patrick Henry advocated a government representing sovereign States, of whom the Federal agent should be the representative, and connected with the people only through the States. The Constitution was a compromise between the two theories, but was more largely impressed with the ideas of Randolph than those of Patterson. It was a Virginian victory, to be, in the future, the source of unnumbered woes to her.

The new Government was organized on the principle of ignoring these radical differences. Hamilton was placed at the head of finance, and Randolph made supervisor of the administration of the laws, while Jefferson, just returned from France, where he had signalized himself as the ardent sympathizer with the radical democracy of the Revolution, was charged with the conduct of foreign affairs and exterior relations. It required the experience of four years to convince the President that popular government can only be carried on by means of parties—organizations of citizens who agree in desiring that certain things shall be done and certain policies be applied to public affairs, and who agree to join together in united effort to secure the objects of their desires. Mr. Jefferson, the radical Democrat, did not agree on any single principle with Mr. Hamilton, the conservative Republican. The one believed that mankind had sufficient virtue, intelligence, and self-control to organize society so as to secure the largest happiness to the great body of the citizenship.

Col. Hamilton, referring to the history of the English race and the experience of mankind, believed that liberty and happiness could only be obtained and retained by constant struggle against the selfishness of human nature; that the strong would oppress the weak, the wise would take advantage of the simple, unless they were restrained by the whole of society acting through a strong government. Mr. Jefferson believed that the less government there was, the better for the happiness, the liberty, and the security of the people. Mr. Hamilton was convinced that happiness, liberty, and security would all be lost unless preserved by a powerful government; that reliance upon the virtue and patriotism and unselfishness of individuals to protect the weak and preserve their rights would be found by experience to be futile, and that selfishness would prove to be the radical motive of general human action. Such opinions of necessity produced clashing acts. The advocates of Union gathered around Hamilton, and he selected all his agents in administering his great office from among them. Jefferson selected people who sympathized with him to carry out his plans and to advocate his ideas and to expound his democratic principles.

Washington, after a worrying experience, became convinced that his preconceived idea that government could be administered on nonpartisan lines by nonpartisans was radically wrong; and he became equally well satisfied that to carry on a government for free people, its conduct must accord with their opinions and sympathize with their sentiments; that a government of opinion must be operated along the line of that opinion, and this required that every

agent, from President to tide waiter, must sympathize with and earnestly support that opinion. The idea that a government of opinion could or would be successfully conducted by agents, principals, or subordinates opposed to such opinion and hostile to its development, was effectually refuted in President Washington's mind.

Early in 1793 war was declared between Great Britain and France. After mature consideration by the Cabinet, the policy of neutrality was determined upon, and Randolph drafted the proclamation which has been the model for precise statement and the basis of the policy of neutrality which has been practiced by the United States ever since, and which has as much as any one thing contributed to the enfranchisement, the development, and the perpetuity of the Union of the States. Directly after the proclamation of neutrality Genet landed at Charleston as minister from the Revolutionary Government of France to the United States of America. The Gallic temperament is never inclined to minimize its own importance or to diminish the value of the achievements of its people. In the great gallery of pictures of French exploits at St. Cloud is a conspicuous representation of the surrender of a British army under Lord Cornwallis to a French one under the General Count de Rochambeau and Admiral Count de Grasse, at Yorktown, in America; and at that period among the French the American Revolution was regarded as an achievement of French statesmanship executed by French arms.

The part played by the Americans was regarded as merely subsidiary and insignificant. As the British had Indian allies, so the French had American

auxiliaries, only differing from the other in degrees of barbarism. Of course, among French officers, the aristocracy, and the educated classes generally, a clearer appreciation of the conditions obtained; but the French democracy believed that America was the creation and should be the creature of France. Mr. Genet, therefore, upon landing, assumed the part of a Roman proconsul taking possession of a conquered province, or a British political agent *advising* an Indian rajah. He began at once to equip vessels, arm them, man them, and send them out with letters of marque to attack British commerce on the high seas. He authorized and ordered all French consuls in American ports to sit as courts of admiralty and to adjudicate all questions of prize of war.

The general American feeling was partial to France and bitter against England, and Genet's measures and movements were hailed with enthusiasm wherever he went in the Southern country. His route was a triumphal march from Charleston to Philadelphia. His letters of marque began to bring in prizes to Charleston and to Norfolk, and there was profit as well as glory and danger in attacking the British under the French flag. Privateers multiplied, and in a few months would swarm the seas. Genet brought an English prize, the *Little Sarah*, to Philadelphia, where he proceeded to fit her out as a fighting ship. Mifflin, ex-quartermaster general and ex-President of the Board of War of the Confederacy, was then Governor of Pennsylvania, and in concert with Alexander Hamilton took appropriate steps to arrest the vessel and prevent the infraction of the proclamation.

Jefferson, alarmed for his friends, the French,

applied to Genet to stop his illegal proceedings. Genet frankly declined to engage that the vessel should not sail, but stated that she would not be ready before Wednesday. Upon this statement Jefferson procured Mifflin's guard to be withdrawn, and the *Little Sarah*, rechristened *La Petite Democrat*, dropped down the river and lay in the stream opposite Chester. Genet then promised that the vessel should not sail until the President, absent at Mount Vernon, should decide as to the legality of his action. While Washington was hurrying from Mount Vernon, *La Petite Democrat* went to sea, and the Secretary of State went to the country.

The affair of Genet brought matters to a crisis. The Secretary of State had two years before brought Philip Freneau, a writer, to Philadelphia, paid him out of the public purse as a sinecure clerk in the State Department, and established him in charge of the organ of the Jeffersonian Radical Democracy, the *National Gazette*. The propaganda of the new philosophy distinguished itself by a prompt attack on the Hamiltonian theories and the Federalists. Of course this led to opposition to the chief of the Federalists, the President, and criticism of his policy, his principles, his manners, and his morals.

Curious as it seems now, the leaders of the Democracy pretended to believe, and taught their disciples to believe, during the three first presidential terms—the two of Washington and the one of John Adams—that there was a deep-seated purpose in the minds of the Federalists to establish a monarchical government in America, on the basis of the Federal Union, and as a preparation for this to introduce aristocratic customs in social life. Wash-

ington always opened the Congress in person, reading his address to them from manuscript. He made a general rule that the President of the United States would return no calls nor accept social invitations. He set apart a day for the reception of everybody, gentle and simple, but he received them standing, and they were presented to him individually by name by one of his aids-de-camp. He invariably wore a velvet suit, silk stockings, lace ruffles, a dress sword, and powder. This was the custom of the society in which he had been reared in Fairfax, at Williamsburg, at Belvoir, and the way he was accustomed to live at Mount Vernon.

He had been occupying a conspicuous and responsible place—the most conspicuous and responsible in America—for twenty years, and position and power of necessity produce dignity and gravity in the possessor. But these simple, reasonable, and necessary social rules gave real offense to many, and were made the pretext of complaint by some. The clerk of the Secretary of State filled the National Gazette with complaints of the aping of regal state by his Excellency. Powdered hair was held up to special detestation as a sign of aristocracy and a mark of gentle birth and breeding.

So the Democrats attended on the President's levees with plain hair and unpowdered heads. After one of these official functions, a friend found Mrs. Martha busily engaged going through the parlors with a maid and a basin, soap and towel, erasing from the walls the marks made by the unpowdered heads of the callers of the preceding evening by reposing their unwigged craniums against her freshly whitened walls. "Why, Mrs. Washington, what in

the name of goodness are you about?" cried the visitor. "Oh, those dirty Democrats!" was the tidy housewife's reply, pointing to the spots made by Democratic polls on the walls. With such a temper "in kitchen and in castle hall" an issue was soon made. In August, 1793, the French Government was requested to recall Mr. Genet, who, deprived of his official status and relieved of his political inflammation, remained in the country, and lived and died a good patriotic American citizen. But the issue with Genet proved that Jefferson and the Democracy were not to control the policy of the country. Events soon demonstrated that as long as Washington was President they were not to exert any influence over it. In the following year (1794) he sent Thomas Pinckney, of South Carolina, to Spain, who negotiated a treaty which defined the boundaries of Florida, and secured to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi. The termination of the war had left the Americans with feelings of bitter hatred, detestation, and horror toward the British and the Tories. The enormities of the invading troops engaged in suppressing the rebellion are almost incredible. The British sacked the town of New Haven and carried off the library of Yale College, as they did also at Princeton and Williamsburg.

It is recorded that "Arnold, after his Virginia raid, returned to New York rich as a nabob with the plunder of Virginia. Phillips was now sent to make his fortune out of what Arnold left unplundered." Judge Thomas Jones, an eminent New York judge under the royal Government of one of the richest and most aristocratic families of the province who adhered to the loyal side, has left a History of New

York during the Revolutionary War, which has been recently published. He says: "The war, in fact, was not levied at rebellion, but at the Treasury of Great Britain; at his Majesty's loyal subjects within the lines; indiscriminately against all persons wherever the army moved; against erudition, religion, and literature in general. Public libraries were robbed, colleges ruined, and churches of all denominations burned and destroyed; while plunder, robberies, peculation, whoring, gaming, and all kinds of dissipations were cherished, nursed, encouraged, and openly countenanced."

General Fitzpatrick, with Sir William Howe's army advancing to the occupation of Philadelphia, wrote to his sister-in-law, Lady Ossory, "from the Head of Elk River, Maryland, September 1, 1777," on the advance to Brandywine: "The scene we are witnesses to is the most vile and execrable that can be conceived. A soldier of ours was yesterday taken by the enemy beyond our lines, *who had chopped off an unfortunate woman's fingers in order to plunder her of her rings*. I really think the return of this army to England is to be dreaded by the peaceable inhabitants, and will occasion a prodigious increase of business for Sir J. Fielding and Jack Ketch. I am sure the office of the latter can never find more deserving objects for its exercise."

In addition to the native British ruffian and brutal Hessian, the Administration called to its aid the red savages of the wilderness, armed them, and set them loose. They offered and paid rewards for scalps without regard to age or sex; that of the babe in arms was merchantable as well as that of feeble old age, that of the matron or maid as well

as that of stalwart ranger or sturdy farmer. War is barbarism. It is the release of the fierce, bad passions of men from the moral and physical restraint imposed by generations of self-control. But there is no law in war but the law of force. The strongest do as they please; and in a war of invasion, suppressing a rebellion, all restraints of religion, morals, sentiment, and right are thrown aside, and its taint infects everything, and must be destroyed. It was so in 1688, after Monmouth's rebellion; it was so in 1745, after Charles Edward's rising; and it was so in 1775-'81, and always will be so. The revival of such memories would be detrimental, if unnecessary; but their recall is now useful to better understand the next episode and trial in Washington's life.

The Treaty of Peace had bound the English to surrender to the United States all the military posts on the lakes and west of the Ohio. With a profound sense of the importance of the Western country to the prosperity, the safety, and the glory of the United States, Washington had urged on the Confederation the necessity of securing the fulfillment of this treaty engagement. But the British Government deferred and delayed, postponed and procrastinated, until Washington became President. It had never gone beyond acknowledging the independence of the several States, but had never recognized the United States—the Union under the Constitution. It sent no minister to the Union, and received none from the Union. Inflamed by the passion the war had created—for he had felt none before—Washington became satisfied that the British intended to make a new effort at conquest.

It was this suspicion that was a potent force in

directing his energy, his mind, and his enthusiasm toward the prompt construction of a Union which would have concentrated power enough to resist the attack on liberty more vigorously than the Confederacy had been enabled to do. It was this feeling that prompted his first move at Mount Vernon in arranging the Compact of 1785, the Annapolis Convention of 1786, and that in Philadelphia in 1787. A speech was reported as having been made by Lord Dorchester at Montreal to a grand council of Indian chiefs, promising them that he would soon send them on the warpath against the Americans. At the same time the British Administration published an order in council substantially excluding American commerce from British West Indian ports.

Next to the Western country and the policy of neutrality, and as part of the same grand system to build up and solidify the Union, Washington desired peace. Arts, industry, happy labor, would, he knew, construct a powerful nation, which in time would lead the world in arts and arms, as in virtue and valor, intelligence and character. He wrote Lafayette, in 1791, "We must have the free navigation of the Mississippi, and we surely will have it if we remain a nation." Everything depended on that—peace, order, happiness, progress. He proposed to send Hamilton to England. But by this time it had become clear to him, that if he was to administer the Government on the lines of the policy he had marked out, he could only do it by the assistance of those who believed in that policy and in him. Mr. Jefferson had diverged so far from the President that both became convinced that it was wisest to sever official relations. The Secretary of State resigned,

and Mr. Randolph, the Attorney-General, was promoted to the place. After a short service Randolph retired, on account of some captured dispatches sent by the French minister to his Government, reflecting on Randolph's official conduct, and sent by the captors to the British minister at Philadelphia. Washington offered the portfolio to Thomas Johnson, his old partner in the Ohio and Potomac Companies, who had nominated him for commander in chief, who had been the first State Governor of Maryland, and filled the place of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, until forced to resign by ill health. He urged Johnson to accept the duty, for, said he, "there has never been a time in which the services of tried friends of the Government were as much needed as they are now." Johnson, though a younger man than Washington by some months, insisted that his age relieved him from the duty and incapacitated him for the labor, and so declined. He then invited Patrick Henry to take the place, and upon his declining, offered it to Timothy Pickering. Pickering, in the Continental Congress, representing Massachusetts, had been one of the coterie of which the Adamses and James Lovell were members, who criticised Washington's "Fabian policy" during the war, and who always opposed his recommendations for a regular army. He was not, therefore, bound to the President by sentimental ties, but he was an able man, a sincere patriot, and a convinced Federalist. He believed the system of a Federal Union was wise, was strong, and could be successfully operated, and would serve to maintain liberty.

Washington had directed Gouverneur Morris, who was going to England on private business, to sound

the British Government unofficially as to when the surrender of the Western posts might be expected, the complete execution of the treaty would be carried out and ministers interchanged, and as to the feasibility of negotiating a commercial treaty. Morris made advances, was repelled with indifference bordering on insolence, and reported that nothing was to be done, except that they would send a minister to the United States. In due time George Hammond arrived, and almost immediately opened a spirited correspondence with Mr. Jefferson concerning Mr. Genet's notorious violation of treaty rights by fitting out privateers in American ports to prey upon the British.

The dismissal of Genet got matters into better train, and Washington returned to his fixed purpose to establish certain relations with Great Britain. If she intended to live up to the treaty in good faith he intended to know it. If she purposed to use it as a cloak to cover designs of future aggression on American commerce or the Western country, he intended to know that. He was clear in his conviction that the new nation could only vindicate its right to live by being ready at all times to defend that right by arms. A people that will not fight for their rights have none, was his belief.

The proposition to send Hamilton as minister plenipotentiary met with such an acrid opposition from the Jeffersonian Democracy that he gave it up, and selected John Jay, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, a man of ability, spotless character, experience in affairs of learning, and thoroughly imbued with the American ideas of the President. Jay was a gentleman and an accom-



plished man of the world, and was received with the distinction due to his personal character, his social standing, and his official position by the society of London. He was presented, and kissed the Queen's hand, which was denounced as a grave infraction of republican principles by the Jeffersonians.

He negotiated a treaty which provided for the payment by the United States of debts due to British merchants, as settled by arbitration, for surrender of the Western posts on July 1, 1796, and that Americans should have the right to trade with the West Indies on condition that they should not transport the productions of those colonies to Europe. It secured the right to trade direct with the colonies of Great Britain in the East or the West, but excluded the right to participate in the carrying trade between those countries, and also between them and Europe. The commercial clauses were entirely unsatisfactory to the American aspiration for freer trade. They felt already the pulsations of the growing vigor which will in time make them lords of the seas; and the seaboard, from Boston to Charleston, blazed with indignant protests against the treaty, and was lighted by the burning of John Jay's effigy.

Washington determined to sign the treaty, as the best that could be done at that time, after the Senate had ratified it, on condition that the West India article should be modified. But before anything definite was done, the British Government, with British insolence, put its own construction on the unratified treaty by ordering the seizure of all vessels carrying provisions to France or French territories and allies. That is, they declared the high seas a *mare clausum*, to be regulated and used at the will

of Great Britain. No such storm of popular indignation against any public act of public officials has ever been raised in the United States as that exhibited against Jay's Treaty.

Public meetings at Boston, at New York, at Baltimore, at Richmond—presided over by Chancellor Wythe, in Richmond, by Livingston in New York, Rodney in Delaware, Christopher Gadsden and the Rutledges in South Carolina—all denounced the sale of American rights of free trade on the high seas. Washington disapproved of the agreement, but it was the best that could be done at that time. It settled the question of the Western posts and the Western country, that was extremely pressing and demanded prompt settlement.

That other question of equal rights for American commerce on the high seas, and freer trade with all the world, his broad mind knew would settle itself in time. If the United States became strong enough to maintain its claim to rights by arms, they would be conceded; if not, not. And it required another war with Great Britain to settle the right, in which the military genius of the American race was exhibited on land and sea, and the right to a free flag established, never to be questioned by any power which shall ever arise in this world. The War of 1812 was waged to resist the British claim to the right of search and of impressment on the high seas. The treaty of 1815 made peace between the belligerents, without referring to the *casus belli*, but the right of search and the right of impressment perished under the thunder of American guns, and since then has been as dead as the first Pharaoh.

Therefore, content to do what could be done,

confident that the future could take care of itself, immovable by popular clamor and impenetrable to popular rage, on August 18, 1795, he signed the Jay Treaty. The episode of the Jay Treaty was but another illustration of the powerful intellect of Washington. His indomitable will had been known of all men for the preceding twenty years. But the country needed peace—rest to grow; that secured, everything would be safe. The constant threat from the Spaniard and the British was on the Western border.

At any moment Indian war might break out from the Ohio to the Savannah. The counties of Kentucky and Illinois would at once seize the British posts on the lakes and the Spanish garrison at the mouth of the Mississippi, and the country be precipitated into a war with Spain and Great Britain, instigated by them through their savage agents. He therefore took the step to guarantee peace and save the Union. Maritime rights must settle themselves in time. The creation of a great, large, wide-spreading Americanism, which would obliterate petty local jealousies and provincial narrowness, and would embrace the continent in its patriotism and the illimitable future in its hope, was the most earnest desire of Washington's heart.

He was the most direct man that ever lived, and as clear-sighted. He saw as far and went as straight to his object as any statesman of history. But he was also gifted with an intuition into character and motive which was almost unerring. He never made a mistake about men but twice. He sometimes did about policies. But his treatment of the Jay controversy was an interesting exhibition of sagacity and tact. The selectmen of Boston sent him the

burning protest of the town meeting against the ratification of the treaty. He answered the whole proceeding with a phrase. His reply to them is dated, "United States, 28th of July, 1795." It is the only instance in his whole life where he dated any paper in this way. But the phrase told the whole story: The United States to the town of Boston; the grand, magnificent whole—custodian of the happiness, the hopes, the aspirations of untold generations yet to be born—to the infinitesimal part, about a question of present barter, exchange, and trade. That was the thought he presented to the world in the date of his letter to Boston.

Washington had been elected to the presidency a second time by the unanimous vote of the electoral colleges, and there was a general desire that he should serve for a third term. But he felt that he had done his duty, and earned his retirement from public life and the enjoyment of domestic comfort. In September, 1796, he issued his farewell address—a paper unequalled in the language for grasp of intellect, for patriotic sentiment, and for prophetic forecast. In it he set forth the principles which had guided him since the definitive Treaty of Peace had established the United States. "Be united," he said, "be AMERICANS. . . . Observe justice and good faith toward all nations, . . . and be independent politically of all. In a word, be a nation, be AMERICANS, and be true to yourselves." The "nation" that he exhorted them to form was a homogeneous race, controlling geographical territory with the same political institutions, united by identity of descent, customs, traditions and principles. But Washington never dreamed of a Nation which would obliterate State lines and

local institutions, and reduce the historic States to the status of counties.

He supported the administration of John Adams, who succeeded him in 1797 as the lineal successor to his policy. Adams sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry as ministers plenipotentiary to France, to negotiate a treaty with the French Republic. The gentlemen of the Directory demanded \$6,400,000 from the United States by way of loan to the Republic, and a bonus of \$250,000 to the Directory themselves. The American envoys spurned the demand with spirit. They remained in Paris seeking to come to some understanding. The Directory emphasized their view of the unreasonableness of the American position by passing a decree subjecting to capture neutral vessels and their cargoes if any portion of such cargoes were of British manufacture. As the Americans controlled the carrying trade of the world, this was equivalent to a confiscation of their commerce.

Congress promptly authorized the President to enlist ten thousand men as a provisional army to be called into actual service in case of war. Adams nominated Washington to be lieutenant general and commander in chief of all the armies raised or to be raised, on July 3, 1798, and he was confirmed the next day. He was then sixty-six years and five months old, a vigorous, hale man. He might have discharged the duties of commander in chief in the field, but the experiment was a doubtful one. He himself was of the opinion that the senior generals of the last war were too old for active service, and therefore selected Alexander Hamilton for inspector general and chief of staff, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and

Henry Knox to have the rank of major generals in the order named.

The view which Washington had taken concerning the old generals was justified, as the exception in favor of Knox was not, by the event. Knox refused to serve under Hamilton and Pinckney, both of whom he had ranked in the old army sixteen years before. But Pinckney promptly accepted, with the offer that, if it would reconcile General Knox, he would give up second place to him and take the junior rank himself. Early in November, 1798, Washington went to Philadelphia to consult with his two major generals and the Secretary of War. Five weeks were spent on this work, and the result was reduced to form by Hamilton, signed by Washington, and forwarded to the Secretary of War, James McHenry. The organization of the army was perfected on paper. He proposed Alexander Hamilton, inspector; Charles C. Pinckney, Henry Knox, or, if either refuses, Henry Lee, with the rank of major generals; Henry Lee—if not a major general—John Brooks, William S. Smith, or John E. Howard, brigadiers; Edward Hand, or Jonathan Dayton, or William S. Smith, adjutant general; Edward Carrington, quartermaster general; James Craik, director of the hospital. Washington never believed that there would be a French invasion. Acting on his lifelong principle, that the best way to prevent war was to be prepared for it, he arranged for the collection of his army, its organization and its mobilization. The promptness with which the Americans took up the glove satisfied the French. Their governors were changed, and the new organization opened negotiations with the United States for a peaceful set-

tlement. John Quincy Adams, then envoy to Paris, made an amicable adjustment, and war was averted. But Washington did not live to see the restoration of peace. At Mount Vernon he was busy, since his return from Philadelphia on the expiration of his second term, in putting his farms in order, in restoring his property, which had been greatly impaired in his twenty years' absence, and in arranging his affairs generally. He erected a separate building for the safe keeping of his papers, military and civil, and employed a gentleman named Rawlins to record his vast and extended correspondence. He also gave to Tobias Lear, his old comrade and secretary, charge of all his papers, and supervised him in arranging and docketing them. No stranger of distinction came to America without calling at Mount Vernon to pay his respects to the greatest character of the age, as was the common phrase—"to gratify curiosity" was Washington's own word. They were invariably invited to stay to dinner and to remain overnight. The invitation was always accepted at the giving, and the acceptance was the custom of the country, and consequently the table of Mount Vernon from year's end to year's end was never without guests. As was the custom with all country gentlemen, Washington's work of the day was done in the morning—the largest part before breakfast, the remainder before noon. The host rises with the sun and rides over the plantation in early morning, to see that the machinery has been properly started and is working smoothly. The guests meet first at breakfast.

That was and is the custom at Virginian country houses on great estates. It prevails to-day at Westover, just as it did at Belvoir before the war, and at

Mount Vernon after the master had returned. The morning of December 12, 1799, was overcast and cloudy. He rode out as usual to make the rounds of his farms and look after his servants and his stock. By midday a light, powdery snow began to fall, which soon changed into a cold, drizzling rain, penetrating the clothes and pervading the lungs—such a rain as is usual in the Chesapeake region at that time of year. After being out two hours he came in, and declined to change his clothes, for he said they were dry, and had protected him perfectly. The next day he went out again, and that night he was taken with an acute sore throat—acute œdematous laryngitis is now known to be the scientific designation of it. Dr. James Craik, his comrade, friend, and medical adviser, was called in, who arrived with two other physicians. They bled him and administered calomel, and he died the next day. The medical treatment has been greatly criticised as ignorant, barbarous, and the cause of his death. It seems that this criticism is unjust, and the highest authorities as specialists on diseases of the throat of the present day say that the science and skill of Washington's medical attendants were fully up to the standard of medical knowledge in Virginia and in America at that day. At this time the case would be conducted differently, but it was treated with the best knowledge that any one had at that time. He had directed Colonel Lear that his body should not be placed in the vault for three days after his death, and the funeral took place on the 18th of December, 1799. It was attended by the militia, Free Masons and corporation of Alexandria, and his many friends from the neighborhood.

The world stood uncovered out of respect for the illustrious dead, and America mourned him as her best-beloved son. He was the first, as he is still the greatest, American. The Congress wore black during the session. When the news of his death reached England, Lord Bridport, who commanded sixty sail of the line lying at Torbay, lowered his flag half mast, every ship doing the same; and the First Consul of France, Napoleon Bonaparte, in announcing his death to the army in a general order, directed that all the flags and standards of the armies of France and service of the Republic should be draped in crape for ten days.

APPENDIX.

GENERAL CHARLES LEE was captured by a patrol of thirty dragoons of Burgoyne's Regiment of Queen's Light Dragoons (Sixteenth Regiment), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, afterward Earl Harcourt. Banastre Tarleton was in charge of the advance of six men. Lee's party and guard fired on the British horse, and several men were killed or wounded, but Lee surrendered at once, and, as all accounts agree, in the most pusillanimous manner. He was considered a deserter in the British army, and he was doubtful if his surrender would be accepted. Sir William Howe without doubt preferred to hang him, and only Washington's firmness and Howe's law doubts gave Lee reprieve until he could make his proposals for treachery. The original paper in Lee's handwriting, found among the papers of Sir Henry Strachey, endorsed "Mr. Lee's plan, 29th March, 1777," has been sold at auction in New York since this work went to press. It belonged to the estate of George H. Moore, formerly Librarian of the New York Historical Society, who published the evidence then known in the case under the title, "The Treason of Charles Lee, Major General, Second in Command in the American Army of the Revolution" (New York, 1860), in which is reproduced in facsimile the autograph "Plan of Mr. Lee." Mr. Lee's plan certainly was adopted by General Howe in part, and in his movement on Philadelphia, but more curious still, it seems to have been the plan of the War Office of the British Government in the War of 1812-'14 for the occupation of the line of the Po-

tomac and the Chesapeake by the capture of Washington and Baltimore.

“MR. LEE’S PLAN—29TH MARCH, 1777.

“As on the one hand it appears to me that by the continuance of the War America has no chance of obtaining the ends She proposes to herself; that altho by struggling She may put the Mother Country to very serious expence both in blood and Money, yet She must in the end, after great desolation, havock and slaughter, be reduc’d to submit to terms much harder than might probably be granted at present—and as on the other hand Great Britain tho’ ultimately victorious, must suffer very heavily even in the process of her victories, every life lost and every guinea spent being in fact worse than thrown away: it is only wasting her own property, shedding her own blood and destroying her own strength; and as I am not only persuaded from the high opinion I have of the humanity and good sense of Lord and General Howe that the terms of accommodation will be as moderate as their powers will admit, but that their powers are more ample than their Successors (shou’d any accident happen) wou’d be vested with, I think myself not only justifiable but bound in conscience to furnish all the lights, I can, to enable ’em to bring matters to a conclusion in the most compendious manner and consequently the least expensive to both Parties—I do this with the more readiness as I know the most generous use will be made of it in all respects—their humanity will incline ’em to have consideration for Individuals who have acted from Principle and their good sense will tell ’em that the more moderate are the general conditions; the more solid and permanent will be the union for if the conditions were extremely repugnant to the general way of thinking, it would be only the mere patchwork of a day which the first breath of wind will discompose and the first symptoms of a rupture betwixt the Bourbon Powers and Great Britain absolutely overturn—but I really have no apprehensions of this kind whilst Lord and General Howe have the direction of affairs, and flatter myself that under their auspices an ac-

commodation may be built on so solid a foundation as not to be shaken by any such incident—in this persuasion and on these principles I shall most sincerely and zealously contribute all in my power to so desirable an end, and if no untoward accidents fall out which no human foresight can guard against I will answer with my life for the success.

“From my present situation and ignorance of certain facts I am sensible that I hazard proposing things which cannot without difficulties be comply'd with; I can only act from surmise, therefore hope allowances will be made for my circumstances. I will suppose then that (exclusive of the Troops requisite for the security of Rhode Island and N. York) General Howe's Army (comprehending every species, British, Hessians and Provincials) amounts to twenty thousand men capable to take the field and act offensively; by which I mean to move to any part of the Continent where occasion requires—I will suppose that the General's design with this force is to clear the Jersey's and take possession of Philadelphia—but in my opinion the taking possession of Philadelphia will not have any decisive consequences—the Congress and People adhering to the Congress have already made up their minds for the event; already They have turn'd their eyes to other places where They can fix their seat of residence, carry on in some measure their Government; in short expecting this event They have devis'd measures for protracting the War in hopes of some favourable turn of affairs in Europe—the taking possession therefore of Philadelphia or any or two Towns more, which the General may have in view, will not be decisive—to bring matters to a conclusion, it is necessary to unhinge or dissolve, if I may so express myself, the whole system or machine of resistance, or in other terms, Congress Government—this system or machine, as affairs now stand, depends entirely on the circumstances and disposition of the People of Maryland Virginia and Pennsylvania—if the Province of Maryland or the greater part of it is reduc'd or submits, and the People of Virginia are prevented or intimidated from marching aid to the Pennsylvania Army the whole machine is dissolv'd and a period put to the War,

to accomplish which, is, the object of the scheme which I now take the liberty of offering to the consideration of his Lordship and the General, and if it is adopted in full I am so confident of the success that I wou'd stake my life on the issue—I have at the same time the comfort to reflect, that in pointing out measures which I know to be the most effectual I point out those which will be attended with no bloodshed or desolation to the Colonies. As the difficulty of passing and of re-passing the North River and the apprehensions from General Carleton's Army will I am confident keep the New Englanders at home, or at least confine 'em to the East side the River; and as their Provinces are at present neither the seat of Government strength nor Politicks I cannot see that any offensive operations against these Provinces wou'd answer any sort of Purpose—to secure N. York and Rhode Island against their attacks will be sufficient. On the supposition then, that General Howe's Army (including every species of Troops) amounts to twenty or even eighteen thousand men at liberty to move to any part of the Continent; as fourteen thousand will be more than sufficient to clear the Jersey's and take possession of Philadelphia, I wou'd propose that four thousand men be immediately embark'd in transports, one half of which shou'd proceed up the Patomac and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesepeak Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis. They will most probably meet with no opposition in taking possession of these Posts, and when possess'd they are so very strong by nature that a few hours work and some trifling artillery will secure them against the attacks of a much greater force than can possibly be brought down against them—their communication with the shipping will be constant and sure—for at Alexandria Vessels of a very considerable burthen (of five or six hundred Tons for instance) can lie in close to the shore, and at Annapolis within musket shot—all the necessaries and refreshments for an Army are near at hand, and in the greatest abundance—Kent Island will supply that of Annapolis and every part on both banks of the Patomac that of Alexandria. These Posts may with ease support each other, as it is but two easy days

march from one to the other, and if occasion requires by a single days march, They may join* and conjunctly carry on their operations wherever it shall be thought eligible to direct 'em; whether to take possession of Baltimore or post themselves on some spot on the Westward bank of the Susquehanna which is a point of the utmost importance—but here I must beg leave to observe that there is a measure which if the General assents to and adopts will be attended with momentous and the most happy consequences—I mean that from these Posts proclamations of pardon shou'd be issued to all those who come in at a given day, and I will answer for it with my life—that all the Inhabitants of that great tract southward of the Patapsico and lying betwixt the Patomac and Chesepeak Bay and those on the eastern Shore of Maryland will immediately lay down their arms—but this is not all, I am much mistaken if those potent and populous German districts, Frederic County in Maryland and York in Pennsylvania do not follow their example—These Germans are extremely numerous, and to a Man have hitherto been the most staunch Assertors of the American cause; but at the same time are so remarkably tenacious of their property and apprehensive of the least injury being done to their fine farms that I have no doubt when They see a probability of their Country becoming the seat of War They will give up all opposition but if contrary to my expectations a force should be assembled at Alexandria sufficient to prevent the Corps detach'd thither from taking possession immediately of the place, it will make no disadvantageous alteration, but rather the reverse—a variety of spots near Alexandria on either bank of the Patomac may be chosen for Posts equally well calculated for all the great purposes I have mention'd—viz—for

“* On the Road from Annapolis to Queen Anne there is one considerable River to be pass'd, but as the ships boats can easily be brought round from the Bay to the usual place of passage or Ferry, this is no impediment if the Two Corps chuse to unite They may by a single days march either at Queen Annes or Marlborough.”

the reduction or compulsion to submission of the whole Province of Maryland for the preventing or intimidating Virginia from sending aids to Pennsylvania—for in fact if any force is assembled at Alexandria sufficient to oppose the Troops sent against it, getting possession of it, it must be at the expence of the more Northern Army, as they must be compos'd of those Troops which were otherwise destin'd for Pennsylvania—to say all in a word, it will unhinge and dissolve the whole system of defence. I am so confident of the event that I will venture to assert with the penalty of my life if the plan is fully adopted, and no accidents (such as a rupture betwixt the Powers of Europe) intervenes that in less than two months from the date of the proclamation not a spark of this desolating war remains unextinguished in any part of the Continent."

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